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Editorials - 26-04-2022

What was isolated and seen as aberrations in India is now in plain sight in the 21st century, begging the question if we are truly modern

A picture on social media last week said so much about India today. Wasim Shaikh of Khargone in Madhya Pradesh stands in front of a piece of land cleared of a settlement. Shaikh’s ‘gumti’ or tiny grocery shop was razed to the ground on April 11 because he was said to have thrown stones during a communal riot a day earlier. Shaikh has no arms; he lost them in an accident in 2005. This does not matter. He is a Muslim in an area where there was violence and that is enough reason for the state to destroy his only source of income.

This is where India is heading, or where India has already reached. A society seemingly without humanity, which is violent, targets minorities, and has the state acting above the law.

The ‘naya’ India

Our ‘naya’ India is one of revenge and hate towards an imagined other. It is one where governments do not administer the law but flout it. It is one where, across India, gangs go about terrorising Muslims and if a riot ensues, the administration follows by destroying homes and workplaces of Muslims. It is one where the leadership of the dominant political party is silent — because this violence solidifies hate and reaps electoral dividends. It is one where the police seek guidance not to uphold peace but from what the political mood wants of it. It is one where the victims of violence are turned into suspects and thrown into jail without bail. It is one where courts often look the other way, or do nothing more than rap governments on the knuckles. And it is one where across all classes, those who are otherwise recognised as decent people feel a sense of satisfaction and even take pleasure at this violence against their fellow citizens. This is where we are as we celebrate 75 years as an independent nation.

The “demolition of law”, which is the best way to describe this bulldozer violence, comes with a fig leaf of legitimacy, of the clearing of illegally-occupied land. This everyone knows is only a cover for the fake news factories and the WhatsApp University to argue that the “law must follow its course”. This form of governance is supposed to have made the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh very popular. Now others are copying it. Gujarat is practising it and Madhya Pradesh has enthusiastically followed and both States head to the polls over the next 18 months. This new weapon reached Delhi last week, where the local administration, citing a technicality, was able to cock a snook at the Supreme Court, no less, for a couple of hours.

The bulldozer violence is the latest step in the march of state-encouraged communal violence across India. It is worsening by the day and what is shocking today becomes routine tomorrow. Lynching, and economic boycotts are now passé. New horrors pile on top of the old which have been forgotten. Who now remembers the 2015 lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq in Dadri, or the murder of 15-year-old Junaid in 2017 on his way home during Eid? Or even from just seven months ago of Moinul Haque of Assam, shot by the police when clearing “encroachments” and whose body was then stomped on by a photographer hired to record the events?

Now the open calls for killings of Muslims have become routine. When the first such event took place in Haridwar late last year, the local police were stirred to act half-heartedly. Now a police report in Delhi can boldly claim that such public calls for mass killings are only about protecting one’s religion.

Do we need to fear mass killings? As many have pointed out, you do not need to organise gruesome single-event communal violence, when the same result can be achieved with “1,000 cuts every day”. Across the country, even if mainly in the north and now in Karnataka too, there are gangs of volunteers to whom the work of harassment, intimidation and local killing has been “outsourced”. They are “freelancers”; they may not be a part of any political party and they may not receive any directions from political functionaries, but they have absorbed the poison of bigotry and do the work expected of them (https://tinyurl.com/2p8d6cn9).

Votes on communal lines

The actions of these vigilantes whip up hate and fear of the other, which, in turn, consolidates voter support that delivers election after election. It is not welfarism (labhartees , the word in Hindi for beneficiaries of government programmes) that is deciding elections. It is the consolidation of the vote on communal lines, plain and simple. It is pointless to ask the political leadership to speak out against mob violence when it is a part of a larger political atmosphere that has been harnessed so successfully at the polls.

If the mob is now free to target one minority, it will soon be emboldened to go after others. Which religious minority will be next? Which ‘lower’ caste will be next? The violence of vigilantes that is being carried out under the benign gaze of the state cannot be controlled. Soon it will outgrow its masters and India will end up reaping the whirlwind.

Pen-pushers like this writer think they can stir people’s conscience against the catastrophe that awaits us. But we are mistaken, we are impotent in the face of this tidal wave of violence that is driven by the ideology of revenge, muscular nationalism and inhumanity. All in the name of “righting historical wrongs”. The intense hatred of Muslims that is now being fanned is just another layer on top of the centuries-old violence against Dalits. It has brought to the surface a certain face of India that we did not want to acknowledge.

To modify the observations of the historian Upinder Singh, the messages of ‘shanti’ that Mahavira, Buddha, Ashoka and Gandhi preached were exceptions in the history of a couple of thousand years of a violent society. The violence of India is now there for us to see in full force in the 21st century, in what is supposed to be a modern nation governed by an exceptional Constitution.

There are exceptions and it is those strands of humanity that we must latch on to and hope that we will emerge from this tunnel. Like Madhulika Rajput of Karauli, Rajasthan, who gave protection to a dozen young Muslims and stood up to a gang that sought entry looking for Muslims (https://tinyurl.com/yu2b5sb8). Or the young Hindu shopkeeper in Jahangirpuri in Delhi who told a reporter, “I am a Hindu, he is a Muslim...we are friends, we help each other in distress...the mob is out to destroy our lives. I will stand, even if alone, in front of the masjid to protect it if a bulldozer comes to destroy it” (https://tinyurl.com/262fum2r).

We can only pin our hopes on the strength and conviction of such Hindu brothers and sisters.

C. Rammanohar Reddy is Editor ofThe India Forum



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Imran Khan’s brand of populism may well thrive despite his fall, even as Pakistan dreams of a progressive politics

Imran Khan promised to end Pakistan’s tryst with ‘corrupt’ and ‘dynastic’ politicians. He insisted that his government would restore Pakistan’s sovereignty, breaking the International Monetary Fund (IMF) begging bowl forever, and never again acceding to the role of frontline state in ‘America’s wars’. He prided himself as a born-again Muslim who would free Pakistani society from the vice-like grip of a decadent western pop culture.

The army has the reins

In the end, it was the proverbial elephant in the room that he dared not name — Pakistan’s pre-eminent political-economic force, the army — that ended his prime ministerial crusade. Mr. Khan may have been formally deposed through a Supreme Court-assisted vote of no-confidence in Pakistan’s lower house of Parliament in early April, but it is an open secret that his fall came after falling foul of the army’s top brass which, less than four years earlier, had facilitated his ascent to the country’s top elected office. It is said that the generals had planned for Mr. Khan to be in power for two consecutive five-year terms; as it turned out, their patience ran out even before the end of the first one.

There is nothing novel about a Pakistani Prime Minister going out kicking and screaming having lost favour with the army. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his daughter Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif, among others, have all suffered a similar fate. With the exception of the nine-year military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, the Bhuttos and the Sharifs had alternated stints in government for the best part of 30 years before Mr. Khan’s ascension as Prime Minister in 2018. On each occasion, they had agreed to uneasy power-sharing arrangements with the army, only for the army to subsequently engineer their unceremonious downfall.

Imran Khan was supposed to be different. A cricket World Cup-winning captain with no political lineage, he represented the perfect foil for unelected apparatuses of the state that, in the revered colonial tradition, vilified politics while eulogising ‘clean and efficient’ administrative order. When the Musharraf dictatorship collapsed in 2008 under the weight of its own contradictions, ushered out by a lawyer-led street movement, Mr. Khan’s grooming by the military establishment began in earnest.

In 2013, his Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) party acquired governmental power for the first time in war-torn Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. While victory was formally secured at the ballot box, the establishment joined the fray by cajoling ‘electables’ — constituency-level politicians whose primary objective is to sit on the treasury benches — into joining the PTI. By the time the next general election rolled around in 2018, the PTI had enough electables in its ranks to cobble together a coalition, and with it the reins of the federal government.

Demographic factors

Yet, the PTI’s rise cannot be explained only by the machinations of the unelected apparatuses of state. Pakistan’s urbane, educated classes have always been enamoured by strong men who promise to clean the Augean stables. Generals and judges were the archetype, but Imran Khan fit the bill even better.

The messiah complex around Imran Khan’s persona was greatly enabled by both demographic and technological change. Almost two-thirds of Pakistan’s over 220 million people are below the age of 29. This majority has come of age as digitalisation has transformed political communication. Able and willing to articulate their political preferences beyond the constraints of socially entrenched patronage networks, many young people believed in the hype around Mr. Khan’s persona. These tech-savvy and often militant supporters used social media platforms to propagate the PTI as a genuine alternative to status quo in a manner not dissimilar to other contemporary right-wing populists as diverse as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump.

A waning

For the first three years after Imran Khan became Prime Minister, the army played along. The combination of digitally mobilised PTI supporters and the state’s own propaganda machinery translated into ever intensifying censorship of the media, progressive intellectuals and people’s movements, as well as the two main Opposition parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N). But dissenting voices refused to go away, while the PTI government predictably made concession after concession to big business — including the army-run ones — and after reneging on its rhetoric about foreign aid, acceded completely to the IMF’s arm-twisting. The Opposition was thus able to stoke public discontent, particularly in the dominant Punjab province where former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif teleconferenced hard-hitting speeches from the comfortable confines of self-exile in London.

Yet, given the long leash he had been granted, Imran Khan may still have survived, and even thrived. But the cat was set among the pigeons when, in October 2021, he refused to sign off on a summary issued by Pakistan Army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa notifying a new spy chief at the power Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The story goes that the Prime Minister wanted the incumbent, Lt. General Faiz Hameed, to retain his office for long enough to see the PTI through another general election. Imran Khan resisted for almost three weeks, eventually acceding to the change. But it was too late; challenging the autonomy of the army proved to be Mr. Khan’s death knell.

Shehbaz Sharif at the helm

The resulting domino effect eventually culminated in his ouster and Nawaz Sharif’s younger brother and three-time Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, taking oath as the new Prime Minister. Having historically enjoyed more cordial ties with the establishment than his brother Nawaz Sharif, Shehbaz Sharif will be charged with steadying the ship and getting the country through to the next general election which must take place at the latest by the summer of 2024.

But what can be done to steady a ship on permanently choppy waters? In which a bloated national security apparatus acts as an arbiter of politics; where perpetual upward redistribution of wealth implicates all major political players and an exponential debt burden, and where anti-establishment political sentiment tends largely to be captured by reactionary forces, not least of all religious militants?

Indeed, even before he was deposed, Imran Khan himself had taken a leaf out of the copybook of the religious right by exclaiming that the Opposition parties were conspiring with the United States to unseat him. The palace intrigues that followed could not save him, but his narrative of a Washington-backed regime change has persisted. Intriguingly, while Mr. Khan himself has avoided direct criticism of the army, his supporters have minced no words about the top brass’s decision to withdraw support to the PTI and instead patronise the ‘corrupt’ and ‘dynastic’ politicians that the Imran Khan phenomenon was supposed to relegate to the dustbin of history once and for all.

Thread in the neighbourhood

Once upon a time, not so long ago, Pakistan was the black sheep of South Asia. A country ruled by generals for half its existence, religion weaponised in the nooks and crannies of society to deadly effect, and a militarised economy perpetually teetering on the brink of collapse. Today, as it grapples with yet another civilian government falling out with the military establishment, Pakistan’s predicament is eerily similar to its neighbours. In Sri Lanka, a former army officer has run the country into the ground along with his strong-arm brothers, while in India the regime is ever more reliant on the violent sidelining of certain minorities even as its regime of accumulation immiserates bigger segments of a predominantly young population.

Populists thrive on the politics of hate. Imran Khan lives on, perhaps in the hope that he can once again win the favour of the army. Only when a genuinely progressive politics takes root within Pakistan’s — and, indeed, South Asia’s — youthful majority, may we expect a meaningful twist in this sordid tale.

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar is Associate Professor of Political Economy at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and has been affiliated with progressive political movements in Pakistan for over two decades



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While universal coverage can catalyse the region’s economic growth, energy trade must be linked to peace building

South Asia has almost a fourth of the global population living on 5% of the world’s landmass. Electricity generation in South Asia has risen exponentially, from 340 terawatt hours (TWh) in 1990 to 1,500 TWh in 2015. Bangladesh has achieved 100% electrification recently while Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka accomplished this in 2019. For India and Afghanistan, the figures are 94.4% and 97.7%, respectively, while for Pakistan it is 73.91%. Bhutan has the cheapest electricity price in South Asia (U.S.$0.036 per kilowatt hour, or kWh) while India has the highest (U.S.$0.08 per kWh.) The Bangladesh government has significantly revamped power production resulting in power demands from 4,942 kWh in 2009 to 25,514 MW as of 2022. India is trying to make a transition to renewable energy to provide for 40% of total consumption, while Pakistan is still struggling to reduce power shortage negatively impacting its economy.

The electricity policies of South Asian countries aim at providing electricity to every household. The objective is to supply reliable and quality electricity in an efficient manner, at reasonable rates and to protect consumer interests. The issues these address include generation, transmission, distribution, rural electrification, research and development, environmental issues, energy conservation and human resource training.

Geographical differences between these countries call for a different approach depending on resources. While India relies heavily on coal, accounting for nearly 55% of its electricity production, 99.9% of Nepal’s energy comes from hydropower, 75% of Bangladesh’s power production relies on natural gas, and Sri Lanka leans on oil, spending as much as 6% of its GDP on importing oil.

Electrification, growth, SDGs

Given that a 0.46% increase in energy consumption leads to a 1% increase in GDP per capita, electrification not only helps in improving lifestyle but also adds to the aggregate economy by improving the nation’s GDP. For middle-income countries, the generation of power plays an essential role in the economic growth of the country. More electricity leads to increased investment and economic activities within and outside the country, which is a more feasible option as opposed to other forms of investments such as foreign direct investment.

The South Asian nations have greatly benefited from widening electricity coverage across industries and households. For example, 50.3% of Bangladesh’s GDP comes from industrial and agricultural sectors which cannot function efficiently without electricity. Nepal’s GDP growth of an average of 7.3% since the earthquake in 2015 is due to rapid urbanisation aided by increased consumption of electricity. On the other hand, Pakistan suffered a drop in industrialisation of textiles by 9.22%, wiping off U.S.$12.4 billion from the industry in 2014 due to power shortages. India leads South Asia in adapting to renewable power, with its annual demand for power increasing by 6%.

Solar power-driven electrification in rural Bangladesh is a huge step towards Sustainable Development Goal 7 (which is “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”) by 2030 and engaging more than 1,00,000 female solar entrepreneurs in Sustainable Development Goal 5 (which is “achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”). India’s pledge to move 40% of total energy produced to renewable energy is also a big step. Access to electricity improves infrastructure i.e., SDG 9 (which is “build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation”). Energy access helps online education through affordable Internet (SDG 4, or “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”), more people are employed (SDG 1: “no poverty”), and are able to access tech-based health solutions (SDG 3, or “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”).

Green growth, green energy

South Asian leaders are increasingly focused on efficient, innovative and advanced methods of energy production for 100% electrification. Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his ‘net zero by 2070’ pledge at COP26 in Glasgow asserted India’s target to increase the capacity of renewable energy from 450GW to 500GW by 2030. South Asia has vast renewable energy resources — hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal and biomass — which can be harnessed for domestic use as well as regional power trade. The first-ever Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) benefits such as poverty reduction, energy efficiency and improved quality of life were realised when there was India-Bhutan hydro trade in 2010.

The region is moving towards green growth and energy as India hosts the International Solar Alliance. In Bangladesh, rural places that are unreachable with traditional grid-based electricity have 45% of their power needs met through a rooftop solar panel programme which is emulated in other parts of the world. This is an important step in achieving Bangladesh’s nationally determined contributions target of 10% renewable energy of total power production.

Regional energy trade

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) prepared the regional energy cooperation framework in 2014, but its implementation is questionable. However, there are a number of bilateral and multilateral energy trade agreements such as the India-Nepal petroleum pipeline deal, the India-Bhutan hydroelectric joint venture, the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India gas pipeline, the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) sub-regional framework for energy cooperation, and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, rumoured to be extended to Bangladesh.

‘South Asia’s regional geopolitics is determined by the conflation of identity, politics, and international borders. Transnational energy projects would thus engage with multiple social and ideational issues’ which is a major limitation for peaceful energy trade. If energy trade is linked and perceived through the lens of conflict resolution and peace building, then a regional security approach with a broader group of stakeholders could help smoothen the energy trade process. The current participation in cross-border projects has been restricted to respective tasks, among Bhutan and India or Nepal and India. It is only now that power-sharing projects among the three nations, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh, have been deemed conceivable.

India exports 1,200MW of electricity to Bangladesh, sufficient for almost 25% of the daily energy demand, with a significant amount from the Kokrajhar power plant in Assam worth U.S.$470 million. Bhutan exports 70% of its own hydropowered electricity to India worth almost U.S.$100 million. Nepal on the other hand, not only sells its surplus hydroelectricity to India but also exported fossil fuel to India worth U.S.$1.2 billion.

What is needed

South Asia is reinforcing its transmission and distribution frameworks to cater to growing energy demand not only through the expansion of power grids but also by boosting green energy such as solar power or hydroelectricity. Going forward, resilient energy frameworks are what are needed such as better building-design practices, climate-proof infrastructure, a flexible monitory framework, and an integrated resource plan that supports renewable energy innovation. Government alone cannot be the provider of reliable and secure energy frameworks, and private sector investment is crucial. In 2022, private financing accounted for 44% of household power in Bangladesh, 48.5% in India, and 53% in Pakistan. Public-private partnership can be a harbinger in meeting the energy transition challenges for the world’s most populous region.

Syed Munir Khasru is Chairman of the international think tank, The Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance (IPAG), New Delhi, India with a presence in Dhaka, Melbourne, Vienna and Dubai. E-mail: munir.khasru@ipag.org



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Actual individual experiences shape economic behaviour

Milton Friedman famously said, ‘Inflation is taxation without legislation.’ The impact of inflation — the overall increase in the prices in an economy — is felt by everyone. High inflation adversely affects the poor. Individuals, therefore, form expectations about how prices will behave in the future to take precautions. If they anticipate high inflation, they negotiate wages or rents to compensate against a potential fall in their purchasing power. Increased wages increase the cost of production, making expectations self-fulfilling and, therefore, playing a pivotal role in determining inflation.

The RBI released the Inflation Expectations Survey of Households (IESH) for March 2022 on April 8. The results on the inflation expectations are based on responses from around 6,000 urban households surveyed in 19 major cities. The release coincides with the completion of two years from the period of the first lockdown in March 2020. The last two years of surveys, therefore, capture individuals’ perceptions during the three waves of COVID-19.The survey results present interesting behavioural insights for public policy, particularly from a gender perspective.

High inflationary expectations

Central banks raise interest rates to ‘anchor’ high inflationary expectations when temporary price shocks, on account of drought or disruption in global supply chains, entail the risk of getting transmitted into actual inflation. To what extent can a raise in interest rates reduce high inflationary expectations? One must cautiously examine factors behind inflation expectations since any misreading could lead to perverse policy decisions.

A significant factor shaping perceptions on inflation are the prices that individuals observe in their daily lives, originally posited by Robert Lucas in his seminal Islands model. A recent study carried out by Acunto et al., 2020, validates that what agents frequently purchase, instead of those purchased infrequently, shape their perception of the general level of inflation. Goods purchased frequently such as groceries tend to be low-priced and highly volatile in comparison to those which are bought seldom. In other words, the prices of the lower-priced potatoes, milk, or apples frequently purchased shape the aggregate inflation expectations more than that of infrequent purchase of a high-priced car. Therefore, generalising aggregate inflation expectations for making general views of prices in the economy could be misleading. This insight has implications for gender-based differences in anticipating inflation in the future. Existing literature shows that women have higher inflationary expectations compared to men. Economic theories explain this divergence by stating that women are ‘more pessimistic’ than men, attributing the pessimism to the difference in their innate characteristics and lack of education. However, a new study reveals that it is not the innate characteristics as much as the traditional gender roles that explain this divergence.

‘Natural experiments’

To test its validity, trends of Inflation Expectations Survey of Households (IESH) before and after the lockdown period present itself as a crude ‘natural experiment’. Natural experiments are real-life circumstances that can be studied to determine the cause-and-effect relationship among sections of people with different exposure levels to an assumed causal factor. The authors hypothesise that if traditional gender roles are the primary reasons behind the gender inflation expectation gap, then the lockdown-imposed work-from-home (WFH) arrangements or loss of employment should contribute in closing this gap. The logic: during the lockdown, people in urban areas lost jobs or remained at home, taking a relatively equal share in the frequent day-to-day purchases.

Two categories of occupations are studied here: homemakers (assumed to be dominated by women) and financial sector employees (assumed to be dominated by men). Looking at the trends of the RBI surveys for the period between March 2018 and March 2020, homemakers report higher inflation expectations than financial sector employees. However, this gap has narrowed over the last two years and has almost converged in March 2022. A possible explanation of closing of the gap could be the gradual ‘experience effect’ of male-dominated financial sector employees. Experience effect, contrary to Rational Expectations Theory that assumes individuals base their decisions on the information available to them, is based on the premise that actual personal experiences shape behaviour more than being informed about the outcome of the event. Focus therefore, could be shifted more on the microfoundations — understanding macroeconomic outcomes by studying factors that shape individual behaviour and decision making — for making better policy decisions concerning macroeconomic phenomena.

Bhaskar J. Kashyap is Assistant Director, NITI Aayog. Dr. Arup Mitra is Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Growth



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Assembly polls are two years away, but parties are gearing up for battle mode in Andhra Pradesh

Elections in Andhra Pradesh (AP) are two years away but the ruling YSR Congress party (YSRCP) and the opposition parties seem to be already fine-tuning their strategies and making necessary course corrections to prepare for the polls.

The mood in the YSRCP has been a mixture of euphoria and disappointment, notably after the appointment of regional coordinators and district presidents and a major overhaul of the Cabinet which caused heartburn for some who underwent a role reversal from being Ministers to MLAs. Those disgruntled leaders were sought to be mollified, lest they switched loyalties at a time when the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the BJP-Jana Sena Party (JSP) were working on a mission mode to dislodge the YSRCP.

With 151 MLAs in the 175-member Legislative Assembly and strong performances in local body elections, the YSRCP is in the driver’s seat, but since nothing is permanent in politics, the party cannot take victory for granted.

The YSRCP leaders are brimming with confidence but they will be committing a costly mistake if they brush aside the anti-incumbency factor. The YSRCP president and Chief Minister Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy is wary of the renewed vigour with which TDP and BJP-JSP are attacking the government for taking certain policy decisions, many of which backfired, the ‘three capitals’ fiasco in particular, and for implementing fiscally imprudent welfare schemes that have imperilled the State’s finances.

The financial implications of keeping the Amaravati (capital city) project in limbo, could soon take their toll, as even if the capital is shifted to Visakhapatnam, subject to courts clearing the move, the government would still have to compensate the huge losses incurred by thousands of farmers who gave away their lands under the pooling scheme. The YSRCP is, meanwhile, hopeful that the plethora of welfare schemes being largely delivered through village and ward secretariats has earned it a lot of goodwill. The party’s electoral strategy also includes citing the impact of bifurcation of the erstwhile united State and the pandemic as reasons for the inability to achieve development on the scale that the party promised and the YSRCP also seeks to blame its predecessor TDP government for the failures.

Mr. Reddy is learnt to have prepared a plan to start visiting the districts soon in order to mobilise support for his party which is coming under pressure to deliver. On the other hand, the TDP is trying to take advantage of the failures of the YSRC government and is focusing on a host of issues which it believes will tilt the scales in its favour. But, to cover the lost ground is a formidable task for the opposition party as the YSRCP is still a force to reckon with. Though the TDP is in a position to successfully regroup again after some years of being down in the dumps, it faces challenges as some of its MLAs have extended tacit support to the YSCRP. Taking the tally of its MLAs from 23 to a number that puts it in the saddle is going to be difficult, if not impossible for the TDP.

The BJP and its ally JSP have meanwhile sought to focus on the work done by the Central government and to target the “corrupt governance” of the YSCRP regime. Besides this, the BJP and its State president Somu Veeraraju has been raking up sensitive issues related to alleged attacks on Hindu temples and religious institutions, in what is suggested as a ploy backed by the party’s central high command. It is anybody’s guess whether this would work in a State largely devoid of communal politics, but the BJP is straining every muscle to rake such issues.

It remains to be seen whether the chinks in the YSCRP armour are weak enough for a resurgent opposition to exploit in the next two years. The citizens of the State, meanwhile, are still hoping for the promises made to them during bifurcation to be fulfilled.

raghavendra.v@thehindu.co.in



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Reviving the official household spending survey is only a first step

India’s official statistical machinery is gearing up to relaunch the All-India Household Consumer Expenditure Survey, traditionally undertaken quinquennially, from July 2022. If it fructifies, the result may be known towards the latter half of 2024, provided the Government permits the release. The last such Survey (2017-18), did not get such a sanction — its results reportedly indicated the first fall in monthly per-capita spending by households since 1972-73, with rural households facing a sharper decline compared to 2011-12. The Statistics Ministry had flagged ‘discrepancies’, ‘data quality issues’ and ‘divergences’ between estimated consumption levels and the actual output of goods and services. While it had sought to scuttle suggestions that unflattering data were being obfuscated, a better course of action would have been to release the data with caveats. It could have argued, for instance, that the numbers, at best, reflect the short-term impact of the ‘bold structural reforms’ carried out in the year preceding the Survey, to ‘formalise’ the economy — demonetisation and the GST. A fresh survey could then have been commissioned later for a clearer picture. This is what the UPA had done in 2011-12 to measure employment and consumer spending levels afresh, after the 2009-10 Surveys were affected by the global financial crisis and a severe drought that hit rural incomes.

The Government had promised to examine the ‘feasibility’ of a fresh Consumer Spending Survey, over 2020-21 and 2021-22, after ‘incorporating all data quality refinements’ mooted by a panel. One hopes the exact ‘refinements’ are spelt out upfront in the upcoming Survey. Of equal import is providing data comparable with past numbers, while factoring in changes in consumption patterns; and it may still not be too late to release the previous Survey’s findings to help assess longer term trends. The absence of official data on such a critical aspect of the economy — used to estimate poverty levels, rebase GDP, and to make private investment decisions — for over a decade, is damaging to India. Being a free-market and transparent democracy distinguished India from the likes of China where official data are read with a pinch of salt. The Government’s actions, including the delayed release of critical jobs data, have dulled that perception. If anything, such Surveys need to be conducted more frequently for more effective policy actions informed by ground realities, no matter how unpleasant they may be. Now, imperfect proxies are deployed to gauge the economy, surmises made about the extinction of extreme poverty, and outlays are tom-tommed without evidence on outcomes. The NSO must be empowered to collect and disseminate more data points, without fear of insinuations about its abilities, or a looming axe on its regular Surveys.



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Macron needs to address disaffection among the working classes to deal with the far-right

The re-election of Emmanuel Macron in Sunday’s presidential race is a relief not just for France’s political centrists but also for its allies in Europe and America. The election took place amid crises — high inflation; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that pushed France into a difficult choice of imposing sanctions on Moscow even at the cost of higher energy prices; and growing political disillusionment among the country’s youth. The first round had seen the far-right rising to its highest ever levels — Marine Le Pen and Éric Zemmour together gathered more than 30% of votes. Yet, Mr. Macron secured a decisive victory in Sunday’s run-off, with 58.5% vote share against Ms. Le Pen’s 41.5%, showing that the centre can still hold in France. The banker-turned politician, who emerged as the surprise champion of French Republican values against an upsurge of far-right populism five years ago, managed to rally the anti-populist base once more. He went to the voters with three broad themes: his administration’s economic performance, a defence of France’s Republican values and support for European sovereignty. While France’s quick return to growth and low unemployment rate helped him project a convincing macroeconomic picture, his attack on Ms. Le Pen as a threat to the French Republican values and the tough line he took on Ukraine allowed him to mobilise the liberal, centre-right and pro-European sections of voters.

Mr. Macron’s victory offers stability for both France and the EU. But a closer look at the two rounds of elections provides a more complicated picture. The French political landscape, historically dominated by the centre-right conservatives and centre-left socialists, has undergone a major transformation. Mr. Macron has emerged as the poster boy of the centrist bloc, the largely status-quoist voters. And his key challengers are from the far-right, which has anti-Semitic and Islamophobic roots. The third bloc is led by leftist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who finished third in the first round. The surge of the far-right and leftist candidates suggests that there is widespread voter anger towards the establishment. And the far-right populists, with their cocktail of anti-establishment welfarism and anti-immigrant rhetoric, seem to be better-equipped to tap this anger than the leftists. Ms. Le Pen may not be strong enough, as of now, to capture power, but she was strong enough to pose a credible challenge to Mr. Macron. In his victory speech, Mr. Macron admitted that there is growing anger among sections of the voters towards the political establishment and promised to tackle it. Going forward, his biggest challenge would be to reach out to the disaffected sections of society, address the growing anger in the underbelly of the working classes, and build credible alternatives to the far-right problem.



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Madurai: It is estimated that there are 33 million carvings in the Shree Meenakshi Amman Temple at Madurai. This temple is the “encyclopaedia of all the Hindu dancing poses depicted both in stone and wood.” The entrance to the shrine of Shree Meenakshi temple is flanked by two dwarapalakas or watchmen and on the doors are found some of the important dancing poses mentioned in the Natyasastra. Every inch of stone work inside the temple has a story to relate through carvings and paintings. For instance, one of the pillars shows Lord Siva coming out from the lingam (Lingodbhavamurti) and Brahma in the form of swan and Vishnu as a boar, boring the earth. This small carving relates a great story, which according to the Lingapurana is that once Brahma and Vishnu were at dispute over their respective greatness. And as they could not decide which of them was greater, the dispute was referred to Lord Siva for arbitration. Lord Siva gave them a test and said that he who finds the top and the bottom of the jyotilingam of Siva would be the greater of the two.



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The tragedy at Malabar has at long last opened the eyes of men who at first minimised the nature of the troubles there. The coming of outside people to help in the situation has drawn the attention of the whole of India to their duty towards Malabar. It is only then that the people throughout the length and breadth of the country realised the seriousness of the situation. There were cries for help and the people naturally imagined that everything was rightly done. If one goes to the interior parts of the country one can see face to face the miserable condition of the people despite the prompt actions taken by the authorities coupled with that of the other philanthropic body of men. The relieving work as at present carried on has taken the shape of helping the mappillas. So far as Hindus are concerned their position is most unhappy. Relief to them was suddenly stopped. Men, women and converts had nothing but to face starvation. There is not a single organisation to help them on behalf of the community. There might be some individual helpers. Fortunately to save the name of the Hindu South India the Arya Samaj came to the help.



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The world of 1980s Malayalam cinema comes alive in the dozen or so books he wrote. Like most of the heroes he created, Paul was a much loved person in the industry who walked into the sunset with few complaints.

The 1980s and 90s were a fertile period for the Malayalam film industry. A new crop of directors and scriptwriters who were willing to experiment with new narrative styles and a middle-class audience had emerged. John Paul, 72, who passed away last week in Kochi, was an important voice of this school of cinema.

Paul wrote close to a hundred screenplays in a four-decade long career, which were directed by a new generation of directors who made their mark in the 1980s and thereafter — Bharathan, Mohan, I V Sasi, Balu Mahendra, Satyan Anthikkad, Sibi Malayil, Kamal. A majority of these — among them Chamaram, Marmaram, Ormmakkayi, Palangal, Athiratram, Revathikkoru Pavakkutty, Yatra, Oru Minnaminunginte Nurunguvettam, Unnikale Oru Kathaparayam and Chamayam — were both critical successes and box-office hits. Along with M T Vasudevan Nair and Padmarajan, script writer-directors, Paul wrote some of the best remembered roles in Malayalam cinema in the 1980s — Gopi in Revathikkoru Pavakutty and Sandhya Mayangum Neram, Nedumudi Venu in Ormakkayi and Vidaparayum Munpe, Murali in Chamayam, Mammootty in Yatra, Zarina Wahab in Chamaram, Mohan Lal in Unnikale Oru Kathaparayam.

A banker by profession, passionate about literature and active in the film society movement, Paul had become a scriptwriter in 1980 by accident. Most of his scripts had a tender love story as their core. They resonated with the moral world of middle-class Malayalis, who embraced these films. In the last few years, Paul had few films and he had turned to writing and TV talks. The world of 1980s Malayalam cinema comes alive in the dozen or so books he wrote. Like most of the heroes he created, Paul was a much loved person in the industry who walked into the sunset with few complaints.

This editorial first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘The storyteller’.



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The French president's victory has, in a time of great flux in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, provided a measure of temporary stability. The Ukraine crisis and China's rise will require a concerted response from liberal democracies in the region.

Across European capitals, there is understandable jubilation at Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the French presidential election. Internationally, he has cultivated the image of being a pro-market, pro-Europe centrist under whose leadership the French economy and Paris’s role in geopolitical affairs have become more salient. He has played a prominent role in the Ukraine crisis, and managed the economic fallout of the pandemic — growth returned to France quickly and unemployment is at its lowest in the last few years. The spectre of a Marine Le Pen presidency — with her anti-EU, anti-globalisation, xenophobic politics — no doubt helped Macron consolidate the centre as well as gain votes from the left. Yet, at best, Macron’s victory may be temporary. By all accounts, disillusionment with the government and market economy, and cleavages within the country, have only deepened in this election.

The far-right has made its largest-ever showing and Macron’s voteshare has declined considerably since 2017. In the first round before the run-off between the president and Le Pen, Jean-Luc Melenchon, the primary left candidate, won an impressive 22 per cent of the vote. Between them, Le Pen and Melenchon have captured the disenchanted French vote — framed by the “gilet jaunes” protests that rocked the country in 2018 and 2019. Macron’s retooling of France’s labour laws, the increasing divide between the countryside, working classes and the rest of the population and the steady rise in cost-of-living have taken the sheen off the liberal project he represents, as well as the form of globalisation he has championed.

However, the French president’s victory has, in a time of great flux in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, provided a measure of temporary stability. The Ukraine crisis and China’s rise will require a concerted response from liberal democracies in the region. For Delhi, too, Paris’s outward orientation has been beneficial — France has been a supporter of its position regarding a rules-based order in Asia and strategic and economic ties between the two countries have deepened. The French far-right has risen on a squarely anti-globalisation platform, funneling the anxieties of the disenfranchised outward as well as against the migrants within. And Le Pen and others have expressed admiration and support for authoritarian rulers. For much of his first term, Macron ignored the issues raised by those who have felt victimised by globalisation and pro-market economic policies. For a liberal France and a stable Europe, he must build bridges with those people in his second term.

This editorial first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘Paris reprieve’.



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It may be necessary to cast a wider look to see why the non-BJP parties are looking so effete in the face of transgressions of citizens' rights and freedoms by the state. When these parties are in power, where they get the opportunity, they are complicit in the very acts they accuse the BJP of.

Rewind, for a moment, to this: A few days ago, in a spectacular show of overzealousness, Assam Police flew to another state to arrest a legislator over a tweet. The arrest of Gujarat MLA Jignesh Mevani — he has been rearrested since, after a Kokrajhar court gave him bail on Monday — for a tweet critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi under severe sections of the IPC and the IT Act is theatre of the absurd at its best, or worst. It raises, yet again, serious questions of police excess, and its abject servility to political bosses. It reiterates that BJP governments, at the Centre and in the states, are not above weaponising the harsh law against dissenters and political opponents. It underlines that at risk are constitutionally protected fundamental freedoms, and that playing fast and loose with due process to target some potentially affects everyone. The continuing drama over Mevani is chilling for another reason as well — it shows how supine the Opposition has become.

It may be necessary to cast a wider look to see why the non-BJP parties are looking so effete in the face of transgressions of citizens’ rights and freedoms by the state. When these parties are in power, where they get the opportunity, they are complicit in the very acts they accuse the BJP of. Or, they simply lack the conviction to take a principled stand. The response of the AAP, after the bulldozers rolled into Northwest Delhi’s Jahangirpuri, affected by communal violence only days ago, is illustrative. Both Deputy CM Manish Sisodia and MLA Atishi sought to lay the blame on two groups — Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingya — that the BJP had also sought to target. They were being settled across India by the BJP to stage riots, the AAP leaders said. From Shaheen Bagh to Jahangirpuri, the AAP either stayed silent, or stayed away, or as it has done now, taken the BJP’s cue. It is not just in Delhi, however, that the AAP plays by the BJP’s book. Last heard, its newly elected government in Punjab had sent the Punjab Police to the doorsteps of at least three critics of AAP convenor and Delhi CM Arvind Kejriwal — former AAP leader Kumar Vishwas, Congress leader (also formerly AAP) Alka Lamba, and Delhi BJP’s Naveen Jindal.

It’s not just the AAP. In Maharashtra, ruled by the Shiv Sena-led Maha Vikas Aghadi government, Mumbai Police has arrested and slapped a sedition charge on Ravi and Navneet Rana, MLA and MP respectively, for apparently nothing more than raising the ante against CM Uddhav Thackeray on the Hanuman Chalisa-Azaan row. And in Chhattisgarh, the Supreme Court had to step in last year to reprimand the Congress government for its alleged misuse of the sedition law — it pointed to the “disturbing trend” of filing sedition cases against officials seen to be loyal to preceding regimes after a change of government. The non-BJP parties may or may not pay an electoral price for this politics. But their many concessions and abdications are taking a wider toll — they are shrinking the space for an alternative politics, they are constricting its possibilities.

This editorial first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘Cut and paste BJP’.



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Ayoade Alakija writes: The pandemic is not over and our future response must be based on the principle that a life in New Delhi has equal worth to a life in New York.

New Delhi is again experiencing an uptick in cases of COVID-19 . The third biggest city in the world – Shanghai – has been going through a protracted lockdown for weeks and sub-variants of Omicron are popping up around the world.

This week, I will be in joining leaders, including Prime Minister Modi and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, at the Raisina Dialogues in India to discuss the challenges of our time and how inequity is a root and exacerbating force.

From the ongoing pandemic, to the climate catastrophe, to rising conflict that is transforming geopolitics, humanity is currently locked in a downward spiral that needs intentionality from leaders to break out of. And if we don’t tackle inequity and the danger of greedy nationalism, we’ll be missing the true lesson of the last few years.

The greatest wrong of the pandemic is how inequitable the rollout of health tools has been. In many lower-income countries, a combination of blatant greed in 2021, a runaway pandemic and disinformation that has specifically undermined a number of excellent vaccines led to more than a million preventable deaths. Waves of the virus have taken a huge toll on our heroic health workers and led to backsliding on virtually every other health challenge.

With more than 80 percent of its adult population now vaccinated, the country will be close to meeting the global target set by WHO of fully vaccinating 70 percent the population by the summer. We know that there’ll be future waves of the virus and I’ll be making the argument at the Raisina Dialogues that now is the moment to double down on sharing health tools fairly.

In lower-income countries, where the vast majority of people are still unvaccinated, there’s a real risk of surge at some point in the near future that knocks out health systems and pushes back further efforts to tackle malaria, measles and polio. To prevent this, the push now on COVID-19 should be on vaccinating the vulnerable and wider population to strengthen the wall of immunity, which has allowed rich countries to open up their economies and societies. Using India as a model, strengthening manufacturing in lower-income countries is also key to ensuring a more even distribution of health resources and mitigating the risk of rich countries hoarding supplies.

The most effective time to increase vaccine-based immunity is before an outbreak.. Therefore, the best tactic is that for any dip in COVID-19, huge effort should go into vaccinating and indeed boosting the most vulnerable and raising the general population so as to protect people and health systems from collapse. And it’s unjust that breakthrough treatments – including antivirals like Paxlovid, which was endorsed last week by WHO – are still only available in a handful of countries when we know it could save a lot of lives.

Treatment equity is just as important as vaccine equity and related to this it’s critical that people can test so that if they’re positive they can be put onto treatment early which provides optimal effectiveness.

While some will say, it’s not possible to overcome the barriers to access in low-income countries in Africa, I say that it is being done and it’s actually the only way to protect health systems in the medium- to long-term. Looking forward to President Biden hosting the Second Global Summit on COVID-19 taking place in the US, I hope all countries regardless of income levels commit to enhancing efforts to share vaccines, tests and treatments.

As well as vaccinating more people quickly, especially those that haven’t been vaccinated yet, we must look at the root causes of the challenges we faced in the first place. Manufacturing vaccines and treatments in regional hubs would make a big difference and help get these game-changing health tools to all countries quickly. It’s positive to see WHO’s mRNA hub in South Africa producing its own mRNA vaccine prototype for COVID-19 but we can’t settle for this.

Furthermore, with pharmaceutical groups unwilling to share technology or know-how in the worst pandemic in more than a century, it’s clear that new rules are needed to ensure that profit is not prioritized over short-term profit. Hope and fine words are not a strategy that delivers for people. It is critical that the World Trade Organization’s discussions on waiving intellectual property rules progress quickly and the outcome is substantive and actually improves access to COVID-19 tools.

The crisis in sharing health tools that led to millions of preventable dying is also an important background for any new Pandemic Accord so that next time we understand the likelihood for nationalistic greed and set in place systems to ensure that life-saving health tools are shared fairly and effectively.

If a fourth dose is good enough for people in rich countries, then it shouldn’t even be a debate about vaccinating people in low-income countries with their primary doses.

The pandemic is not over and our future response must be based on the principle that a life in New Delhi has equal worth to a life in New York.

We must reject the politics of convenience and embrace the politics of hard work – multilateralism is in peril as are the millions of lives that depend upon global solidarity.

Those that disagree are part of the problem.

I look forward to uniting with leaders in New Delhi, to tackle the multidimensional crisis of conflict, climate crisis and COVID3, which is driving spiking food prices and inflation and threatening overall national security. The world faces its greatest challenge since the founding of the UN after the Second World War. Historic challenges need historic leadership and time is not on our side.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘Minding the gap in pandemic’. The writer is co-chair of Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT)-Accelerator



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Vamsee Juluri writes: The problem isn’t communalism, but refusal to see another reality.

It is ironic that Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s recent article is titled ‘With eyes wide open’ (IE, April 22). The real nature of the abyss may be obvious to everyone else, but what he presents is the view of a small class of people who have made it their sole virtue to keep their eyes firmly shut.

This descent into the abyss did not begin with Ram Navami or Hanuman Jayanti. Nor with some attack on the idea of India a few years ago.

The fall that Mehta tries to pin on Hanuman and Ram is an old, colossal and, worst of all, unnatural one.

The Hindu revivalist writer Ram Swarup’s phrase — one god, two humanities or many gods, one humanity — describes the dilemma succinctly. Two thousand years of monotheistic cultural imperialism have left only India and a few other nations with their old gods still standing. That is the big picture. Not “democratic backsliding”. Or even “clash of civilisations”.

One might say it’s in the past. But is it?

When I search for “Ram Navami” or “Hanuman Jayanti”, I see a spate of images that seem to have escaped Mehta’s sight altogether. I see a 16-year-old boy named Shivam Shukla with his head smashed in by a rock, struggling to breathe through a tube in a hospital bed. I see a woman crying for her home which has been set on fire. I see news of Hindu processions being attacked in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, West Bengal and New Delhi.

I see unnecessary pain and suffering. And lies.

I do not see a “new Hinduism” as Mehta says. Instead, I see a world where the divergence between reality and truth is so deep that no one cares to reach across the epistemic or digital divide any more.

For someone who has decided that the problem is Hinduism, no number of Hindu boys in hospitals, temples destroyed or prayer songs silenced will change their understanding.

For someone who has decided the problem is Islam, no amount of condemnation of Hinduism or charges of communalism will change their assumption either.

We have two parallel reality industries now — an older one which works in the denial of Hindu pain, and a newer one which prospers in the selective stoking of it for political gains. If we pretend only one matters — or worse, that the other doesn’t exist — we are no better than those we critique.

I do not see the need for Hindu youth to celebrate outside mosques with flags and swords. Yet, I cannot say they are the only ones doing it when video clips appear of Muslim youth apparently having done the same.

Tit-for-tat turf battles? A warped form of the American “Take Back the Night” sort of civic campaign? What is this public negotiation really about? And what happened to the spirit of Ishwar-Allah (or Ram-Rahim, as we used to sing in Prasanthi Nilayam)?

But I see a different trajectory than Mehta does, perhaps. For him, that spirit is gone, shredded by “communalism”, which is synonymous for him not with “Hindu Nationalism” or “Hindutva”, but just “Hinduism”. That fig leaf of a distinction is now gone.

This unintentionally honest admission reveals much about how “communalism” is understood in India. As Sufiya Pathan, a researcher with Ahmedabad-based Centre for Indic Studies, has written, the term began to be used about India only in the 1920s. It presented itself not as a European idea, but as an innate condition of India — of religion in India, to be precise. And not just any religion, but the religion that happens to be that of the “majority”, naturally, which has the burden of demonstrating “tolerance” at all costs.

And how exactly is Hinduism to do that? “The West,” writes Pathan, “did not see religious reform or the eradication of religion as a solution to its own inter-religious strife,” but saw reform as a return to a purer form of the church, always. But in India, “reform” meant the opposite, and it still does.

It means Hindu eradication. Destroy the “idols”. Raze the temples. Silence the festivals. Reduce Rama and Krishna to guilt-professing memes. An elephant is abused somewhere? Just make a weeping Ganesha meme refusing puja from his worshippers, as if they were the ones who abused it. A woman is assaulted? Blame the inadequacy of goddess-worship in preventing it, as if lands that destroyed their own age-old goddess images have somehow smashed patriarchy.

And where the misappropriation of images of the gods doesn’t suffice, simply make up new stories about them that no devout Hindu has before, and then demand, on the basis of these new legends, a ban on this or that “Aryan invader” festival.

Mehta and others see only the 75-year-long history of a secular republic being broken down. Others see the 2,000-year-long history of survival against the odds.

For Hindus who keep their eyes open, every day now is like The Darkening Age, Catherine Nixey’s study of the destruction of the indigenous traditions, temples and libraries of the old “pagan” world by Christianity. The only change is that in the old days it was in the name of one god, and now it’s in the name of progress or development.

And yet, for Hindus who follow Hanuman and Rama there remains a sense of hope. Politicians and ideologues may make spectacles or targets of Hanuman. But in the end, Hanuman is still what every Hindu wants to be in relation to the feet of Sita and Rama, not to some passing political episode.

Just say, “Jai Hanuman”, Mr Mehta, and leave it to him. You can’t surely believe in his beautiful and elegant spirit from the Sundara Kanda, and also believe he’s just a hateful trope now, can you?

The writer is professor of media studies at the University of San Francisco


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C. Raja Mohan writes: Ukraine war has persuaded Delhi to recalibrate its great power relations, compelled Brussels to wake up from geopolitical slumber.

The re-election of Emmanuel Macron as the president of France on Sunday has sent a sigh of relief across Europe and North America. Delhi too is pleased with the return of Macron, who laid a strong foundation for India’s strategic partnership with France.

Victory for Marine Le Pen, Macron’s opponent, would have dramatically complicated the geopolitics of Europe. If the Russian aggression against Ukraine challenges the existing European regional order, Le Pen’s challenge to Macron underlined Moscow’s expansive influence in the internal politics of European nations. Le Pen, like so many other right-wing leaders in Europe, has close ties to Vladimir Putin. Many of them are deeply hostile to the European Union. Le Pen’s victory would have not only altered France’s international trajectory, but also shaken the EU to its political core.

Unlike the Soviet Union, which sought to shape European politics though left-wing parties, Russia today influences European politics through right-wing parties. That Le Pen got nearly 42 per cent of the popular vote reflects the growing challenge to mainstream politics. European establishments now have no choice but to double down on confronting Putin.

Russia’s threat to the regional and domestic order in Europe is among multiple factors shaping Delhi’s intensifying engagement with Brussels. Although India and the EU have talked of a strategic partnership for two decades, they have struggled to realise it. Three major external factors are facilitating the transformation of India’s ties with Europe.

The first is the Russian question. As the war in Ukraine dominates Delhi’s conversations with visiting European leaders this week, India’s reluctance to condemn Putin’s aggression might suggest nothing has really changed — that Delhi is tied inseparably to Moscow and is at best “neutral” in Russia’s conflicts with the West. During the last few weeks, Delhi has insisted that its silence is not an endorsement of Russian aggression. India’s position has continued to evolve. Delhi’s repeated emphasis on respecting the territorial integrity of states is a repudiation of Russia’s unacceptable aggression.

There is no question that the Ukraine invasion has put Delhi in acute strategic discomfort amidst the escalating conflict with China. For India, a normal relationship between Russia and the West would have been ideal. But Russia’s confrontation with the West comes during India’s rapidly expanding economic and political ties to Europe and America. Delhi might be sentimental about India’s historic Russian connection but it is not going to sacrifice its growing ties to the West on that altar. Russia’s declining economic weight and growing international isolation begins to simplify India’s choices.

Meanwhile, geographic proximity and economic complementarity have tied Europe even more deeply to Russia. The EU’s annual trade with Russia at around $260 billion is massive in comparison to India’s $10 billion. Unlike India, Europe’s societal connections with Russia are deep-rooted. A range of leaders in Europe, including Macron, have been advocating a historic reconciliation with Russia and Moscow’s integration into the regional security order.

Putin’s reckless invasion of Ukraine has compelled Europe to embark on a costly effort to disconnect from Russia. This is particularly true for Germany, which has cultivated strong commercial ties with Russia. With Putin locked in a long and unwinnable war in Ukraine, Russia is condemned to pay a heavy price for his folly and is bound to emerge as a terribly weakened power.

The war in Ukraine has certainly presented a major near-term problem that needs to be managed by Delhi and Brussels. Yet, they also find themselves in the same policy boat — of trying to reduce reliance on Russia. And over the longer term, a diminished Russia is bound to become less of a complicating factor in India’s engagement with Europe.

For nearly a century, India’s Russian connection had complicated Delhi’s ties to Europe. If the Russian revolution of 1917 inspired large sections of the Indian national movement, the partnership with Moscow dominated India’s international relations during the Cold War. That phase is drawing to a close.

Second is the China question that adds a new imperative to India’s partnership with Europe. Contrary to the mythology in Delhi that Russia has been pushed into China’s arms, Moscow has been deepening ties with Beijing for more than two decades triggering many anxieties in Delhi. In June 2021, Joe Biden had met Putin in Geneva with an offer to explore a productive relationship with Russia. Putin, however, made a conscious choice to turn to China instead. In February, Putin traveled to Beijing to announce a partnership “without limits”. Whether Russia was pushed or jumped into Chinese arms makes no difference to India. India has no option but to manage the consequences of the Russian decision. In the last two decades, China has emerged as a great power and now presents a generational challenge for Indian policymakers. That challenge has been made harder by Putin’s alliance with Xi Jinping.

As Delhi strives to retain a reasonable relationship with Moscow, Europe emerges as an important partner in letting India cope with the China challenge. This is reinforced by Europe’s own rethinking on China.

For more than two decades, Europe pursued relentless economic engagement with China, without a reference to Beijing’s long-term political ambitions. Thanks to the growing problems of doing business with Xi’s China, Beijing’s geopolitical alliance with Moscow, and the rapid deterioration of Sino-US relations, Brussels is ready to invest serious political capital in building purposeful strategic ties with India. Delhi is ready to reciprocate.

Finally, there is the American question. Until recently it appeared that Europe’s calls for “strategic autonomy” from the US were in sync with India’s own worldview. But the Ukraine crisis has underlined the US’s centrality in securing Europe against Russia. In Asia, Chinese assertiveness has brought back the US as a critical factor in shaping peace and security. The US, however, is not looking for weak allies in Europe and Asia. Washington wants a strong Europe taking greater responsibility for its own security; it would like Delhi to play a larger role in Asia and become a credible provider of regional security. Above all, America wants India and Europe to build stronger ties with each other.

The Ukraine war has persuaded Delhi to recalibrate its great power relations and has compelled Europe to end its long geopolitical holiday. For the first time since independence, India’s interests are now aligning with those of Europe. Together, Delhi and Brussels can help reshape Eurasia as well as the Indo-Pacific.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘Delhi & Brussels’. The writer is senior fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express



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Christophe Jaffrelot, Phillip Varghese write: They are primarily Dalits and their Muslim and Christian identity is secondary, as evident in several cases of atrocities against Dalits

An inter-ministerial dialogue has recently taken place to reassess the possibility of setting up a national panel to look into the merit of the demand to extend Scheduled Caste (SC) status to Muslim and Christian Dalits. After Independence, the Constitutional Order of 1950 listed SCs and STs using the list mentioned in the Government of India (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1936. The order specified that no person professing a religion other than Hinduism could be deemed as a member of a Scheduled Caste community. The idea was that religions other than Hinduism did not have a caste system.

This argument can no longer be defended for two reasons.

First, the order was amended in 1956 to include Sikh Dalits and again in 1990 to include Buddhist Dalits, notwithstanding the fact that these religions were supposed to not observe caste discrimination.

Second, Muslim and Christian Dalits are as affected by caste discrimination as Hindu Dalits. They are primarily Dalits and their Muslim and Christian identity is secondary, as evident in several cases of atrocities against Dalits. The majority of the victims in the Kandhamal, Karamchedu, and Tsundur massacres and in the recent incidents of violence reported from Tumakuru, Belagavi, Mandya, and Bagalkot in Karnataka were Dalit Christians. These victims were attacked not because they were Christians but because they were “untouchables” who had converted to Christianity. Despite converting to Christianity, their socioeconomic status had not improved. In fact, it had worsened because, in the process, they lost access to positive discrimination.

This is also evident from the few available surveys.

In 2008, a study commissioned by the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) and co-authored by Satish Deshpande and Geetika Bapna — “Dalits in the Muslim and Christian Communities — A Status Report on Current Social Scientific Knowledge” — showed that Dalit Muslims, who represent 8 per cent of their community and Dalit Christians, who constitute 23.5 per cent of their community, were over-represented among the poor of India. In rural India, 39.6 per cent of the Dalit Muslims live below the poverty line and 46.8 per cent of the Dalit Muslims in urban parts of the country are below the poverty line. The corresponding figures for Dalit Christians are 30.1 and 32.3 per cent. By contrast, 29.2 per cent of Muslims in rural India and 41.4 per cent of Muslims in urban parts of the country are BPL. Rural and Urban Dalit Christians below the poverty line were 16.2 and 12.5 per cent respectively.

Dalit Muslims and Christians have sometimes been forced to bury their dead in separate cemeteries. Churches have segregated against Dalit Christians in the past.

The Sachar Commission Report observed in 2006 that the social and economic situation of Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians did not improve after conversion. In 2007, the Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission Report recommended that the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, should be revised to delink SC status with religion, and religion-neutral status should be given to all Dalits and Scheduled Tribes. It also suggested a sub-quota of 8.4 per cent for minorities within the OBC quota of 27 per cent, as well as a reservation for Dalit minorities within the Scheduled Caste quota of 15 per cent.

The Mishra Commission report and the National Commission for Minorities report were tabled in Parliament in December 2009. Both were in favour of extending constitutional protection and safeguards to Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims that are available to their counterparts who profess Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism. Governments have, however, not acted on these recommendations.

They have argued against these reports — despite the empirical evidence they have collected — citing the paucity of disaggregated data on Dalit Muslims and Christians and contesting the validity of conversion records across generations. This contradicts the fact that 20 states have extended benefits to Dalit Muslims and Christians under the OBC category, following the Mandal Commission’s recommendations. The continued exclusion of Muslim and Christian Dalits from the benefits of reservation, solely on the basis of religion, violates the equality provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Reservation, according to the Constitution, relies on criteria such as social status, standing in the community, marginalisation, discrimination, violence and social exclusion.

How can one explain the government’s obstinacy? It’s something that dates back to 1950. Among the few things that keep Hindu Dalits from converting is that they retain the benefits of reservation. If reservation becomes universal, they would be less hesitant to accept the materialistic offers given by missionaries for converting. This could lead to a fall in the numbers of the country’s Hindu population — something that worries a lot of Hindu organisations.

While the Constitutional Order of 1950 could be amended regarding Indian religions like Sikhism and Buddhism, the same relaxation of the rule cannot apply to “foreign religions”– this is a clear indication that communalism is now influencing this important issue. Besides,
giving Dalit Christians and Muslims access to reservation would make the competition tougher for Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist Dalits.

Therefore, these groups do not lobby in favour of their brothers from Dalit Christian and Dalit Muslim communities.

In January 2020, the Supreme Court accepted a petition filed by the National Council of Dalit Christians on the matter. But the judiciary has not yet given its ruling on the contentious issue of reservation for Dalit Christians and Muslims.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘A continuing exclusion’. Jaffrelot is senior research fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s India Institute, London. Varghese is assistant professor, Department of Political Science & International Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Delhi



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Rekha Sharma writes: It has upheld the right of the victim to be heard, giving them confidence that their voices will not be silenced.

The Supreme Court order cancelling the bail of Ashish Mishra and his consequent surrender before a local court have not only served the cause of justice but also given confidence to the victims that their voices will not be silenced as was done by the Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court. During the hearing of the bail application, the counsel for the victims got disconnected from the online proceedings, and he moved an application for a rehearing which was not considered. Holding that a victim has an unbridled participatory right, from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings, and that such a right is substantive, enforceable and another facet of human rights, the apex court expressed its disquiet over the manner in which the high court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims to be heard.

It may be recalled that Ashish Mishra is the son of Ajay Mishra Teni, a minister of state for home affairs in the Union cabinet. He allegedly, along with his aides, drove an SUV, with two others vehicles in tow, into a group of farmers in Lakhimpur Kheri district in UP, as they were walking back after protesting against the three farm laws, and allegedly also opened gunfire from inside his vehicle. This resulted in the death of four farmers and one journalist, with the driver of the SUV and two more killed in the clash that followed and several others injured.

It also needs to be recalled that notwithstanding the ruthless manner in which the farmers were mowed down, and despite the fact that the incident caused widespread outrage and clamour for the arrest of Ashish Mishra, who was named in the FIR as the prime accused, the UP police made no effort to arrest him. The police treated him with kid gloves, and during the so-called investigation summoned him not as an accused, but as a witness. He was arrested only after the matter reached the Supreme Court on a letter written by two advocates, and after the court had made scathing observations about the manner in which the investigation was conducted, compelling it to appoint an SIT headed by a retired judge from another high court to carry out further investigation.

None of these facts was found grave enough to merit consideration by the learned high court judge. He instead laid undue emphasis on only one fact, namely, that no fire injury was found on any of the deceased. Castigating the high court, the Supreme Court in its order said that “instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses, and the impact that his release may have on the trial and society at large, the High Court had adopted a myopic view of the evidence and proceeded to decide the case on merits.” The Supreme Court has remitted the case to the high court for considering the bail application afresh, but it has fallen short of giving a further direction that it will not be heard by the same judge. Given that the judge virtually ignored all the principles that a court needs to keep in mind in the matter of bail, it would have been just and fair if the Supreme Court had also given a specific direction that the matter would not be heard by the same judge. In view of this ambiguity, let us hope and trust that the chief justice of the concerned high court would entrust the case to a different judge.

The Supreme Court while cancelling the bail gave one week’s time to the accused to surrender. This long period of freedom to a person with powerful links, and the backing of the State machinery, is disconcerting.

The order also throws light on another disturbing fact. It observed that the high court demonstrated tearing hurry in entertaining or granting bail to the accused. The reasons are obvious, and need not be stated explicitly. But then, this has not happened for the first time. Often, the cases of the high and mighty are taken up for hearing out of turn, sometimes in a matter of a day, while others with little or no means languish in jails for years. Is it not time that the Supreme Court issued directions to the high courts, and also to its own registry, to collate, and furnish information about how many bail applications or habeas corpus petitions concerning the civil liberties and constitutional rights of the people to life and liberty are pending and since when? The information must also explain why some cases received precedence over others. We are living at a time when the state and its instruments, and those enjoying their patronage, are trampling with impunity over the fundamental rights of the people to life and liberty. In these trying times, the beleaguered citizens turn to the courts for relief. Let no one feel that they are the children of a lesser god.

The Chief Justice of India recently visited Jallianwala Bagh and wrote in the visitor’s book, “Jallianwala Bagh manifests the strength and resilience of the people of this country. This serene garden is symbolic of the great sacrifice made in the face of tyranny. It serves as a reminder of the heavy price paid for freedom, which we must always cherish and protect.” These are poignant words. The Chief Justice is the first citizen of the judicial fraternity, and people look towards him and his worthy colleagues when their freedom is in danger at the hands of the s tate. Hopefully, the courts will not disappoint.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 26, 2022 under the title ‘Justice for the silenced’. The writer is a former judge of the Delhi High Court



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The national monetisation pipeline has identified 25 airports run by the Airports Authority of India (AAI) for action over the next three years. Four of them are located in Tamil Nadu – all international airports. GoI’s airport monetisation plan needs to be studied with the TN government’s major industries policy note, 2022-23, to see how the approach can be tweaked to realign incentives between the two levels of government to encourage industrial development. It’s essential because the current airport infrastructure policy doesn’t reconcile political risks to potential rewards of monetisation.

TN’s policy note is an extension of what the previous DMK government suggested during the UPA-1 era. The note says that land forms the major portion of overall project cost. Henceforth, if the state transfers land free to GoI, which subsequently monetises the infrastructure, the state should be entitled to a share of the gains. It’s a sensible suggestion and one GoI should consider. Revenue from infrastructure flows to governments through two streams. One, through taxes, which are split between GoI and states on the basis of the Finance Commission’s recommendations and GST Council’s decisions. Two, through subsequent monetisation of an asset.

It’s the second stream that needs fine-tuning. Often, land is obtained by invoking a legislation to forcibly take over privately-owned property to serve a public purpose. This can sometimes extract a political cost that’s borne entirely by the state government. This risk can be mitigated by giving states a share of the upside arising out of monetisation. A mismatch between risk and reward across the two levels of government has acted as a drag on India’s industrialisation. The UP government’s example is pertinent here. It holds the equity of Noida International Airport incorporated in 2018. After overseeing the land acquisition process, it contracted Zurich Airport to build the airport and then operate it for 40 years. The upside of a potential monetisation will accrue to UP. True, Jewar is a greenfield project and AAI’s are existing airports. But the principle holds.

Separately, there’s a need to re-evaluate mechanisms of awarding compensation when land is acquired. The legislative process is complex and tilts towards the state. Sometimes this results in paltry compensation. On paper, there are redressal mechanisms. However, it’s almost impossible for an individual to get redress. Tweaks in laws allowing acquisition can help mitigate resistance to acquisition. The doctrine of eminent domain needs to be balanced with fairness.



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With seven Supreme Court judges retiring this year and over a third of sanctioned high court judges posts lying vacant, Parliament should urgently consider increasing the retirement ages of SC and HC judges from 65 and 62 respectively. Scarce judicial resources are constantly expended in finding suitable candidates for these top constitutional positions. And with replacements rarely happening concurrently, the pendency burden grows faster. On August 31 last year, nine SC judges were appointed after two years of no appointments. It’s another matter that a nearly full-strength SC failed to prioritise consequential constitution bench matters.

The vacancy problem is more pronounced in HCs where 45% of pending 59 lakh cases are awaiting disposal for over five years. While the overall vacancy position is 35% in HCs, in big HCs like Allahabad, Calcutta and Patna nearly 50% sanctioned posts lie vacant. The bizarrely different retirement ages for SC-HC judges may be a colonial legacy, but the UK has progressively increased retirement age for judicial office holders to 75. The benefits of India following suit go beyond pendency.

It’s no one’s case that judges turn unfit after 62 or 65. Many secure positions as judicial members of tribunals and commissions. But the hankering for post-retirement jobs weakens judicial independence vis-à-vis central and state executives. If judges serve till 70 there’s minimal incentive to seek post-retirement sinecures. Alternatively, a higher retirement age can also attract the best minds to the vocation. Only a few like Justice Rohinton Nariman and Justice UU Lalit have left behind lucrative practices to join SC. HC collegiums also face great difficulty attracting noted lawyers because of the low retirement age of 62 and delayed appointments. Even Article 224A’s option of allowing reappointment of retired HC judges hasn’t been exercised. A fully staffed judiciary will help crores of citizens awaiting justice in civil and criminal matters.



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Though India has strong bilateral ties with several EU member states, they have not translated into a strong partnership with the European Union (EU) as a whole. That should change with this agreement.

The announcement by Narendra Modi and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to establish the EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) brings a new dimension to the India-EU relationship. Though India has strong bilateral ties with several EU member states, they have not translated into a strong partnership with the European Union (EU) as a whole. That should change with this agreement.

Trade, technology and security are the TTC's pillars to be built on existing sectoral programmes. For the EU, the India TTC is the second, the first was with the US. The EU's relationship with the US is very different from that with India. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its 'friendship without bounds' with China have necessitated the EU to pivot again, stepping up engagement with India. Brussels' relationship with Beijing is complex, much like New Delhi's relationship with Moscow. Yet both parties understand the importance of deepening ties with like-minded parties in the changing geopolitical context. Tackling climate change and transiting to a net-zero economy will be the TTC's strong drivers. India can be an important technology partner for development, innovation, and upscaling to drive down costs, and developing technologies in key areas of the low carbon economy like batteries, hydrogen, and energy security. Trade must be more than bilateral, though. The council should serve as a partnership to expand trade based on resilient supply chains.

The ties of history have served more to detract than aid the EU-India partnership. However, the two have more in common than is traditionally acknowledged. The EU and India bring complementary advantages to the partnership while structural and attitudinal similarities provide learning opportunities.

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Musk has also indicated his concern over Twitter's content moderation practices, the nature of its proprietary algorithms, the degree of politicisation of the platform, and automated accounts that amplify information, or misinformation.

Elon Musk, the world's richest man who plans to colonise space, snap the world's dependence on oil and add computing power to the human brain, is buying Twitter for $44 billion with an admitted desire to uphold free speech. In previous statements, he has likened the social media platform to being the town square where humanity debates its future. He has also indicated his concern over Twitter's content moderation practices, the nature of its proprietary algorithms, the degree of politicisation of the platform, and automated accounts that amplify information, or misinformation. These are areas of change the world's biggest microblogging site can expect as Musk attempts to unlock its 'true' potential.

Some of these practices crept into Twitter, which started out with the same intent as Musk's desire for free speech, as it became clear some degree of moderation was necessary to keep the platform from becoming a catch-all of human hatred. Advertising, its lifeblood, had started to desert the company before Twitter co-founder Jack Dorsey began to act to improve the health of its commentary. Technology fences and content rules came up to keep the conversation kosher. This included banning former US President Donald Trump, who conducted statecraft through tweets, over the riots on Capitol Hill in January 2021. If Musk sets out to lower these guardrails, he could be taking Twitter somewhere back in its toxic, anarchic past. That may not sit well with advertisers.

Then there is the question of Musk's credentials as an upholder of free speech. He has been largely silent on China, a big market for Tesla cars, but has been critical of Russia, where his business interests are lower. Musk has tweeted about high import duties on electric cars in India, and the Indian government has tweeted back saying he must commit to making them in the country. Starlink, a satellite broadband service provided by Musk's SpaceX, has also run into problems with the authorities for accepting pre-bookings without a licence to operate in India.

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Algorithmic transparency. That’s the best thing Elon Musk can do for Twitter. It may also be the only meaningful thing he can do — and never mind those extolling the virtues of the edit button. The Right sees Mr Musk’s play for Twitter as their triumph, but their joy at what they see as the ultimate comeuppance of what was perceived as a citadel of the Left may well be short-lived.

Twitter, despite what one may think, is not a Libertarian free-speech experiment. It is a media company, and accountability comes with that territory. That will involve content moderation and cracking down on bots, even if this is performed by superior algos. It is unlikely that those being moderated will take it quietly. It also remains to be seen how the hands-off approach to moderation that Mr Musk, a free-speech absolutist, wants to adopt for Twitter will fit in with this imperative (and regulatory requirement in many geographies) to be responsible. Finally, while the deal (once it closes) will benefit many private shareholders (and employees), Twitter still has to figure out a business model that can deliver profits. It’s possible that all this is beyond Twitter’s current management, and that Mr Musk could do much better. After all, he currently has the best track record in handling third-generation problems — from autonomous climate-friendly vehicles to the colonisation of space.

But the history of media is replete with people who think they can do better — and then come up short. In Twitter’s case, almost everyone has a view on how to make it better. Mr Musk, though, has bet his money on the expectation that he can. Twitter, a private company with public shareholding, will become a closely held one, which means a powerful media company that can shape opinions (and at some level, decide who gets to be heard) will come under even less scrutiny. That should worry everyone.



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The past few weeks have seen a growing uncertainty about the amount of wheat the government will be able to procure this year. In regions where procurement has traditionally been high, market prices have surged beyond Minimum Support Price (MSP) levels, encouraging farmers to sell to private traders rather than the government. Given the tightness in the international wheat market, private traders are building inventories in anticipation of future gains. Analysts posit that government procurement will fall significantly short of last year’s levels. Data from the Food Corporation of India (FCI) shows that the government has procured around 11 million tonnes of wheat in this rabi marketing season up to April 20. This figure was 16 million tonnes as on April 19 last year.

This year’s procurement (perhaps even production) ending up lower than last year comes even as the government is planning to export up to 10-15 million tonnes of wheat and private traders are stocking up — this is the perfect constellation for a sharp rise in prices. Wheat is not the only worry. Indonesia, the world’s largest exporter of palm oil, has banned edible oil exports on account of domestic shortages. This is bad news for India, the world’s biggest edible oil importer. Edible oil inflation has already been very high in the past year.

These developments come at a time when the inflationary situation is already expected to be volatile. In its April meeting, Reserve Bank of India (RBI)’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), projected that retail inflation will stay above the 6% mark in the quarter ending June 30. In an interview with Business Standard, MPC member Jayanth Varma said that inflation staying above the 6% level for three consecutive quarters – this will be a violation of RBI’s mandate under the inflation-targeting framework – is a possibility. The inflation-targeting framework seeks to control inflation by giving a demand shock (by raising interest rates) when there is a surge in prices. But demand shocks do not apply to food are unlikely to help bring down food prices. There is little MPC can do on the food inflation front. This calls for more synergised intervention from the Union and state governments. That may include a review of wheat exports and, in the case of edible oils, an aggressive plan for procurement in the short-term and self-sufficiency in the long.



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The recently-concluded Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) summit generated some fresh enthusiasm for regionalism in South Asia. Alongside the charter, several key agreements, ranging from technology transfer to connectivity, were signed. These are notable advancements for the 25-year-old initiative which has managed to achieve very little despite a lot of promise and potential. Mostly seen as a rebound of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), BIMSTEC’s record stands at an unimpressive total of five summits in 25 years, an insignificant operational budget and an understaffed secretariat built 8 years ago. What stagnates regionalism around the Bay of Bengal?

Regions do not naturally occur, and neither does regionalism. Politically, regions are created by states that can develop mental maps to forge communities around them. The making of such a community is either on political, financial, or social factors where states can structure orders beyond the level of the nation-State. States might come together when they have a common security threat or a risk. They may either converge based on shared financial gains of a market. Regionalism may also evolve due to shared markers of social and cultural links. In this case, even though the Bay of Bengal region has become significant due to the rise of the littoral States and the Chinese headway, regionalism is stagnated because of several fault-lines within these three possible shared markers.

Take the case of a security or a political community. While glaring security issues such as India-Pakistan in the SAARC are absent, the BIMSTEC States do not mutually share security concerns. There are broadly three aspects: 

First, the nature of asymmetry in the region makes security elusive as a shared concept. In such security asymmetries, the bigger power, in this case, India, remains apprehensive of the smaller states ganging up. The smaller States are dependent on the bigger power, but they are also insecure enough to avail opportunities from extra-regional powers when needed. 

For instance, smaller States in South Asia balance India’s position by bringing in China. On the flip side, bigger States tend to use bilateralism over multilateralism to gain an upper hand rather than getting entangled in norms of equity. 

Second, national security and regional security do not necessarily converge. Despite the lack of major wars, the region has been plagued by insurgent activities and low-intensity conflict which has only tightened the borders. The insurgency issues across India’s Northeast overlapping with Myanmar and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka’s civil war, and the case of the Rohingya refugees stretching Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand are recurring security issues. 

Finally, extra-regional actors further complicate the making of a security community. For instance, China is perceived as a competitor by India, but a partner by several States within the region.

Despite the promise of economic development, the region remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. Ruptured connectivity and broken linkages do not serve the pre-requisites of a good market. The Cold War history is replete with the inward-looking economic policies like import substitution that made the countries apprehensive about intra-regional trade.

Despite the post-globalisation optimism about trade, two reasons explain why the Bay of Bengal community does not share a market bond. Similar to political asymmetry, the first concern is economic asymmetry. Smaller States are apprehensive about their markets being flooded by the bigger State. Ambitious Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) remain on paper. Relatively weaker economies look for a level-playing field, while the stronger economies go by the logic of profit. India’s approach during the RCEP negotiations is indicative of the problems of a regional market consensus in the postcolonial world. 

Second, the economic logic has remained subservient to the political diktats in the region. Unlike the impression of liberalisation undoing the state borders and reducing its autonomy, the state structures economic behaviour. Excessive formalisation, bureaucratic hurdles and red-tapism have only multiplied with bad connectivity.

The community in the region is stuck in the crossfire of hard borders, nationalism, and citizenship. The most prominently told story of the Bay of Bengal region is its history of migration that completely changed post-decolonisation. The region had a wide-ranging circular migration network between the subcontinent and Southeast Asia during the colonial period.

Communities carried cultural imprints through religion, language, and kinship ties that went beyond the present constitution of state borders. Partition and decolonisation changed the composition of this region along with the principle of territorial citizenship. The project of otherisation broke the back of the community. Cross-border movements became securitised and continuing insurgencies made the gaze of the State even tougher. What was previously a region of mobile communities became a space of hard-bordered States for whom breach of borders was threatening.

These constraints do not necessarily mean that all elements and ingredients of regionalism are missing. If one may look beyond the borders, the elements are either latent or have been regulated and illegalised by the States. Consider the case of a fourth variable that can tie the region apart from politics, the market. and society — the environment. The climate crisis can be a shared security risk for the States, but is not treated as an issue of “high” politics. Throughout the region, informal trade and migration are regular realities but they are often within the fold of illegality. These elements remind us that the region has its connections despite the states and not because of them. 

So far, the States have spoken about the region, but acted only as States. It is unlikely that states would cease to be the central actors. However, unless they accommodate some shared markers beyond the elements that separate them and meet the community halfway, regionalism would only have promise and no impact.

Udayan Das is an assistant professor, department of political science, St Xavier’s College, Kolkata

The views expressed are personal



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The regional fact sheet (Asia) of the sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with a high degree of confidence projects an increase in heatwaves in the future. Delhi has already recorded the highest temperature in the first half of April since 1950. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) reported the highest average temperature since 1901 for March and a decline in long-term precipitation by 71%. Parts of India are likely to experience increased droughts and an extension of the forest fire season.

For the Himalayan region, heat stress and prolonged droughts will trigger a wide range of issues, and one of the most pressing is the struggle to mitigate forest fire events. In all likelihood, dry conditions and heatwaves will further exacerbate these.

The Uttarakhand state forest department (UKFD)’s data on forest fires (2000-2020) indicates that approximately 2,400 hectares of forest area gets affected by forest fires annually. Robust satellite-based technologies have been available with the forest department for about a decade-and-a-half, providing real-time accurate information on forest fire incidents.

Yet, forests continue to burn year after year. Technological interventions are useful, only to the extent of tracking a fire incident. The solutions to mitigate fires are missing, which require thinking beyond technology. Topography is a limiting factor, ridges and steep slopes are difficult to reach for immediate action. Yet, cloud seeding and spraying water through choppers are hugely impractical and enormously expensive.

What is more problematic is the false sense of hope conveyed by forest managers, deflecting the state to come up with the right solutions. Public concerns are also limited to the fire season, as the first shower of the monsoon hits the mountains, and the seasonal conservationists disappear until the next fire season arrives. Myths, misconceptions, and misinterpretations about the causes of fires are also a matter of huge concern.

Most popular arguments around forest fires in Uttarakhand are directed toward a tree species, Pinus roxburghii (locally known as chir pine) a native conifer that has dominated the Himalayan slopes for thousands of years, and the rural communities who have time and again displayed their affinity to the forests through historic movements. The 1916 protest against the opening up of forests for commercial exploitation by the British and the Chipko movement of the 1970s when mountain women and men put their bodies between the tree and the axe are among these.

Chir pine is likely to spread further if policies remain unchecked. Although, false notions that Chir pine is the primary cause of forest fires require correction; 99% of forest fires in Uttarakhand are ignited due to human activities. Chir pine forests do not ignite fires on their own, the fault of the species lies in its incredible ability to tolerate fire and thrive post-fire events.

As for communities, evidence suggests that pre-monsoon burning results in a better flush of grass in the coming season. In a fodder-deficit region, it is difficult to maintain livestock, which has been an integral part of rural households for centuries. The struggle for fodder is manifested by the fact that Uttarakhand is perhaps the only region in the world where women still have to climb trees for livestock fodder. Fodder production under the pine canopy has yielded promising results. Such strategies provide fodder for livestock and reduce women’s drudgery.

Stringent forest policies have created a barrier between the communities and the forest department. Poor forest management has assisted the expansion of Chir pine. The predictions made through IPCC’s AR6 and the heatwaves in Delhi give us a fair indication of the future. Practices and policies need to be revised, the future strategy rewritten, and past mistakes corrected.

In Uttarakhand, long-term community engagement, incentive mechanisms, and shared ownership can be a silver bullet in the management of forest fires. The onus of execution lies with the forest department. Otherwise, these forests will continue to burn, possibly at larger intensities in the future.

Vishal Singh is the director, Centre for Ecology Development and Research 

The views expressed are personal



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Despite the United States (US) invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003-11) and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, interstate wars, involving great powers were not expected to drive the 21st century.

The prime movers of contemporary world politics were supposed to emanate from global financial networks and supply chains, technology-induced telescoping of time and space, cultural hybridisation and religious revival, enduring inequality and exploitation, global power shift to the Indo-Pacific, terrorism and lethal technologies, and/or the anthropogenic climate crisis in the fragile planetary ecosystem. A global pandemic originating from State duplicity and human hubris recently joined this daunting list.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revives the great power war. European post-modernity lies in a shambles and looks increasingly fanciful. But what exactly do Russia’s invasion and Ukraine’s resistance denote for the rest of us and the remainder of the 21st century?

War, reflecting the relations, patterns, and balances of military power between States, is understandably dominated by great powers, ie, States with system-shaping capabilities and intentions. Nuclear deterrence has reduced the incidence of war between great powers, but not their war-making proclivities in general. Since ancient times, in all civilisational settings, great powers have not hesitated to use force to secure their interests, as portrayed in the fabled Melian dialogue by the historian Thucydides.

Athens, during its war against Sparta, demands that the island of Melos becomes its vassal State and rejects the promise of Melian neutrality with the chilling words: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Can this bleak-yet-compelling statement be countered by another potent idea? Perhaps, yes.

The philosopher Immanuel Kant regards peace as an ethical duty: It is only under conditions of peace that human beings can treat each other as ends, rather than as means to an end. Writing in 1795, Kant proposes that a zone of peace, the “pacific union”, has begun to be established among liberal societies.

Kant bases his “perpetual peace” on the ever-widening acceptance of three “definitive articles”. The first definitive article, which is a constitutional guarantee of caution, restrains a liberal State vis-à-vis its citizens by ensuring their moral autonomy and individualism, while guaranteeing social order.

The second definitive article is an international legal guarantee of respect that restrains liberal States vis-à-vis one another, thereby establishing a pacific union that securely maintains the rights of each State. The third definitive article restrains a liberal State vis-à-vis the citizens of other liberal States by establishing a cosmopolitan law of universal hospitality, which permits “the spirit of commerce” to flourish and makes the pacific union both peaceful and prosperous.

In our times, Kant’s pacific union and perpetual peace have re-emerged as the “democratic peace” proposition, in two distinct versions. The stronger version suggests that democracies are inherently more peaceful because their political cultures involve “give and take”, and their political institutions operate on checks and balances. The weaker version proposes that while democracies are not more peaceful, they do not fight one another.

This idea provoked fierce academic debate in the 1990s, with some scholars arguing that it is almost “an empirical law in international relations” (Jack Levy), while others dismissed it as statistically inconsequential given the small number of democracies over the past two centuries (John Mearsheimer).

Out of this idea emerges a clear policy prescription: If you want peace, promote democracy. Taken to its extreme, the democratic peace can justify an armed intervention to impose democracy, as happened in 2003 with the US invasion of Iraq.

After the September 11 attacks, the ideology of neoconservatism came to dominate US foreign policy. Neocons viewed international issues in absolute moral categories: Democracy was good, authoritarianism was evil. For the sole superpower, the use of military force was the first foreign policy option, not the last. If multilateral institutions and international agreements did not bolster American interests and values, they should be discarded. Democracy could be imposed through the barrel of the gun.

The US transformed Germany and Japan, two monstrous dictatorships, into democracies after militarily defeating them in World War II, and it should do so again. If weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq after its defeat and occupation, so what? The removal of the Saddam Hussein regime was justification enough. The nature of the regime supersedes the balance of power and other considerations. If communist China has freedom of action in the nuclear arena, so should democratic India; ergo, the US-India civil nuclear agreement.

Great power wars endure, and democratic peace flatters to deceive. Would a genuinely democratic Russia not have perceived Ukraine’s pro-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and pro-European Union (EU) policy preferences as menacing and provocative?

Conversely, would Ukraine have felt less threatened by a genuinely democratic Russia and sought to develop friendlier relations with it?

Cooperative security, ie, collaborating in agreed mechanisms to reduce tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, and maintain stability, appears the only viable route to international peace and security in the 21st century. Apart from a military alliance (NATO) and a regional union (the EU), the Euro-Atlantic also contains a cooperative security arrangement, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Sadly, while NATO and the EU are constantly in the news, OSCE has been missing in action in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Varun Sahni teaches international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 

The views expressed are personal



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New Delhi: India wants to fill a large gap in global wheat supplies caused by the Ukraine war, as it is one of the few countries to currently hold surplus stocks, while anticipating another bumper crop in the world’s second-largest grower.

The government is banking on robust exports to lift farm incomes. Soaring global prices, which are higher than government-ordained domestic minimum support prices, have offered a never-before chance to private traders to profitably send shipments abroad.

As the wheat harvest season is underway, trends point to more sobering conclusions, which could upend the country’s export ambitions. Hot weather across north India has cut wheat yields at a time when the country is counting on a bumper crop to tap export markets as supplies from Russia and Ukraine, which account for 29%of global exports, dwindle.

Traders and analysts say it is clear that the country will have a smaller crop this year than previously predicted. In February, before a damaging heatwave took hold, the government forecast wheat production would be a record 111.32 million tonnes this year, against 109.59 million tonnes the previous year.

An early summer marked by nearly a month of above-normal temperatures in March now threatens to cut that estimate.

This could give rise to a spectre of domestic inflation in cereals and potentially a supply crunch with the onset of autumn months, analysts say.

The main winter staple is currently being harvested in major grain-bowl states of Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Cultivators said their per-acre yields (one acre equals 0.40 hectare) have fallen 10-15%.

The Ukraine war has changed the dynamics of how the staple is bought and sold. Usually, the government takes the lead in wheat procurement, or the buying of wheat at federally fixed minimum support prices.

This season, however, the government’s procurement has been slow, as private traders buy record quantities because they expect higher exports and domestic prices to rise in the coming months.

Till April 24, the government and its agencies have procured 13.69 million tonnes from 1.19 million farmers, offering an MSP value of 27,592 crore, according to official data. Last year as of date, the government had procured 6% more.

Here’s what the math looks like. The government needs approximately 25 million tonnes of wheat annually to meet requirements under various programmes, including subsidised grains under the public distribution scheme, available for 800 million people or two-thirds of the population.

Another 10 million tonnes is needed for the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana, the Covid-relief scheme which provides 5kg of additional grains per person per month. This scheme has been extended till September 2022. The government’s opening stocks as on April 1 stood at 19 million tonnes.

Traders and analysts say, under this scenario, if India ends up exporting up to 10 million tonnes, a widely cited target, it could stoke cereal inflation by the onset of the winter months.

“Prices currently are 200-400 more than the minimum support prices of 2,015 per quintal. Traders expect prices to go up further,” said Ashok Agrawal of Comtrade, a commodity trading firm.

Traders are rushing to stockpile wheat because they expect robust exports and higher domestic prices in the coming months. If output due to the heatwave falls by even 10% and prices go up by 8-10%, then the country might have to clamp an export ban by October-November, Agrawal said.

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dented wheat supplies globally, India's wheat exports hit 7.85 million tonnes in the fiscal year to March, an all-time high. This is a sharp rise from 2.1 million tonnes the country exported in the previous year.

At 14%, India’s share in global wheat output is roughly equal to the combined share of Russia and Ukraine. Yet, Indian wheat is otherwise not very competitive globally because international prices are usually far lower than MSPs. The Ukraine war has changed this trend.

Wheat prices domestically have already shot up 15% year-on-year on March 22 on the back of higher exports. These are signs of possible wheat inflation, Agrawal said.

The impact of the Ukraine crisis on India is a mixed bag, analysts say. “It’s both a boon and bane,” said economist Pushan Sharma of Crisil Research Ltd. India will gain from wheat and maize exports and cheaper Russian oil but will pay higher import bills for edible oil it imports from Russia and Ukraine.

If Indian wheat exports rise by 45-50% this calendar year, it will “expectedly push up the price of the grain 8-10% from a year ago in the first quarter of next fiscal,” Sharma said.

ITC Ltd, the country’s largest wheat exporter, has publicly said India is on course to export nearly 21 million tonnes of wheat in FY 2022-23, while the ministry of commerce expects 10 to 15 million tonnes of export in the fiscal year.

By how much India’s wheat crop will fall due to the heatwave is as yet unclear. “The bottom line is that if India’s what crop is significantly lower than expected due to damage because of heat stress, then cereal inflation could be a pain point in 2023,” Agrawal said.



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"Free speech is the bedrock of a functioning democracy, and Twitter is the digital town square where matters vital to the future of humanity are debated," Elon Musk, the new owner of Twitter, said in his first reaction after sealing the deal to take over one of the world’s most influential social media companies.

Musk, in quotes released by Twitter’s communications team, went on to say that he wants to “make Twitter better than ever” by bringing in new features, and plans to “make the algorithms open source to increase trust”, defeat “the spam bots”, and authenticate “all humans”.

Inevitably, Musk’s mission with Twitter could turn out bigger than can be summarised in what he said on Monday. But his initial remarks carry important indicators for what the future could hold for Twitter, and none is more important than his focus on free speech.

Twitter, it must be remembered, was the first social media company to permanently ban then United States (US) President Donald Trump, who had egged on his supporters before the infamous insurrection at the US Capitol on January 6 last year. While others — Facebook, YouTube, and the likes — followed suit, that Twitter did it first is crucial.

Musk, at the time, said tech companies cannot act “as the de facto arbiter of truth”. In appearances since, he has gone on to describe himself as a “free speech absolutist”, especially when prodded to block Russian news content on his Starlink satellite internet service in the days after Moscow invaded Ukraine and launched a propaganda blitzkrieg.

The position has been consistent with the billionaire’s libertarian outlook for the internet, in which he was one of the earliest protagonists, even though his critics point out that his conduct has often contradicted what he said. He has, in the past, called a British national in Thailand “a pedo guy” for criticising him, discredited media reporting critical of him and his companies as motivated, and attempted to stop a Twitter account from posting his flight paths from open-source data.

Of course, it was the freedom of speech enshrined in the First Amendment of the US Constitution — the law that applies to Twitter — that protected Musk’s right to make those comments, even if he at times pushed the boundaries of fiduciary propriety.

But the libertarian idea of speech online today has weaknesses: not all speech is equal, and not all communities suffer equally when free speech is abused.

Take, for instance, the example of Trump, who often mocked the idea of wearing masks during his time in office. If Trump managed to motivate even 25% of Americans who never wore a mask, it likely led to around 4,200 additional deaths till September 2020, a projection by a CDC epidemiologist estimated.

On the other hand, when Trump himself caught the virus, he received an experimental antibody cocktail that would cost close to $100,000 for an average American without insurance — a price that will likely be impossible in a country where the annual median household income is $67,000.

There are examples within Musk’s sphere itself. The billionaire entrepreneur has a legion of followers who often see Musk’s responses to his critics as a dog whistle: journalists, especially women, have reported instances where they have been harassed over social media, flooded with hate and abuse.

Then there is the question of the world beyond the United States of America.

A libertarian Twitter will immediately fly in the face of the Digital Services Act, which the European parliament sealed a consensus on just last week. The future law, expected to come into force between one and two years from now, makes it mandatory for social media companies to remove illegal content under European law (with much narrower immunity for speech than American law) or face fines up to 6% of their annual global turnover.

Legal compliance requirement is far from the sole reason for content moderation to be inevitable — there is a moral motive as well, especially in the Global South. In countries lacking robust institutions and in authoritarian regimes, abuse of free speech will inevitably hit communities outside of the social, economic and political elite harder.

Bad actors can be as sophisticated as nation-States and as solitary as American far-Right figures like Milo Yiannopoulos and Alex Jones — two prominent men banned permanently from Twitter (and several other platforms). Yiannopoulos routinely rallied racist and sexist troll armies, and Jones, who runs a far-right conspiracy theory website Infowars, claimed incidents like the Sandy Hook school massacre in the US and the 9/11 attacks were “false flag operations”.

These challenges are not new — Yiannopoulos was banned in 2016, a year that was a tipping point for platform trust and safety. This was the year when disinformation campaigns, abusing online speech, undermined American elections and the Brexit referendum.

Those are manifestations of how far the internet of today has metamorphosed from the internet envisioned in the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. Penned by cyberlibertarian John Perry Barlow in 1996, it envisioned the internet as a “world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity” — but today, the harms from doing so can be grave.

Barlow did not foresee that problems offline will translate into problems online. Musk, of course, is aware of these challenges. The successes of the projects that today give him his superstar status — Tesla, SpaceX, Hyperloop, Starlink, stem not from ideological absolutism but pragmatism. In almost all of these, unlike true libertarianism, Musk benefited from government help, tax breaks or subsidy.

Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that what Musk does with Twitter will be wholly irrational. In a recent Ted talk, for instance, there was a hint of more nuance to his free speech plans for Twitter: “Twitter has become kind of the de-facto town square, so it’s just really important that people have both the reality and the perception that they are able to speak freely within the bounds of the law.”

How he works on addressing perceptions about free speech on Twitter will be crucial because it is one thing to engineer for matter and material, it is completely another to build for thought.

In Perspective takes a deep dive into current issues, the visible and invisible factors at play, and their implications for our future

The views expressed are personal



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As a stellar cast of leaders descended to Delhi this week for the Raisina Dialogue, which has, in seven years, become a significant platform on the lines of the Munich and Shangri-La dialogues, there are two parallel narratives of India in western capitals. And while these intersect at times, they also operate almost on independent planes. They reveal both the priorities of foreign governments and international capital, but also the success and challenges for Indian diplomacy.

The first narrative is what dominates most foreign ministries, armed forces, intelligence agencies, business chambers, investment banks, financial firms, and policy institutes.

In this narrative, India is among the most important swing players in the international system. It is politically stable with strong leadership within a democratic framework. It is among the key global economic engines coupled with a pro-business regime and an expanding market. It has a gigantic and connected population. It possesses one of the strongest militaries in Asia. It is increasingly embracing a new assertive role and is willing to make difficult strategic choices, especially when it comes to China. And it has a vibrant technology sector with a pioneering role in the digital economy.

All of this makes Delhi somewhat indispensable as existing international structures go through a churn, old rivalries resurface and new ones sharpen, and each country looks to expand partnerships which would help their companies profit, their workforce get jobs, their trading arrangements become more robust, and their interests more secure especially in the Indo-Pacific. The guests at the Raisina Dialogue want to be friends with this India.

The second narrative is what dominates the thinking of large sections of the western press, human rights organisations, segments of the liberal and Left political landscape, including legislators, and a set of foreign policy and economic analysts, some within but mostly outside the governance ecosystems.

In this narrative, India is on the cusp of a crisis. Its economic story is exaggerated and obscures the slowdown in growth and rising inequality. Its strategic strengths are overblown, given the deficits in its military modernisation, its reluctance to speak up candidly about the China threat, and its desire to be in all global strategic boats simultaneously. And India’s democratic script has gone awry, with an illiberal and majoritarian regime deepening communal cleavages, misusing independent institutions, giving an ideological cover to vigilante groups, and undermining the rule of law and social peace.

This narrative is partly driven and stoked by India’s external adversaries. But it is also driven by constituencies that genuinely believe that neglecting these trends will push India on to an insular and authoritarian route, and weaken its value as a credible and strong interlocutor for the West.

Sometimes, the two narratives — despite their contradictions — overlap. Which is why you have foreign leaders reciting a long list of Indian strengths, interspersed with statements on their concerns about India’s political and strategic direction.

But for the most part, as much as the government’s critics find it uncomfortable to acknowledge it, the balance of power is clear. Those who wield political, military and economic levers of power in western capitals want to leverage India’s strengths, rather than turn the spotlight on its perceived weaknesses except sporadically.

This is due to India’s structural advantages. But it is also due to relentless Indian diplomacy, which has had the tough job of casting a spin on India’s turn towards illiberalism, pretending there is a values-based convergence for public optics, while firmly focusing on tangible interests to build convergences.

This has also involved building up political, economic, diplomatic and military constituencies in key capitals, which speak up for Indian interests as well as leveraging personal relationships.

But success in ensuring the first narrative prevails requires constant work, for domestic political events often end up feeding the second narrative. While the context is entirely different, how sceptics can, abruptly, overpower advocates of a relationship is most visible in the case of Saudi Arabia and the United States (US). Riyadh has remained one of Washington’s closest allies, but the killing of columnist Jamal Khashoggi, allegedly on the orders of Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), led to a shift where the Democratic administration and Congress took a tough line on the kingdom. The reduced energy dependence played a part. The strategic argument took a backseat, the rift between the two capitals deepened, Saudis began exploring alternatives and deepening their partnership with China. It is only now, as DC tries to make up with Riyadh, that MBS has regained the upper hand.

The world has become more dangerous and the period where India could focus on domestic transformation in a relatively benign external climate is long gone. But each crisis is throwing up newer opportunities. The pandemic has made Make in India a defining diplomatic card, aligned with the world’s focus on diversifying supply chains. China’s border challenge has made both India reset its strategic calculus and the world see Delhi as the only capital that is actually spilling blood to resist the new bout of Chinese expansionism. Russia’s war is opening diplomatic and military doors as the West makes a renewed bid to woo India.

All of this is helping New Delhi win the narrative war where it matters — inside the power corridors of Washington, London, Paris, and Brussels. But to ensure that the noise from outside those corridors doesn’t percolate through the windows and translate into policy, and, more importantly, to live up to its constitutional principles, India may want to take a hard look at what’s happening on the ground.

The views expressed are personal



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British Prime Minister (PM) Boris Johnson’s visit to India accomplished a long-awaited objective.

On July 17, 2019, Johnson stood on a stage in London, waving a smoked fish above his head. “I want you to consider this kipper,” he told the crowd. British manufacturers of the traditional breakfast treat had their postage costs unfairly pushed up by European Union (EU) regulations. After Brexit, such red tape would be a thing of the past. “We will,” he said, “get our mojo back”.

It was classic Johnson – soaring rhetoric on a patriotic theme, delivered with an attention-grabbing stunt. That rules governing kipper shipments were set by the United Kingdom (UK), not the EU, was also characteristic of Johnson’s history of putting narratives ahead of facts.

Despite his popularity and ability to pull off successful feats in politics and governance, there appears a trait of dramatic overreach in his approach, often clouding harsh contradictory realities. That led the Conservative Party, led by Johnson, towards an excessive, carefree economic bonding with China, to the detriment of accepted norms and regulations governing international ties.

Johnson’s visit to India was a concerted move to re-calibrate ties with democratic states, and ward off increasing dependence on autocratic countries. A British report, leaked to the press in London, revealed how China and its global companies, such Huawei had penetrated Britain’s renowned institutions.

Moreover, Hidden Hand, authored by Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, explicated Chinese influence operations across many geographies – including Britain – and international institutions. Hamilton and Ohlberg explicitly narrate a wake-up call about the deep entrenchment of the Chinese Communist Party’s undesirable economic influence among certain British elites.

It prompted a realisation in Britain that Chinese influence breached the proverbial demarcated line between a legitimate effort at winning support from other countries and the unacceptable use of corruption and coercion to shape decision-making in target nations. There was a major revolt in the ruling Conservative Party against undue and unfair Chinese penetration into the British economy. With further pressure from the United States, Johnson began to review the UK’s relationship with China.

During his first term in power, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an effort to reach out to Britain; that appears to have petered out. Britain’s recurring efforts to balance India and Pakistan inevitably put off New Delhi. Nevertheless, the Indian establishment seems to have taken it in its stride by setting itself a political challenge: To decisively turn Britain in favour of India.

New Delhi has sufficient equities to bring about a change. Some years ago, Indian external affairs minister, S Jaishankar, addressing a business summit in London, emphasised that Britain remains a top-tier economy, commands significant international influence, enjoys special relations with Europe and United States, and is an important hub of global research and innovation.

Johnson’s arrival in India bespoke the potential use of Britain as a significant middle power and of India as a rising power in furthering a symbiotic relationship and expanding India’s strategic options. The successful completion of the ongoing India-UK Free Trade Agreement (FTA), marked by 26 segments, will be a significant achievement.

Johnson voiced his intent to assist in deepening the long-term partnership between the two countries. As threats to mutual peace and prosperity rise from autocratic states, democracies and friends must stick together.

This is a proper sequel to the energy emanated from the G-7 Summit held last year in the UK. That congregation clarified that apart from earnest dialogues among the member-states of the grouping, it was necessary to widen the ambit of such institutions beyond the geographic West by increasing parleys with large democracies like India.

As if on cue, a recent “Integrated Review of Defence, Security, and Foreign Policy”, released by the UK, speaks of the country’s desire to establish a more significant and more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific than any other European country. It is highlighted by an eagerness to develop a maritime partnership with India to support mutual security objectives in the Indian Ocean.

This would be underpinned by enhanced collaboration in defence objectives, and the continuation of joint military exercises to improve interoperability. Another notable aspect is increasing industrial collaboration with India by building upon the “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)”, signed in 2019.

The United Kingdom will continue to provide important financing arrangements regarding further investment. To bolster green infrastructure in India, a co-operative framework has been crafted between India and UK About $425 million will be provided by India, while the British International Investment (BII) would bring forth up to $1 billion in support. It is deemed to boost-up attendant manufacturing and services in India.

The Modi-Johnson summit emanated positive vibes. Therefore, thorny issues like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the scenario in Afghanistan, and its potential attendant effects on the region and beyond could surely be papered over skillfully without affecting sundry discernible promising attributes in relations between India and the UK.

Ranajoy Sen is an analyst. He writes on global affairs, economy and politics.

The views expressed are personal



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The climate crisis-induced disasters are among the most relevant dangers to human survival. Children, in particular, are at the receiving end. Today, an estimated 2.2 billion children worldwide are growing up facing the impacts of the climate crisis, even though they have the right to healthy and nutritious food, good physical, mental and social health, and access to knowledge. The climate crisis directly threatens these basic rights of children.

India is the third most disaster-prone country globally, next only to United States (US) and China, with children comprising 40% of its population. Any disasters impact the most vulnerable people and their children disproportionately.

The Children’s Climate Risk Index (CCRI), which ranks countries based on children’s exposure to climate and environmental shocks such as cyclones and heat waves, and their vulnerability to those shocks based on their access to essential services. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and India are among four South Asian countries where children are at extremely high risk of the impacts of the climate crisis, with a ranking of 14th, 15th, 25th and 26th, respectively. In addition, CCRI has placed India as one of the 33 extremely high-risk countries, with flooding and air pollution being the repeated environmental shocks, leading to adverse socio-economic consequences for women and children.

A human rights crisis

The climate crisis is a human rights crisis because the children of this and future generations will not have the basic requirement of life i.e. clean air, safe drinking water, and sufficient food and secure shelter.

On a larger degree, the climate crisis is also looming over the achievement of universal health care (UHC) through adverse health outcomes and disruption of the health care system. Although it is already creating a substantial global burden of disease, the current Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) due to unsafe water, lack of sanitation and hygiene, urban air pollution, indoor smoke from solid fuels, and lead exposure dwarf the present-day effects of climate change on health. The incidence of many infectious diseases shows seasonality, and additional outbreaks frequently accompany extreme weather events. Since meteorological parameters influence vector reproduction, it is obvious to link disease outbreaks with climate change and to assume a correlation between increasing disease incidence and global warming.

However, the factors responsible for the emergence/re-emergence of vector-borne diseases are complex and mutually influence each other. Many countries with the highest susceptibility to the climate crisis have the lowest UHC coverage. These regions stand to have colossal gains through an integrated approach. Climate-sensitive illnesses are on the increase due to the extremes of weather impact.

Estimating the future burden of climate-related disease impacts on children is complex. The problem will affect the lifecycle of a child from the pre-conception period to his or her adolescence. Furthermore, people experience different inherent sensitivities to the impacts of the climate crisis at different ages and life stages. Hence, climate health strategies for children should be tailored as per their stage of life.

Keeping this in mind, India’s first National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) was released on June 30, 2008. In addition, a National Expert Group on Climate Change & Health was constituted in July 2015 to prepare an action plan, recommend strategies for adaptation, and capacity building.

UHC strategies must work to improve the thoughtfulness of climate crisis, use novel climate-sensitive financial frameworks, and incorporate the mitigation of greenhouse gases. They should strive for evidence-based climate adaptation that protects the health and prioritises health system climate resiliency. Integration of the climate crisis adaptation within global health strategy could mean both better sustainability of the existing programmes as the climate becomes increasingly unpredictable and better inclusion of these climate crisis efforts in the near-term international health programmes by coupling with programmes that already have funding,

Children’s environmental health indicators

Frameworks for prevention include the incorporation of climate crisis actions into the 10 essential functions of public health and the WHO’s efforts to develop internationally comparable Children’s Environmental Health Indicators (CEHIs). CEHIs—subdivided into categories of context, exposures, health outcomes, and actions—have emerged from several international agreements as a proposed tool for tracking the state of children’s environmental health. Prevention through adaptation, resilience, and mitigation.

Prevention strategies about climate crisis have primarily focused on reducing or mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) levels in the global system. However, the concept of prevention in public health is multi-tiered.

To wrap up, there is a specified need to enhance monitoring of current children’s environmental health status, better incorporation of climate change adaptation into existing programs, and new climate-sensitive disease prevention programs that have short- and long-term health co-benefits.

Vikas Kaushal is head – health, Save the Children (Bal Raksha Bharat)

The views expressed are personal



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The great French chef Alain Ducasse was supposed to be in India today. He postponed his visit at the last minute, but his Ecole Ducasse, a culinary and hotel school will open as scheduled in partnership with Dilip Puri’s state-of-the-art Indian School of Hospitality in Gurgaon.

Ducasse has been to India at least once before. When I met him (at his New York restaurant Adour which has since closed) over a decade ago, he told me that he had once talked to the Taj group about opening one of his restaurants here. Eventually the idea was dropped because the Taj was not sure that the Indian market could handle Ducasse’s prices.

Nobu Matsuhisa, founder of the Nobu chain and inventor of a popular school of modern Japanese cooking that is often mistaken for real Japanese food, had the same experience. I met him when he opened his Dubai restaurant and he told me that a proposed collaboration with the Leela group had fallen through because he liked to open large, expensive restaurants and, once again, it was not clear if the Indian market was ready for expensive restaurants of that size.

I reckon that things have changed now. People are willing to pay much more for meals than they were a decade ago, so Nobu might work in India. But Ducasse? I am not sure. Not because Ducasse's food is not good (it is brilliant) or because rich Indians won’t pay for high priced food but because Indians seem to have fallen out of love with French food.

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There was a time when, all over the world, formal dining meant French cuisine. In such great cities as New York, the top restaurants were French (say Lutece or Le Cote Basque). In London, all the top hotels hired French (or French-Swiss) executive chefs. In Hong Kong, haute cuisine meant only French food.

This was true of India as well. Cooking schools encouraged students to learn French (as did some hotel training programmes) and nearly every senior chef had a background in French food. For instance, when Satish Arora became executive chef of the Taj Mahal Hotel in 1973, at the absurdly young age of 26 (I don’t think that record has been broken in India to date; at least not at a major hotel), his training was in French food. He replaced the legendary Miguel Mascarenhas, known to everyone as Maskie, whose claim to fame was also his French food.

In those days, every expensive hotel restaurant was French. The Taj had the Rendezvous, always associated with Maskie. The Oberoi in Delhi had the confusingly named The Taj which served French haute cuisine.

Bit by bit, the better Indian chefs started moving away from French food and discovering our own cuisines. Arora is best remembered for his innovations with Indian food at the Taj, not for the French cuisine skills that first got him the job.

And then Indian diners discovered other foreign cuisines, most notably Chinese. Even when it was not Punjabified, relatively authentic Chinese food became a popular option at upmarket restaurants. But what really finished off French restaurants in India was the rise in popularity of Italian food. This was pioneered by two Taj restaurants, Trattoria in Mumbai and Casa Medici in Delhi and soon spread to the standalone sector.

It has now got to the stage where, if a five-star hotel needs to open a ‘Continental’ restaurant, Italian food will always be preferred over French. The Mumbai Taj has closed both the original Rendezvous and the French-influenced Zodiac Grill. The Mumbai Oberoi closed the French The Rotisserie and opened Vetro, an Italian restaurant in its place. Hyatt and Marriott keep opening new hotels but always prefer Italian restaurants to French.

So why did French food lose out? Three reasons, I think. One: French cuisine has little to offer vegetarians who, these days, are the restaurant guests with the most money. Italian food has pastas and pizzas.

Two: Indians love carbs. We may be the only people in the world who will order both noodles and fried rice when we go to a Chinese restaurant. Italian food can be carb-heavy which works well in India. French food is meat and vegetables.

And three: This is slightly controversial but I do believe that it takes lots of training and skill to cook French food. The kind of Italian food served at restaurants in India, however, is simple to make so chefs and cooks are easy to find.

Consequently, it is hard to find good French restaurants in India even at top hotels. In Delhi, there is just the Orient Express which opened way back in 1983. In Mumbai, Calcutta, Bangalore and Chennai, there is not a single noteworthy French restaurant at any of the city’s top hotels.

Strangely, it is the standalone sector that seems to have rediscovered French food. Riyaaz Amlani, best known for his Social and Smokehouse chains, has opened two French restaurants in Mumbai: Slink and Bardot and Souffle. I had a mixed experience at Slink and Bardot but I absolutely loved Souffle. It is unusual to find somewhere that serves a perfect duck confit, an excellent roast chicken or a high quality cheese souffle and still manage to pack the punters in.

In Delhi, there is Reve in Aerocity which I have not been to but have heard good things about. And Priyank Sukhija, the restaurant king of Delhi, has opened Bougie, a stylish new French bistro with elegant interiors by Natasha Jain. It is packed on weekends and the location is spectacular which also helps.

Both places appeal to a younger clientele which neither knows nor cares what the Rendezvous or the Zodiac Grill were and has no interest in the haute cuisine traditions of France. Younger diners prefer simple bistro food and they go to the new restaurants for the best reason of all: Because they like the food.

Does this mean that French cuisine is making some sort of comeback in urban India? It is too early to tell but the pattern is the same in New York, London and other cities. French food is being shorn of the snobbery associated with it, and made more accessible by being served in friendly and relaxed surroundings and it is cooked by highly skilled chefs.

Perhaps Alain Ducasse will try the new places when he finally makes it here. It should make him proud to see the cuisine of his country find a new generation of fans in India.



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The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was founded in 1925 and in three years it will be 100. Some people have felt, especially after the events since 2019, that 2025 will herald the transition of India to a Hindu Rashtra. I explored what that could possibly mean in a previous book and am taking up some aspects of that here.

A nation can be secular, Hindu Rashtra, Islamic State or any other thing based on the law. It is the laws that define the nature of the State. Today India is governed through a Constitution which was adopted after Independence, and a set of criminal laws codified in the 19th century. These laws, mainly the Indian Penal Code, were enacted in 1860 and have remained more or less intact across the whole of South Asia. To understand what changes can come here, we must first try to understand what the term Hindu Rashtra means.

To my mind, it could mean one of two things. The first is that it is an interpretation of the Hindu texts and the construction of a State and laws based on these texts. The problem here, as Dr B.R. Ambedkar had examined in his classic essay “Annihilation of Caste”, is that these texts are not applicable. Enforcing the caste theory in law is not possible in our time, for no reason other than the fact that the majority of Hindus would be disadvantaged by this.

It is for this reason that Nepal was an incomplete Hindu Rashtra, which it was till 2008. In the kingdom of Nepal, executive authority had flowed from a Kshatriya King, as prescribed in the Manu Smriti, and he was advised by a Brahmin, called the “Mool Purohit”, or “Bada Gurujyu”, in his court. But no other part of the caste framework was applied, because it could not be. So, we can rule out a Hindu Rashtra in India where only those born Kshatriya will rule us, advised by Brahmins, and the rest of us left with few or no rights.

The other form that such a Hindu Rashtra may take would be to become exclusionary. This is the form that many religious states, including Pakistan, have taken. In Pakistan, no non-Muslim can become Prime Minister by law (Article 91). This was also the case for the President (Article 41), which is important because Pakistan’s President had the power to dismiss Parliament, which was not something that the Indian President has.

So a Hindu Rashtra of this type can mandate by law that no non-Hindu can become Prime Minister or chief minister, and that only Hindus can hold certain offices. We should consider here that though we have no such law, there is no Muslim chief minister at present in this country, that no Muslim has ever served a full five-year term as CM in any state other than Jammu and Kashmir, and of course there has never been a Muslim Prime Minister in India.

This type of Hindu Rashtra can also adopt some other discriminatory aspects against its religious minorities that certain states like Pakistan have chosen. For instance, non-Muslims vote in separate electorates, and the apostatised community of Ahmadis cannot call themselves Muslims and have no religious freedom. BJP MP Subramanian Swamy has proposed that Muslims should be disenfranchised, meaning that they lose their right to vote.

Germany in the 1930s adopted a set of laws that prevented inter-marriage between communities. In India, after 2018, seven BJP states have passed laws that also criminalise marriage between Muslims and Hindus. German laws excluded Jews from citizenship, and India has of course adopted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), excluding Muslims, and the Union home minister has promised us the National Register of Citizens (NRC), which also targets what he calls “termites”.

Many of the things that India has done, especially since 2019, with targeted laws and policy on namaz, hijab, beef, bulldozer, talaq and so on would also be something that we can see in an exclusionary Hindu Rashtra.

So the question is, if we have already excluded Muslims from political offices by default, and if we are already harassing them daily through laws, like Nazi Germany had done and like Pakistan does even now, then why do we need a Hindu Rashtra at all or a change from the present set of laws? My book concluded that we did not. That the present Constitution and the laws give Hindus enough freedom to apply discrimination against non-Hindus legally, while still pretending to be pluralist, democratic and secular. There appears to be no particular advantage or benefit that we get in officially changing our constitutional and legal state from a secular one to a Hindu Rashtra.

Of course we can still do it because it can give us pride and we can humiliate Muslims further and tell them they have no stake in India. Some have written that many Muslims might prefer this honesty rather than be marginalised through hypocrisy as they have been done.

Whatever we decide, it will interest the world. The era of religious states is over and no new ones of significance have been founded in the 21st century. Many states founded on religion have reversed their discriminatory laws because birth and faith are too narrow a frame to view individuals through. While for citizens this period may be traumatic, and it is for me the worst period of my life, for writers it is rich with material as a nation once admired around the world is eating itself alive.



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It was undoubtedly a measure of the international assessment of Boris Johnson’s government that the pound sterling plummeted to its lowest level against the dollar since 2020 while he was scattering “Narendras” like confetti on his “khas dost”, our own Prime Minister, and being photographed in an ornate Hindu temple flanked by seven barefoot men, presumably sadhus, in saffron robes and turbans.

Not that the British Prime Minister’s hand of friendship is to be spurned, especially not when he appears to be promising India a privileged alliance like those with Russia and China. If that sounds contradictory, it’s part of the enigma of a journalist-turned-politician of considerable charm and persuasive skill who was Theresa May’s loyal lieutenant until he ditched her to take her job.

The astute principle (“I don’t think it’s the job of one country to preach to another”) that Mr Johnson mentioned on Indian television offered an important clue to his strategy for winning friends and influencing people and the dexterous balancing act with Russia, China and India. Instead, he tries to spin a charkha squatting on the floor and boasts of being the first Conservative Prime Minister to visit Mr Modi’s home state. Yet, if ever two countries were natural allies, they are India and Britain, and not only because both are now to some extent under American tutelage.

However, Indians looking for all-weather friends and support in Ladakh cannot forget Mr Johnson’s “I am no Sinophobe -- very far from it” to Bloomberg, and adding: “I’m not going to tell you that the UK government is going to pitchfork away every overture from China.” Of course not. China is Britain’s third largest trading partner while India is the 17th. Queen Elizabeth II lavished board and lodging at Buckingham Palace on President Xi Jinping whereas Mr Modi merited only a lunch. But beleaguered in “Londongrad” -- a nickname alluding to Russian money’s high presence in London, of which more later -- neither can Mr Johnson turn up his nose at India’s vast market or its geopolitical significance for the Indo-Pacific region. Certainly not after the hopes of the world rushing to deal with Britain after Brexit collapsed long before the war that is now savaging Ukraine.

Mr Johnson can claim special rights in India (only if presented with the utmost tact of course) because so much here has been assimilated from the colonial era that it is sometimes difficult to tell where Britain stops and India begins. History is reinforced by 1.4 million Indian-origin people (around 2.5 per cent of the population of England and Wales) comprising the largest ethnic group there after whites. In those years when Britain knocked in vain at Europe’s closed door, some European leaders explained in private that even Britain’s whites had undergone cultural mutation during their long association with India. Mr Johnson’s Turkish ancestry and the half-Sikh QC to whom he was married for 25 years may have contributed further to the glibness that enabled him smoothly to gloss over India’s independent position on Russia which irritates other Western powers, notably the United States.

The sterling’s instability was not the only problem brewing at home. While what has been dubbed “Partygate” still threatens his job, other issues cloud the horizon. There was -- and is -- the question of Rishi Sunak, his ethnic Indian chancellor of the exchequer, taking advantage of a loophole in British law so that his wife Akshata, the daughter of Infosys founder, N.R. Narayana Murthy, and reportedly richer than Queen Elizabeth II herself, could have the best of all worlds. There also was -- and is -- his home secretary Priti Patel and her dogged resistance to immigration from Asia, betraying the established but nevertheless insecure immigrant’s resentment of new arrivals. It’s a global phenomenon.

Australia had to be persuaded to lower the drawbridge to some extent; the United States still treats waiting queues on the Mexican border scandalously; and Indian Singaporeans are most critical of increased migration from India.

The outrageous plan to send those who seek asylum in Britain to Rwanda, where more than 75,000 Congolese refugees are already languishing in camps, not just for their papers to be processed but also resettlement, is probably a collective decision. Nothing could be more callous.

The world hasn’t forgotten that in just 100 blood-soaked days in 1994, Rwanda’s ethnic majority Hutus slaughtered 800,000 people, mainly the minority Tutsis but also political opponents irrespective of ethnicity. That massacre makes the Russian barbarity in Ukraine seem almost like a tea party. Transferring asylum-seekers to such a place almost sounds like another Guantanamo Bay beyond the protection of civilised law.

Post-Brexit Britain, trying to go it alone, cannot afford to ignore any possible source of comfort, especially with retail sales falling alarmingly and investment dwindling. Hence the ambivalence that may suit India but exposes the reliance on Chinese investment and Russian oligarchs with links to Vladimir Putin who buy right of residence by promising to invest in Britain. A 2009 book, Londongrad: From Russia with Cash; The Inside Story of the Oligarchs, by Mark Hollingsworth and Stewart Lansley, tells the dazzling tale of these financial buccaneers who made colossal fortunes after Communism collapsed in Russia, and settled in London to enjoy their new-found wealth. They include Alexander Lebedev at whose Italian villa Mr Johnson was reportedly a guest in 2018 and whom he has since ennobled. Lord Lebedev’s father, a former KGB agent, is co-owner of the independent Novaya Gazeta newspaper in Russia, while he himself owns Britain’s Independent and Evening Standard newspapers.

Mr Johnson would be the first to repeat, and rightly too, that domestic characteristics have little bearing on foreign policy. But history, not least of the British empire, shows that the internal does have a way of influencing the external. Moreover, the close interaction between India and Britain is possible only because of India’s deep understanding of and sympathy for Britain’s dilemma. It gives no pleasure here to be reminded that Dean Acheson’s observation -- that “Great Britain has lost an empire but not yet found a role” -- remains as true under Boris Johnson as when it was made in 1962. But he might yet be able to smooth things over if the proposed free trade agreement grants Indians more British visas in return for India importing more Scotch.



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The optics of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Kashmir after August 5, 2019, may have been impressive, particularly since the major event was held at Palli, a village near the Pakistan border, on National Panchayati Raj Day. It was meant to convey the message that democracy had reached the nooks and corners, encompassing 30,000 villages in the Valley. But what the Prime Minister did not commit to was a timeline as to when the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir will regain statehood.

The fanfare of the visit notwithstanding, the Prime Minister may have missed an opportunity in not offering a glimpse of the political future of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh when a concrete road map was expected to be laid out. In nearly three years since its abrogation, the debate surrounding Article 370 may have faded, but anticipation of the return of democracy remains as keen as ever, certainly in the Valley.

A greater reassurance on the timeframe for Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir would have been welcome. In fact, India, with its commitment to the world’s largest electoral democracy, in which all people make their choice of leaders and governments, should also commit itself to creating an Assembly for the Union Territory of Ladakh.

The Union Territory may lie in a sensitive border area where the focus is on India-China tensions, especially post-2020 skirmishes in the Galwan valley. But it’s up to India to expand on its commitment to democracy by showing that it can have a responsible elected government even in such a forward area and setting. The Ladakhis would also love their share of democracy, which may have reached the grassroots in Kashmir but is yet to get to Ladakh.

The increased connectivity that the Prime Minister promised in signalling the start of Rs 20,000 crore schemes to enhance connectivity and electricity generation through traditional and renewable sources comes at a time when the footfall of international tourists increased manifold in the Kashmir Valley last winter, the harsh security environment notwithstanding and with even the separatist sections calling for free access for tourists.

Funds for development, electricity, water and toilets would always be welcomed in a region that suffered through decades of violence and mayhem and from which there is a promise of a liberated future and jobs for the youth of today, as the Prime Minister assured. But only an end to the political uncertainty can lead to a better future and it is in this regard that the call for a return to elections should be paid heed to.

The politics of delimitation, etc., will run its course given the historical differences between Jammu and Kashmir. One of the main objectives of the abrogation of Article 370 may have fructified as about 175 central laws have become applicable in the Valley, as the PM took pride in pointing out. It is, however, truly democratic only if the people can have their say, even in the Valley where the Gupkar Alliance members are major players.

No one believes the security risks will go away with the return of democracy as militancy in the Valley also has a history to it now. Statehood for J&K and democracy for Ladakh may not end the problems but, historically, democracy has been the Indian way. To set a timeframe now for statehood would be forward-looking and more fruitful than delving into the historicity of the agreement that brought Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian fold and the subsequent change to the status of J&K and Ladakh.



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The French presidential elections last Sunday had more than the normal significance for many reasons. Under the two-stage system, the run-off between the two leading candidates had thrown up extreme right-wing populist Marine Le Pen against incumbent President Emmanuel Macron. The election was held against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

President Macron won by a fairly comfortable margin of 58.2 per cent to 41.8 per cent for Ms Le Pen, but it was smaller than when he had won the presidency for the first time in 2017. However, this is the first time in two decades in France that a President has been re-elected. Since Charles de Gaulle created the Fifth Republic, only two other Presidents have been elected to multiple terms — Socialist Francois Mitterrand in 1988 and Gaullist Jacques Chirac in 2002.

However, the fact that Ms Le Pen had garnered 13.3 million votes cannot be ignored by the winner, who was seen as lacking in empathy and perceived as a technocratic, distant figure. France remains deeply divided and needs healing. It is estimated that 70 per cent of affluent people voted for Mr Macron, while 65 per cent of the poor went with Ms Le Pen. Even more significantly, around 70 per cent of the 18-24 age group voted for leftist Jean-Luc Melenchon, who came third in the first round and got eliminated.

The whole of Europe appeared to heave a sigh of relief after President Macron’s win as a Le Pen victory would have been a setback for multiple reasons. Ms Le Pen has been known to lean towards Russian President Vladimir Putin, and sceptical towards both the European Union and Nato. Her victory could have dealt a death blow to the idea of Europe, which was already severely damaged by Brexit, after the British decided to leave the EU.

US President Joe Biden, in his congratulatory message to Mr Macron, put his finger on the other important factor. He said Mr Macron’s win will help “to defend democracy”. The victory earlier of Viktor Orban as President of Hungary had raised concerns in Europe about populists capturing more space in the EU. Mr Orban claimed after his win: “The whole world has seen tonight in Budapest that Christian democratic politics, conservative civic policies, and patriotic politics have won. We are telling Europe that this is not the past. This is the future.”

Coincidentally, in Slovenia, a three-term populist Prime Minister Janez Jensa was also defeated by an alliance committed to liberal democracy.

From the foreign policy perspective, Ms Le Pen as President would have caused disunity in Nato’s collective stand on firmly opposing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine. Ms Le Pen has always been an unabashed fan of President Putin.

Unsurprisingly, a Hungarian bank lent money to Ms Le Pen’s party for the French election. The populists were holding hands to spread their control over more and more EU nations. France is holding the presidency of the EU till end June. It is expected that Mr Macron will steer the EU towards an oil embargo on Russia.

Mr Macron’s personality and style have invited analysis as a lead-up to the election. The Economist magazine summed it up as follows: “He is solitary, he decides everything alone”. That approach covers policy, diplomacy, appointments, etc. This may make Mr Macron appear like a distant emperor, but it helps him deliver on pledges in his election manifesto. He could act, sometimes not successfully, to loosen the labour market, cut taxes, end the pension privileges of railway workers, and to encourage investment. He also sometimes succeeded when defying the conventional approach. He reopened schools two months into the Covid breakout. He imposed a “Covid Pass” that most people felt would not work, but saw vaccination rates rise above the levels in other EU nations.

So, what does the second Macron presidency mean beyond Europe? His basic vision will be same, encompassing multilateralism, the rule of law, Nato and a commitment to European strategic autonomy. The last may be contested as most European nations are happy to have the US involved with European security after the Ukraine war. India has, since the days of Indira Gandhi, felt comfortable in dealing with France due to its being half-in and half-out of the European alliance system. When India conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998, the French foreign minister was in India. France protested the least out of the five UN Security Council permanent members. That is why, besides Russia, for big defence platforms like Air Force planes, India used France to reduce dependence on a single nation. India will be more comfortable with a strategically independent France, even within Europe.

Mr Macron may now try to be more collegial in running France but by temperament he is a technocratic doer. On environment, he will push harder as not only does he believe in it, but he also needs to woo younger voters on the Left and the Greens. His diplomacy often leaves his partners in EU scratching their heads. He has been keeping a channel open to Mr Putin and may try peace-making again.

India can feel reassured that a known pair of hands are at Elysée Palace to keep Indo-French relations on an even keel. France is an important source for technology in the defence, aerospace, and civil nuclear sectors.

Mr Macron’s centrist positioning holds lessons for India. Since 2015, 245 people have died in Islamist terror attacks, some conducted brutally in public. He has still not let the extremist right-wing hijack French politics. True, Ms Le Pen has increased her vote percentage, but countering a populist leader who uses a mix of bigotry and xenophobia is no cakewalk. Mr Macron’s personality-based, highly centralised, pledge-oriented politics, neither left nor right, can be compared to Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party. Mr Macron also instituted school reforms, which halved the class size and introduced school breakfasts.

Mr Macron is also looking at some populist measures that provide relief to the common man like gasoline rebate. He probably realises the danger of governance from within a bubble. He has elections to the National Assembly coming up in June. If the Opposition seizes control there, he will find it more difficult to implement his agenda. France was angry but has voted with its head, realising that a Le Pen presidency would cause great disruption in times of war and pandemic, that Mr Macron handled well. Punjab voted with its heart and may yet regret it. Meanwhile, India needs to search for a Macron of its own.



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Over two decades ago, Bill Gates entered into a famous spat with a leader in the global automobile industry, remarking, “if the car industry had innovated like software and computers, we would have cars costing less than $4,000 and delivering a mileage of over 50 miles a litre”, to which, the car industry man retorted, “...and crash three times a day.”

In a brave new Tesla-redefined world, we have a booming industry of electric vehicles (EVs), which are being defined and viewed more as computers as wheels rather than variants and improvisations on traditional automobiles. There are sprouting start-ups on the one hand, which are working on its software side, or the battery and its recharging, and on the other, infra and energy companies designing new-age charging solutions, even as traditional car industries are transforming for an age beyond the carbon-rich fossil fuels.

Innovation best booms, especially in a nascent area, with least regulations and a near-total free hand to the dreamers, innovators, designers, developers, who can experiment freely, building prototypes and improving the product in stages and pieces. It would be foolhardy to wait for perfect solutions. Hence, by design, the early-age EVs would be imperfect. Think of the early-age mobile phones, or TVs, or even aeroplanes.

But a recent spate of accidents, where either a vehicle has burst while being driven or while being parked, or a battery has gone off while being charged inside a home, some of them fatal, which is a cause for concern.

The road safety and overall safety tests for electric vehicles, including their battery and charging equipment, must undergo as excruciatingly stringent a battery of tests as are legally mandated for the traditional automobile industry. There can be no allowance for a slip up in issues of public safety.

India needs to come out, quickly, even urgently, with a comprehensive policy on electric vehicles.



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