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Editorials - 04-04-2022

New Delhi should play its cards extremely well right now to invest in future geopolitical dividends

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to a flurry of diplomatic activity in New Delhi: some visitors came to test the waters, some to discuss life beyond Ukraine, some to seek solidarity, and some others to issue veiled warnings. New Delhi has been forthcoming and patient. What, however, hasn’t gone down very well in India is the public chastisement of its Russia policy i.e., the decision to continue its trade with Russia and unwillingness to condemn Russian aggression. It appears that several visitors to New Delhi miss a crucial point: India is not in Europe even if it shares, despite the occasional aberration, many of the norms and values held dear by much of the international community. More importantly, notwithstanding the Indian diaspora in the West and the warmth of people-to-people contacts, India is a post-colonial country with understandable sensitivities about how Western interlocutors engage the country.

More so, it is unfair to ask a developing country fighting serious economic hardships and recovering from the debilitating impact of COVID-19 not to buy discounted Russian oil, especially when some of India’s critics are still buying energy from Russia, discounted or not. Several Western policy commentators are aghast as to why India is unwilling to endure some economic pain to send a loud and clear message that it doesn’t not support territorial aggression by any country. The answer once again lies in the state of India’s economy, its need for unrestricted supply of defence equipment, and its geopolitical location. There is little doubt that the Ukraine war will impact the Indian economy, slowly perhaps but steadily for sure. Unfortunately for India, the sanctions on Russia have come at a time when the Indian economy is still recovering from the impact of COVID-19.

The strawman arguments

One of the arguments that is emphatically made by several of India’s partners in the West is that the Russia-Ukraine war is a broader conflict between democracies and non-democracies, and therefore India must decide which side of the ideological divide it wants to be on. That is not just a baseless myth, but a dangerous trope that can plunge the international community into another needless ideological rivalry. This is not something that New Delhi should get caught in. Russia’s military aggression is unjustified, and India’s decision to abstain from condemning Russia is based on a geopolitical rationale (just like India did not condemn the American invasion of Iraq in 2003); it has nothing to do with India being any less of a democracy.

The second argument is that Russia is unlikely to help India in a future conflict with China. This argument is not without merit, but then again, it misses the point. Russia may not help India against China in the longer run, but India certainly cannot afford to have yet another unfriendly country in an otherwise deeply unfriendly region. And that is sound strategic rationale for not alienating Russia. This argument also implies that the West may not stand by India when it comes to China if India doesn’t stand by them today. This argument overlooks the reality that China is a challenge to the U.S. as well as to India, albeit in varying degrees. India needs the assistance of its partners to meet the China challenge, but this is hardly a one-way street.

Charms of the swing state

This is also India’s big power moment. The fact that both the opposing sides in this war are rushing their senior interlocutors to New Delhi to woo India also shows that India is the most sought-after swing state in the contemporary international system, a role it has played well so far. Despite being in an adversarial relationship with India, China sees merit in reaching out to India to convince the latter to move on with business as usual notwithstanding what it did to India in 2020.

China sees the Ukraine war as an opportunity to construct an anti-American world order by forging some regional unity. This at least partly explains Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to South Asia. Then came Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the only recent visitor to have managed a personal meeting with the Indian Prime Minister. The meeting is also a clear indication of the Indian leadership’s intent not to abandon Moscow, at least not yet.

The U.S. is also keen to retain India in its fold. For sure, it doesn’t want to lose the exceptional gains it has made with India over the past two decades. The visitors from the U.K. and Germany also want New Delhi on their side. New Delhi may indeed be on their side, but not in the manner they would like India to be.

By refusing to fully ally with either side and yet maintaining good relations with both, New Delhi may have finally experimented with the tenets of strategic autonomy that it has long professed but struggled to practice. Contemporary Indian diplomacy is a textbook example of a swing state that refuses to swing either way.

Between the present and future

Yet, there is a time to be a swing state, and a time to think beyond it. There is little doubt that the war will quicken the fundamental transformations that Asian geopolitics was already undergoing. Southern Asia’s continental geopolitics is now China-centric. It is only a matter of time before the rest of the Asian region becomes China-centric as well. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, its current focus on Russia and Ukraine, the further weakening of Russia, and Beijing’s proactive outreach to the region with money and muscle will eventually lead to the end of Indian primacy in the region and the rise of a China-centric Asian geopolitical order.

When the Ukraine war is done and dusted, India will be relegated to a weaker position in the region that it was before the war began. The current adrenaline rush in New Delhi of being a swing state courted by various powerful suitors will eventually fade away. That is the harsh reality of geopolitics. That is precisely why New Delhi should play its cards extremely well right now to invest in future geopolitical dividends. Decision-makers in New Delhi will have to go back to the drawing board and create long-term plans to engage the region, including China, and the international community.

Put differently, New Delhi will need to keep in mind its long-term objectives even during the delicate balancing that it is doing today. Ideally, in the longer run, India would like to have both the West and Russia on its side. But given how this war is unfolding and the manner in which Beijing is making its moves, New Delhi may indeed find it harder than ever to manage the growing contradictions between the West and Russia. Geopolitical choices are almost never black and white, nor are they always readily available. Sometimes, therefore, states must proactively try to shape the environment to generate new options. It is New Delhi’s turn to do so.

Happymon Jacob is Associate Professor, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi



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Even if it does not fully meet the requirements of either Moscow or Kyiv, it would at least prevent a wider conflagration

Several weeks into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has become a virtual proxy war with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) providing military assistance to Ukraine to persist in its fight against Russia, the fog of war has not lifted. Some direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives have taken place but these have been of little avail. At this point it seems unlikely that an end to the ongoing humanitarian disaster is in sight.

Boost for the U.S.

It is increasingly evident that this is a war that nobody wants, least of all the Ukrainians or even the Russians; yet no one seems to be making the right moves to end the conflict. For NATO and its allies in Europe, this is not a conflict they wished to wage at this time. For the U.S., however, the unity displayed by NATO currently has been a major boost, reinforcing its belief that European security is inextricably linked to a strong and united NATO. Whether with the help of NATO, the U.S. has succeeded in isolating Russia in Europe is still an open question, but the U.S. can feel satisfied with the outcome as of now.

In the meantime, the carnage in Ukraine continues. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, for his part, might claim that he is ready to discuss neutrality, even as Russia, while continuing with its military operations, has been sending out feelers that it could consider limiting the conflict. However, in effect the two antagonists appear to be talking past rather than to one another.

What is more unfortunate is that the world is standing by, allowing the conflict to continue — with the West encouraging rather than restraining Mr. Zelensky from ‘baiting’ Russian President Vladimir Putin. Neither the United Nations, nor any of the major countries, have seriously explored any peace moves, nor followed up on what Mr. Zelensky means when he says that he is ready to discuss neutrality. To an outsider, it looks as if Ukraine has become a pawn in the power game between the West and Russia.

Seize the chance

If indeed the world is approaching a tipping point, then what is needed is less, not more, of the kind of grandstanding employed by Mr. Zelensky (occasionally laced with a demand for direct talks with Mr. Putin), or the charade of negotiations that are currently taking place between Ukraine and Russian negotiators. It may be too much to expect the Russian side to demonstrate proper contriteness for the unfortunate killing of thousands of civilians, but pressure should be brought on Russia to try and enter into more realistic negotiations with Ukraine. The West also needs to play a more active role, and try to devise a ‘Peace Plan’ taking advantage of the occasional statements made by both sides about their willingness to halt the conflict.

The crying need today is for a peace plan which even if it does not fully satisfy the requirements of either Russia or Ukraine — and obliquely that of the U.S. and the West — will at least ensure a cessation of hostilities and prevent the conflict from becoming further enlarged, resulting in a wider conflagration involving more countries and more powers. It should not prove too difficult, or beyond the realm of possibility, to arrive at a peace arrangement or devise a plan, that would accommodate Ukraine’s professed need for neutrality (with or without assured guarantees) and Russia’s concern about the further Eastward push of NATO (that implicitly threatens Russia’s security).

Working out an arrangement down to the smallest detail would, however, entail a great deal of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ by interlocutors acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine, who also have the necessary ‘gravitas’ to undertake such a task. Speed is of the essence, as with each passing day, the risk of a wider conflagration increases. The world is not bereft of individuals who can play a critical role as interlocutors at this time, but it demands both honesty of purpose and the will to overcome the odds.

The use of sanctions

To begin with, the West should reconsider its current obsession with imposing additional sanctions on Russia, in the expectation that this would lead to the collapse of Russia and an end to the ‘regality’ of Mr. Putin. It might be argued that there is greater merit in imposing economic sanctions on a country than in launching an all-out war.

Notwithstanding this, and despite the pressure that sanctions have put on the Russian economy (its economy is expected to plunge by anything between 12% to 15% over the next few months), the jury is still out on whether economic pain of this kind would lead any country — at least in the short and the medium term — to alter its mindset. Iran is a classic instance.

In the meantime, several well regarded economists have come out with their views regarding the ‘unintended consequences’ of the overuse of sanctions. Their refrain is that “the over use of economic weapons could reverse the process of globalisation that has allowed the modern world to prosper”. Similar concerns exist about the fragmentation of the global payment situation. Certain experts have again warned that the sanctions regime placed on Russia, unless calibrated very carefully, could exacerbate food shortages in low income countries. The short point is that economic sanctions, while seemingly an excellent option, can also have deleterious consequences for much of the world.

It would also be interesting to speculate on some of the spillover effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Indisputably, Russia’s inability to coerce Ukraine into submission within a very short time frame has dented Russia’s image as also that of its vaunted military machine. While many explanations for Russia’s slow advance in Ukraine may be forthcoming, what must have surprised, if not shocked, Russia is that the 30-nation NATO should have displayed this degree of cohesion in the face of the Russian onslaught. This would have been a wakeup call for Russia, and a clear boost to the efforts of the West to contain what it perceived as Russian neo-imperialism.

What is ahead for Russia

If Mr. Putin’s effort to ‘correct history’ was the trigger for the Ukraine crisis — one that did not quite follow the script he had hoped for — there could be a similar and equally less palatable fallout for the West as well: more specifically, the U.S. and its hopes to reclaim global leadership. According to many analysts, one fallout of the current conflict in Ukraine is likely to be a further cementing of the already deepening Russia-China strategic relationship, which has been in evidence over the past several months. The degree of unity displayed by the West, and the determination to stand together, is expected to result in taking the existing Russia-China relationship to the next level, approximating to what existed prior to the Great Communist Divide in the early 1960s. Some analysts even argue that a clue to this can be found in some of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent utterances, wherein he has talked of the need to revive the spirit of the Korean War of the 1950s.

Several possibilities arise if the Russia-West divide was to crystallise along the current lines. Almost certainly, one will see a reshaping of the world energy map, if current embargoes on Russian oil and gas were to continue.

Oil flows to Europe would thereupon come mainly from West Asia and the U.S.; in turn countries such as China and India may become major importers of crude from Russia. It is uncertain at this time whether this would be a practicable proposition over the longer haul, but new permutations and combinations are certain to take place.

India’s stand

Next, even as China and Russia relations become further strengthened, the question before India would be how it should position itself. Till now, India had taken a consistent stand of not criticising or condemning Russia on any account, including its invasion of Ukraine. This was largely based on India’s long-term defence and other relationships with Russia. This could undergo changes. One might also anticipate a further churn in the politics of West Asia — where the Abraham Accords in 2020 seemed to bring a certain degree of normalcy and stability. Iran’s posture and politics will also play an important role in shaping the politics of this region.

One thought that cannot be dismissed as being entirely frivolous is whether repeated accusations levelled by the West against Mr. Putin of attempting to use nuclear weapons to devastate Ukraine, are a prelude to, or a curtain raiser, for experimentation — more importantly, preparing the public to consider removing the current taboo regarding nuclear weapons. Repeated references, without providing any evidence, would seem to suggest that this might possibly be a smokescreen for such experimentation. For instance, it may not be too outlandish for both sides to consider the use of miniaturised nukes with precision (drone) delivery mechanisms. If the Russia-Ukraine war were to persist, one could even envisage the possibility of the use of micro nuclear payloads mated to miniaturised precision delivery mechanisms. One hopes that before this, saner voices across the world would prepare the way for a peace package in Ukraine.

M.K. Narayanan is a former Director, Intelligence Bureau, a former National Security Adviser and a former Governor of West Bengal



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In pronouncing the end of the marital rape exception, the Karnataka High Court has delivered a nuanced judgment

Over the last several months, arguments challenging the constitutionality of the marital rape exception in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) had gripped the Delhi High Court. While the judgment in those petitions is still awaited, in one clean swoop Justice M. Nagaprasanna of the Karnataka High Court on March 23, 2022, in the case ofHrishikesh Sahoo vs State of Karnataka , pronounced the end of the marital rape exception.

The background

Outcomes in judicial proceedings are almost always shaped by the cases which come before the courts. This judgment was a result of a unique case where a woman had filed a criminal complaint of rape against her husband due to the repeated acts of sexual assault she had to face. The police registered her complaint under Section 376 notwithstanding the marital rape exception, a charge sheet was filed and the Sessions Judge took cognisance and framed charges under Section 376. The husband filed an application to drop the charge of Section 376 but the Sessions Judge rejected it. This led to the husband approaching the High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings.

In a nuanced and far-reaching judgment, Justice Nagaprasanna refused to quash the charge of rape against the husband. He held that if a man, being a husband is exempted for his acts of sexual assault, it would destroy women’s right to equality, which is the very soul of the Constitution. He held that the Constitution recognises and grants equal status to women, but the exception to marital rape in the IPC amounts to discrimination because a wife is treated as subordinate to the husband. The Constitution considers marriage as an association of equals and does not in any sense depict women to be subordinate to men and guarantees women the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 the right to live with dignity, personal liberty, bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, right to reproductive choices, right to privacy, right to freedom of speech and expression. He held that the exemption of the husband on committal of such assault/rape cannot be so absolute that it becomes a licence for commission of a crime; in provocative words he stated, “a man is a man; an act is an act; rape is a rape, be it performed by a man the “husband” on the woman “wife”, and refused to quash the case.

Earlier judgments

There have been other judgments which have already been a precursor to doing away with this exception. InIndependent Thought vs Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court of India diluted it and removed the exception to marital rape to a wife not below 15 years and made it 18 years. The Court stated that this would not amount to removing the exception to marital rape for women above 18 years as that was not the case before it, but Justice Madan B. Lokur in similar words held, “... a rape is a rape... A rape that actually occurs cannot legislatively be simply wished away or legislatively denied as non-existent....” The Court held that a girl cannot be treated as a commodity having no say over her body or someone who has no right to deny sexual intercourse to her husband and that the human rights of a girl child are very much alive and kicking whether she is married or not.

Roots of the principle

The exception to marital rape in common law was due to the dictum by Chief Justice Matthew Hale of Britain in 1736 where he stated: “But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract.” The concept that by marriage, a woman gave up her body to the husband was accepted as an enduring principle of common law, due to which a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife. This was therefore translated into criminal codes, including the Indian Penal Code which India adopted.

This principle has now been completely abolished. In the United Kingdom, in 1991, the exception to marital rape was done away with in the case ofR. vs R. The House of Lords held that where the common law rule no longer even remotely represents what is the true position of a wife in present-day society, the duty of the court is to take steps to alter the rule. The court held that a husband’s immunity as expounded by Chief Justice Matthew Hale no longer exists and took the view that the time had arrived when the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law, irrespective of his relationship with his victim. It held that it was the duty of the court to remove a common law fiction which had become anachronistic and offensive and that there was no justification for the marital exemption in rape.

That was in 1991, more than 30 years ago in the U.K. The Karnataka High Court took a similar view of its duties as a constitutional court in the present case and held that the exception to marital rape in Section 375 is regressive, wherein a woman is treated as a subordinate to the husband and against the constitutional guarantee of equality. Our courts have now truly pronounced the death knell of the marital rape exception.

Jayna Kothari is a Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India



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The existing approach of dealing with surface water and groundwater independently has severe limitations

The theme of this year’s World Water Day (March 22) was ‘Groundwater: Making the Invisible Visible’. The primary focus is to draw attention to the role of groundwater in water and sanitation systems, agriculture, industry, ecosystems, and climate change adaptation. Groundwater helps reduce the risk of temporary water shortage and caters to the needs of arid and semiarid regions, but its value has not been fully recognised in policymaking. While dependence on groundwater is increasing everywhere, there are serious issues of depletion of stored groundwater and deterioration of quality. High temperatures and drought threaten water security. Due to its high storage capacity, groundwater is more resilient to the effects of climate change than surface water. The international conference on ‘Groundwater, Key to the Sustainable Development Goals’ (May 2022) and the UN-Water Summit on Groundwater (December 2022) are part of global initiatives to highlight the significance of groundwater in sustainable development.

With an annual groundwater extraction of 248.69 billion cubic meters (2017), India is among the largest users of groundwater in the world. Almost 89% of the groundwater extracted is used for irrigation and the rest for domestic and industrial use (9% and 2%).

Extraction value

According to the Central Ground Water Board, the annual groundwater withdrawal is considered to be safe when the extraction rate is limited to below 70% of the annual replenishable recharge. Available data indicate that the level of extraction for the country in 2017 was 63%, from 58% in 2004. However, the level varied across regions. Punjab, Rajasthan, Haryana, Delhi, Chandigarh, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry have crossed the 70% mark. Of 534 districts in 22 States/UTs, 202 districts had stage of extraction ranging from 71% to 385%. NITI Aayog has set the 70% extraction value as the target to be achieved by 2030.

Besides the high level of extraction, quality is also an issue of concern. A quantity-wise safe district may be vulnerable due to deterioration of water quality. Fluoride, iron, salinity, nitrate, and arsenic contamination are major problems. As many as 335 districts reported nitrate pollution compared to 109 in 2006. A high level of nitrate affects human health. Source of nitrates are mainly anthropogenic and depend on local actions. Biological contamination has also been reported from different parts of the country.

Changing approach

The existing approach of dealing with surface water and groundwater independently has severe limitations. As the Mihir Shah Committee (2016) proposed, the Central Water Commission and the Central Ground Water Board could be united and a national water framework with an integrated perspective developed. There is also a need to work out local-level plans covering water resources in all its forms: rainwater, surface water, soil water and groundwater and the resource use sectors. Groundwater, surface water and the intervening landscape form part of a matrix, and together with the vegetation system they constitute the Critical Zone, where most terrestrial life resides.

Re-establishing connections between surface and groundwater systems, both for governance and management, entails a local area approach that will involve revisiting the present groundwater estimations process, large-scale aquifer mapping, linking aquifers with river basin/watershed boundaries, hydrogeomorphology analysis, and factoring land uses and human-induced changes in the water system. Linking cropping patterns and crop intensity with groundwater availability, aquifer type, and the present state of groundwater extraction at the farm level is imperative. At present, there is an energy subsidy for groundwater extraction with little regulation. This encourages farmers to withdraw water at their will. There is a larger issue of ownership of community resources in this context. Although groundwater recharging takes place through a geohydrological process and is not confined to administrative or property boundaries, a landowner has the exclusive right to groundwater available in their property. A community resource thus turns into a private resource due to the location of extraction site. Re-articulation of the legal framework for groundwater use gains relevance in this context.

The new paradigm for groundwater management is a socio-ecological challenge, where localism matters. It warrants technical, economic, legal and governance remediation with space for active public participation and community regulatory options to maintain groundwater balance at the village/ watershed level.

Srikumar Chattopadhyay is National Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research, and former Scientist, National Centre for Earth Science Studies



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Anticipating a ‘Hinduisation’ of Tamil Nadu politics, the CPI(M) is seeking to enter the temple arena

The Tamil Nadu CPI(M)’s recent proposal to participate in temple festivals “to counter the dominance of [the] Sangh Parivar in temples and festivals” reminds one ofMadan Motcham , a famous short story by Tamil writer Jayamohan. Though branded stridently anti-communist, Jayamohan, in that story, tries to explore how folk deities in Tamil Nadu are appropriated by mainstream Hinduism. This appropriation has benefited Hindutva groups in Kanniyakumari district. In the southern tip of the country, Hindutva groups have become a relatively powerful political force. These groups appropriate ‘smaller’ Gods, who were ignored earlier by the upper castes, but can the comrades turn the tables on Hindutva forces by using similar tactics?

CPI(M) State Secretary K. Balakrishnan’s recent announcement of the party’s plans to enter the temple scene has led to criticism and scepticism. P. Shanmugam, a member of the party State Secretariat, sought to play down the controversy by insisting that there is no “ideological shift”. “Any shift in the ideology will be decided by the All India Congress of the party. The party can think about joining the temple administration to counter Hindutva groups as is the practice in Kerala. The party in West Bengal also actively participates in Durga Puja celebrations. We don’t intend to participate in temple festivals and propagate the ideas of God and religion. We know that 95% of the people are believers, but they can’t be called communal by any yardstick. What is happening is that a minuscule group that is communal is seeking to take advantage of religious beliefs. We have to counter them,” he argued.

Communists are perhaps hoping that the people will realise that they have never hurled abuses at God, religion or the priestly class, unlike the original Dravidian parties. The Dravidian movement, too, has climbed down from its strident denunciation of religion and God over the years. DMK founder C.N. Annadurai famously came up with the slogan, ‘Ondre Kulam, Oruvane Devan (Humanity is one and we have only one God)’. “I do not say that there should not be any temples. I only say that temples should not be the camp of scoundrels,” wrote DMK leader Karunanidhi in the filmParasakthi . He used to take occasional potshots at Hindu deities. But AIADMK founder M.G. Ramachandran did not his keep faith secret: he used to regularly visit the Mookambika temple, for instance. His political heir Jayalalithaa was also quite brazen in flaunting her piety and visiting temples. Karunanidhi’s son, M.K. Stalin, who is now Chief Minister, keeps away from all religious activities but insists that the DMK is not an anti-Hindu party.

Communists have had no need to make such compromises. But they are desperate to stay relevant in today’s age where religious polarisation is stark and pervasive. The entire ‘secular’ opposition seems helpless in the face of the BJP’s growing dominance. The voters at large seem to be willing to ignore other issues when their religious sensibilities are played upon. It is in these circumstances that the CPI(M), anticipating a ‘Hinduisation’ of Tamil Nadu politics too, is seeking to enter the temple arena, particularly the cultural space.

Dravidar Viduthalai Kazhagam leader Viduthalai Rajendran said that the CPI(M) should reconsider its plan. “Do not play into the hands of the RSS and BJP that have a long association with religion because their politics is nothing but religion. They uphold the caste system and spread irrational beliefs. The Sangh Parivar will go out and say that they have succeeded in making the CPI(M) toe their line,” Mr. Rajendran warned.

Whether the CPI(M) will have enough elbow room in temple activities remains to be seen.

kolappan.b@thehindu.co.in



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The relaxation of AFSPA is welcome, but the demand for full repeal should be considered

In what is clearly a nod to the vociferous demand for the repeal of the unpopular Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) from several States in the northeast, especially after 13 civilians were killed in Mon district in Nagaland in December last year, the Union Home Ministry has decided to considerably reduce the number of “disturbed areas” under the Act in three States. The order, from April 1, is applicable for six months. In Nagaland, while AFSPA was removed from the jurisdiction of 15 police stations in seven districts, it remains in place in 57 police stations in 13 districts. The relaxation has been most substantial in Assam, where it has been removed entirely from 23 districts and partially from one, thus limiting its operation fully to only nine districts. In Manipur, on the other hand, only 15 police station areas in six districts have been excluded from the disturbed area notification, and the Act is still in force in 82 police stations in 16 districts, including several hill districts whether or not they adjoin the international boundary. As things stand, the Government’s decision to relax the application of the Act in specific areas seems to stem from the reduction in violence and also administrative reasons rather than as a response to the burning question on whether the Act is essential to security operations in these States, which have experienced insurgencies of various degrees in the past.

While this piecemeal gesture would be welcomed by the residents in these areas in particular, the popular demand for the repeal of the Act in full from the three States remains unfulfilled. Despite the vociferous protests from security forces for the retention of the Act, human rights organisations, sections of civil society and committees including the five-member committee led by retired Supreme Court judge B.P. Jeevan Reddy in 2005, have steadfastly called for its repeal. The committee in particular had suggested that the Act had created an impression that the people of the northeast States were being targeted for hostile treatment and that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act could instead be suitably amended to tackle terrorism. The Supreme Court-appointed Justice N. Santosh Hegde committee, in 2013, which investigated “encounter” killings in Manipur, suggested that the Act must be properly reviewed every six months to see if its implementation is necessary, but extensions of the purview of the Act have proceeded as routine affairs. In 2016, the Supreme Court had also ruled that the armed forces could not be immune from investigation for excesses committed during the discharge of their duties even in “disturbed areas”, in effect circumscribing the conditions in which the immunity is applied. These beg the question again — why should the Act remain in the statute?



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The Centre must crank up capital spendingif it wants to stoke the economy

Official industrial data from February shows output in the eight core sectors grew at the fastest pace in four months at 5.8%, aided liberally by a low base effect — production had contracted 3.3% a year earlier. However, when compared with January 2022, output in all of these sectors actually declined, with the overall index contracting 5.3%. Electricity generation, a good indicator of business activity and which contributes about 20% to the weight of the index, declined 3.3% from the preceding month. Steel, another index heavyweight that feeds into various sectors of the economy from housing to cars to white goods and small-scale engineering and parts units, dipped 5.2% from January 2022. Making up the largest component of the index, at about 28%, is the refinery products category. For a sector that facilitates other industries by powering mobility, output slid 8% sequentially. The Omicron wave, early in the calendar year, coupled with rising prices likely dampened demand, signalling uneven economic recovery from the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. The road to a full recovery looks long and bumpy, as the latest production levels are still below, or barely above, those seen pre-pandemic. Inflation, which has already breached the Reserve Bank of India’s upper tolerance limit of 6% two months running, is a threat to consumer demand. If demand remains muted, or worse, slips further, the domino effect upstream will only impact the core sectors further. The RBI’s Monetary Policy Committee has its work cut out in a meeting later this week, when the panel will decide on benchmark interest rates that could potentially influence inflation.

At the same time, government spending, which could set the pace for overall growth in a stuttering economy, has not roared forward. Capital expenditure grew a mere 0.8% in February from a year earlier. Even though capex had risen about 20% in the April-February 11-month period, the Centre still had about Rs. 1.2 lakh crore left to be spent in March, and it appears unlikely that the Government would have met its revised capex target of Rs. 6 lakh crore for FY22. Though tax revenues have been robust, the Government likely held back on capital expenditure to help offset the lack of divestment proceeds it had budgeted for. Given geopolitical tensions, the stock market has been too volatile for the Government to go ahead with the initial public offer for LIC. The sale of stake in BPCL has also not proceeded apace. Despite these roadblocks, the Government may have little choice but to crank up capital spending early in the new fiscal if it wants to stoke the economy. The multiplier effect would not only benefit industries such as cement and steel, but may also help crowd in private investment, spurring job creation, which has been the economy’s Achilles heel for a while now.



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Washington, April 3: A series of deportations, jailings and other forms of “intimidation and harassment” of Indian students who had taken part-time employment to pay for their education, without permission from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalisation Service, has led to a “wave of fear” in the Indian student community in this country during the last few weeks. Reports reaching here from Detroit, Michigan, which has an Indian student population over 400 say that during the last month Indian students suspected of having violated visa regulations by taking part-time jobs were seized by INS agents at bus stops, in their homes and on the streets. Of the 100 students who now face proceedings against them at least two had to spend three nights in jail because they could not produce the $2,000 bond required as security. The Deputy Director of the Detroit Office of the INS said that “these people had violated the law. They have taken part-time jobs without permission at a time when there is a lot of pressure from local labour unions and community groups because of the unemployment situation in the country.”



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Opposition leader Michael Foot questioned British intelligence and diplomacy, which he said had been outsmarted by the Argentinians.

Amidst cries of “resign, resign” Margaret Thatcher faced a hostile House of Commons as she condemned what she called Argentina’s “unprovoked invasion” of the Falkland Islands and announced that she was asking the country’s task force to sail towards the Argentinian coast to see how the islanders could be liberated. Opposition leader Michael Foot questioned British intelligence and diplomacy, which he said had been outsmarted by the Argentinians.

Zia’s Plans

Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq has announced that the military government was considering a new political strategy for the country, Radio Pakistan reported, indicating that he has set his face against holding elections. The real problem for the government is not the transfer of power, he told the nominated Majlis-E-Bhoora, the Federal Advisory Council which opened its second session in Islamabad on Saturday. The problem was setting up of “a true Islamic democratic system” with the “maximum association of people” in running the affairs of the country.

State Polls

The Haryana and Kerala governments have asked the Election Commission to hold assembly elections. The two states are expected to go to the polls next month along with West Bengal. While Kerala is under President’s Rule, the term of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha expires in June. The EC is expected to announce its decision in a day or two.

TN House Fracas

Paper weights flew as DMK and AIADMK members came close to blows following a heated exchange in the Tamil Nadu Assembly between Law Minister C Ponnaiyan and leader of the Opposition, M Karunanidhi.



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In Prime Minister Khan’s telling, the story is that a “powerful foreign country”, which he also identified as the United States, is behind the Opposition’s moves to remove him from office, because this foreign power does not want Pakistan to have an independent foreign policy.

Prime Minister Imran Khan said in the run-up to the no confidence motion against him that he was not the type to throw in the towel early and dug deep into his days as a cricketer to declare that the game was not over until the last ball had been bowled. That last ball turned out to be the National Assembly’s ruling on Sunday that the no confidence motion, submitted early in March, went against a provision of the constitution demanding all citizens’ loyalty to the state. After this ruling, Khan pulled up stumps by dissolving the National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies, and declaring that he would seek a fresh mandate from the people at elections. He now equates the political moves against his government as a conspiracy against Pakistan itself.

South Asia has been here before. Several embattled leaders in the Subcontinent have used the foreign hand card to stay on in power. In Prime Minister Khan’s telling, the story is that a “powerful foreign country”, which he also identified as the United States, is behind the Opposition’s moves to remove him from office, because this foreign power does not want Pakistan to have an independent foreign policy. Khan was sure to go if the no confidence vote had been permitted. The Opposition was present in the National Assembly in strength, and would have been able to muster the numbers required to win the motion. However, it is doubtful if even after all this, Khan can stay on. There is a question mark over the legality of his decisions today. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has taken suo motu cognisance of the matter, including if a prime minister already facing a no confidence motion can dissolve Parliament and call an election.

Whichever way the verdict goes, it seems as if the ultimate resolution of this political showdown does lie in an election. Until then, Pakistan seems set for a prolonged period of political uncertainty. In the midst of all this, it is yet too early to arrive at definite conclusions about the significance of the remarks of the Pakistan Army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, that Islamabad wants to resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue and diplomacy, particularly as his outreach seemed to indicate that the India-China border dispute and the Kashmir issue are linked. However, as he pointed out, and as has been stated by Indian Army chief General M M Naravane as well, the Line of Control is quiet after the two armies arrived at an agreement last year reaffirming their commitment to the 2003 ceasefire. This gives hope that once matters settle down in Pakistan, there can be some forward movement in a relationship that has been frozen for far too long.



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By placing upfront its economic interests, India has clearly signalled non-acceptance of any sanctions regime unilaterally imposed by nations that are themselves opportunistically violating.

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has confirmed that India has already received “3-4 days” worth of crude oil supply from Russia at hugely discounted prices, amid Western warnings on trade with Moscow. If fuel is available at a discount, why mustn’t India buy, she has said, while putting the country’s “national interest” and “energy security” first. Her statement reinforces what External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar earlier pointed out: Countries importing much of their energy requirement from Russia shouldn’t harangue others. Russia supplies over a quarter of the European Union’s petroleum crude and 38 per cent of natural gas imports, which has hardly changed even with the war in Ukraine. India, by contrast, imported only 1.5 per cent of its entire crude from Russia in 2020-21, while marginally going up to 2.3 per cent during April-January 2021-22.

It’s possible the Russian share in India’s imports may significantly rise in the coming months, especially with the sanctions-hit nation reportedly offering its crude at up to $35-per-barrel discounts. The discount is, moreover, on prices before the war, implying an even larger reduction over current levels. With Brent crude continuing to trade at nearly $105/barrel — above the pre-war level, although down from the March 8 peak closing of $127.98 — why shouldn’t India take the Russian offer? This is more so when the countries that unilaterally imposed sanctions, ostensibly to diminish Russia’s war chest, are continuing to source from it. India’s bilateral trade with Russia is quite small: some $7 billion of imports and $3 billion exports annually. That can potentially increase with India purchasing more Russian crude, and the proposed rupee-ruble trade-cum-dedicated payment mechanism to bypass Western sanctions. Since India has to “earn” the rubles in order to pay for higher fuel, fertiliser and other imports from Russia, it also opens up the scope for greater exports — be it pharmaceuticals, tea and textiles or buffalo meat, sugar, rice and dairy products — to the latter. Russia, after all, requires many of these items that it cannot currently import due to the sweeping financial sanctions.

By placing upfront its economic interests, India has clearly signalled non-acceptance of any sanctions regime unilaterally imposed by nations that are themselves opportunistically violating —for instance, access to the SWIFT messaging network has not been cut off for Russian banks specifically designated for energy trades. US sanctions in the past had forced India to curtail Iranian oil imports, which plunged from 24 million tonnes in 2018-19 to zero by 2020-21. The Russian aggression against Ukraine deserves to be condemned in the strongest possible terms. But neither India nor the world can afford oil prices staying elevated at $100-plus per barrel. And sanctions, apart from inflicting unnecessary costs, cannot substitute for diplomacy and dialogue.



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It’s only prudent to repeal this Act now. Study its record to strengthen the foundation of Indian democracy

As far back as 1776, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations reflected on the harmful effects of laws that “often continue in force long after the end of the circumstances that first gave rise to them and once made them reasonable”. In that passage, however, Smith didn’t consider laws that were not reasonable even in the circumstances in which they were made.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is one such law. Since the full force of this onerous law comes into play only in “disturbed areas”, one must welcome the government’s announcement to reduce the number of such areas. But not to consider the repeal of this anachronistic law, which is now almost as old as the Republic, is a missed opportunity to reflect on why this law has or has not been successful, and to learn from this history and strengthen the foundation of our democracy.

AFSPA allows civilian authorities to call on the armed forces to come to the assistance of civil powers. Once a state — or a part of a state — is declared “disturbed” under this law, the armed forces can make preventive arrests, search premises without warrants, and even shoot and kill civilians. Legal action against those abusing these powers requires the prior approval of the central government — a feature that functions as de facto immunity from prosecution.

A disturbed area proclamation under AFSPA has uncanny similarities with emergencies or states of exception — including martial law and states of siege. Critics charge that it effectively suspends fundamental freedoms and creates a de facto emergency regime.

AFSPA was adopted in 1958 during the early days of the Naga uprising to apply to what was then the state of Assam and the union territory of Manipur. It is hard to believe that to contend with a small group of armed rebels in a remote infrastructure-poor region it was found necessary to have a law modelled on a colonial ordinance devised to tackle the Quit India Movement — the most serious challenge faced by British colonial rule since the rebellion of 1857, as the then Viceroy of India saw it. That such a law remains in force till this day does not speak well of our experiment with democracy.

The counterinsurgency campaigns against the Nagas were counterproductive. The suffering brought by the forced displacements during village regrouping, for example, only broadened the support for the rebels. Senior government officials who knew the region well soon regretted the way such decisions were made. “It may well be asked how such a ghastly tragedy could have been enacted at all with civilised and intelligent human beings at the helm of the administration,” wrote Nari Rustomji of the Indian Civil Service, who held positions such as the chief secretary of Assam and adviser on tribal areas to the governor. During the Mizo uprising of the 1960s and 1970s what is now the state of Mizoram went through a similar devastating ordeal.

In the following decades, as new states were formed in Northeast India, AFSPA was amended to accommodate the names of those states.

Seven of the region’s eight states have been at the receiving end of AFSPA at one time or another.

Over the past six decades, AFSPA’s use has extended well beyond the actual conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Multiple state and non-state armed actors have operated under its shadow. For instance, in Assam in the 1990s, death squads — or “secret killers” as they were called — carried out a wave of extrajudicial killings. These could not have occurred without the cover provided by AFSPA’s disturbed area designation.

In 2012, the Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association of Manipur petitioned the Supreme Court to investigate as many as 1,528 cases of fake encounters that allegedly occurred in the state between 1979 and 2012. The Supreme Court appointed a three-member commission to inquire into the first six of the 1,528 cases in the petition so that it could be “fully satisfied about the truth of the allegations”. None of the small sample of six cases was found to be an actual “encounter”. Drawing on these findings, the Supreme Court bench decided that the allegations could not “be summarily rubbished”. Its interim judgment of July 2016 said that “there is some truth in the allegations, calling for a deeper probe”.

In the court’s view, AFSPA clearly provided the context for these killings. The practice of deploying the armed forces to assist civil power, the ruling stressed, is premised on the assumption that “normalcy would be restored within a reasonable period”. If the civil administration and the armed forces fail to achieve this, that “cannot be a fig leaf for prolonged, permanent or indefinite deployment of the armed forces”. That would be a mockery of “our democratic process” and “a travesty” of the constitutional distribution of powers between the Centre and the states, which provides the legal foundation for the practice.

This is not the only time the apex court has been critical of AFSPA. It is often forgotten that when it pronounced AFSPA constitutional in 1997, it also recommended some changes. Among them was the stipulation that a “disturbed area” designation be subjected to review every six months. In some parts of Northeast India, AFSPA is now routinely extended every six months. But there is little evidence that any meaningful review occurs at those times. A statement made by an Assam official in August 2018 when AFSPA was extended in the state for six months is illustrative. “The situation is peaceful,” said the state’s police chief casually, “but we will not take a decision on withdrawing AFSPA till the NRC exercise is over.”

Edmund Burke, a contemporary of Adam Smith, wrote of the circumstances in which the repeal of a law becomes necessary and appropriate. Since “laws, like houses, lean on one another”, he said, repealing a law can be difficult. But when a law’s “transgressions against common right and the ends of just government” are considerable, it is only prudent to abrogate and repeal that law. This is true of AFSPA.
The writer is professor of Political Studies at Bard College, New York.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 4, 2022 under the title ‘Goodbye AFSPA’. The writer is professor of Political Science at Bard College, New York.



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Some measures that can be implemented immediately include sensitising informal sector workers on gender-based violence and informing them in simple language about the laws that deal with such violence

The Female Labour Force Participation Rate, already low in India, received a further setback with the pandemic. Women were the first to lose their jobs once the lockdown was announced, two years ago, and they are yet to get back into the labour force. The female labour force participation rate was at 9.4 per cent for the period between September-December 2021, according to the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). This is the lowest female labour force participation rate since 2016 when the data was first compiled.

In understanding the all-time low female labour force participation rate, there is a need to factor in a longstanding problem — the safety of women in workplaces. All women deserve a non-discriminatory and safe working space. But those in the informal and unorganised sector deserve particular attention. The pandemic aggravated the situation for women in the informal economy.

The informal economy in India encompasses a variety of activities. The agricultural sector has the highest level of informal employment, followed by manufacturing, trade and construction. In terms of rural-urban differentials, informal employment constituted 96 per cent of total jobs in rural areas, where female informal employment was 98 per cent compared to 95 per cent of male informal employment. Seventy-nine per cent of the jobs in urban India were of an informal nature, with 82 per cent of total female workers engaged in informal employment compared to 78 per cent among urban male workers.

Statistics show that women are more likely to be engaged in the informal sector in both rural and urban areas. They are also more likely than men to be working as informal workers in the formal sector. However, not much has been done in terms of understanding the violence faced by women in the informal sector which can range from harassment to sexual assault and rape. Such violence can be tied up with several aspects ranging from a male-dominated workplace to harassment by labour contractors to a lack of basic amenities for women in the workplace. A few studies also indicate that women in the informal sector face sexual harassment in workplaces.

A recent study by Oxfam India on tea plantation workers reveals that the extremely hierarchical nature of their jobs, the migrant status of workers and the lack of other job opportunities for women tea pluckers contribute to the normalisation of workplace violence. Facilities such as canteens and toilets — generally available in factories where workers are predominantly men — are lacking in the fields. Because of the presence of the mostly male “sardars” (supervisors), women try to seek privacy far away from where their colleagues are working. This makes them vulnerable to sexual abuse or attacks by wild animals. It is now quite well known that women sugarcane cutters undergo forceful hysterectomies. These workers also face domestic violence and verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.

Difficult working conditions are aggravated in the absence of proper redressal mechanisms and women’s access to them. It’s well-known that laws such as the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013, Criminal Amendment Act 2013, and Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are not implemented well and do not take the difficulties faced by women in the informal sector into account. An effective body for this purpose could have been the Local Complaints Committee structure under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013, But such bodies are almost non-functional.

The quest for inclusive growth in the post-pandemic should catalyse endeavours to make workplaces in the informal sector safe for women. Some measures that can be implemented immediately include sensitising informal sector workers on gender-based violence and informing them in simple language about the laws that deal with such violence; employers must ensure that complaints committees are functional; sensitising local labour contractors on how to deal with cases of sexual harassment at workplaces. These bare minimum measures can be implemented with technical support from local women’s rights organisations. The government should also step in to improve the implementation of existing laws and increase budgetary provisions for workplace safety.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 4, 2022 under the title ‘Employment with dignity’. The writer leads the informal sector work at Oxfam India



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Shifting to a two-part tariff for solar and wind will incentivise private investments

Power generation tariffs in India comprise two parts. The first part is a fixed component – the cost that a generator incurs. This is not linked to the amount of power generated. The second part varies with the quantum of generation. The two-part tariff has been in vogue since 1992. It applies to thermal and hydro generation. It does not apply to renewable generation — solar, wind, and also nuclear. Under the two-part formula, the variable cost is calculated on the basis prescribed by the regulatory commissions. This is based on the cost of fuel — coal or gas or lignite — as the case may be. The fixed cost is also determined by regulatory commissions and it has a graded payment system depending on the extent to which the plant would be in a position to generate. The point here is that when a generator is in a position to generate, it gets to recover the fixed cost (or some part of it), irrespective of whether it actually generates power.

In the case of hydropower generation, the fact is that we don’t have any valuation for water as we have for coal or gas and hence, hydro generators do not have any variable cost of generation. The entire cost of a hydro station is fixed cost and notionally half of this cost is treated as variable cost.

In contrast, solar and wind generation and also nuclear are still governed by a single-part tariff. The single-part tariff applies to nuclear power stations for various reasons including the fact that given the technology, a nuclear generator does not usually increase/decrease the generation at a quick tempo, but maintains a steady stream. In any case, nuclear power accounts for only about two per cent of the entire generation, so let’s leave it aside. On the other hand, solar and wind generation account for about 10 per cent of the generation today and going by the statement delivered during COP26 in Glasgow, we want to ramp it up to 50 per cent by 2030.

A few issues that need to be considered here. The renewable sector has been given a “must run” status. This means that any generation from renewables needs to be dispatched first. The logic is that if we do not use the sun’s rays or for that matter the wind velocity, it is lost forever. The state load dispatch centres (SLDCs) are under instructions to adhere to this principle. The problem is that “must run” runs counter to the basic economic theory that in order to minimise total cost, dispatch should commence from the source offering the cheapest variable cost and then move upwards. Here lies the problem.

With a single part tariff for renewable generation, the entire cost is variable and at Rs 2.5 per unit for solar generation, it is not the cheapest source. There are several NTPC coal-fired pit head plants whose variable costs are far lower, for example, Simhadri (Rs 1.36), Korba (Rs 1.36), Sipat (Rs 1.43), Vindhyachal (Rs 1.70), and Talcher (Rs 2.00). This list is only indicative and not exhaustive. In fact, Rs 2.5 per unit is only for those solar generators that are of recent origin. For the older solar plants, the tariff could be well above Rs 3 per unit and for wind-based generation, it is even higher, averaging around Rs 4.5 per unit. It is no surprise, therefore, that the SLDCs often flout the principle of “must run”, since the distribution companies would save money by asking the renewable generator to back down while keeping the tap on for a coal-based generation.

The solution to this problem is to apply a two-part tariff for solar and wind generators as we do for hydro plants today. But while in the case of hydro, 50 per cent of the total cost is attributed as a variable cost, what should be the principle for renewable generators?

The overriding principle is that the percentage allocated as variable cost should ensure that renewable generation has the lowest variable cost so that there is no violation of the “must-run” principle. At the same time, the fixed cost component should not be kept so high that it hurts the consumers. A fine balance between the proportion of the fixed and variable costs will have to be maintained. There are other benefits of introducing a two-part tariff for renewable generation. It would ensure a certain minimum return to developers even if they are not generating during certain hours, as in the case of coal and hydro plants.

With a single-part tariff, whenever the renewable generator is asked to back down for maintaining grid balance, it is paid nothing. If we are serious about having a renewable generating capacity of 450-500 GW by 2030, we need to create a proper environment and ensure adequate returns to invite fresh investments into renewable generation. One must remember that while the government may fix targets, implementation has to be done by private players and therefore, market signals are important.

The switch from a single to a two-part tariff structure for renewables has to be made right now as we are at the cusp of ramping up our renewable generation and it takes time for matters to get streamlined as we have seen in the past.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 4, 2022 under the title ‘Ramping up renewables’. The writer is senior visiting fellow, ICRIER and former, Member (Economic & Commercial), CEA



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A good leader is, first of all, a good person, one who listens to and addresses the questions of the most vulnerable

Days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I found myself in a classroom on the wrong side of the chairs and desks. My audience was a group of officers, women and men, from a small, picture-postcard island nation. My brief was to talk about leadership in a time of uncertainty. At a time when there is no dearth of wisdom on such a subject — from courses in Ivy League universities to 15-second videos on YouTube by your neighbourhood uncle — I thought a good opening would be to ask the officers the same question they had posed to me: Who is a good leader? I focused the question more sharply by asking: Which of the two is a better leader, the man in Moscow or the man in Kyiv? Much of the world has already framed one as David and the other as Goliath. I didn’t expect much debate, but I was surprised to hear silence. It spoke volumes.

Under their breath, I could hear some references to the Ukrainian leader but, for the record, when it was time to take a call for the whole house, the consensus was that if we have to choose between the two, there is no one.

The officers from the island nation were as emotional as the blue sea that surrounds their country. And equally deep. I asked, “Why do you say so?” They again chose silence. Maybe they were expecting the teacher in me to answer this, maybe they were waiting for me to recall stories of the Kalinga war and Emperor Ashoka and his Dhamma, advocating peace. I am not sure. What I am sure of is how few in the room saw in either of the two — the attacked and the attacker — an exemplary model of leadership.

In War and Peace, Leo Tolstoy writes that the “strongest of all warriors” are time and patience. As we mark exactly two years of the lockdown, we know that these two warriors were the only ones fighting on our side as we remained locked down in our homes. And yet, for all the talk of a new normal, of a world knit together by technology, where truth and entertainment stream to unite us all, a large country still thought of the old means of achieving its devastating end: War. The death of innocent children, women and men and the devastation of cities and destruction of lives so beautifully constructed with time and patience. Another large country found an opportunity to sell and supply arms. Where was the sensitivity that emerged from battling a pandemic? Forget that; it was back to the stone age where might is right.

Perhaps that’s why my audience wasn’t sure of who is a good leader. Because even the one who was attacked showed a very self-promotional idea of leadership, but more about that later.

Aristotle has an answer: A good leader is nobody but a follower and following is nothing but understanding the needs and wants of the people. Today, “to follow” means Meta and blue ticks. But this is purely self-referential. “I have so many followers”: This becomes the end-all and be-all. Who these followers are, what they want, what they say — that’s not my problem. So the Ukrainian leader’s televised bravery helped him become a living-room hero, while his country and citizens bore the pain.

No wonder, Aristotle concludes that it’s a good follower who qualifies as a good leader.

In other words, when everyone is fighting to mark their own space, flaunt their number of followers, whether on social media or the Election Commission dashboard, can we find a leader who follows the people, tracks their tears, defeats, struggles, fears? Who sees people falling into a sewer or waiting for a job interview or crying over injustice and knows what they want from their leader? A person who promotes peace rather than war, healing rather than anger? In other words, a good leader is, first of all, a good person. For Aristotle, a good person acts and lives their virtues. People are led only by virtue, not by persuasion or rhetoric or self-praise or fear. A good leader communicates her values to citizens, that’s why parents and teachers are our first leaders. They are the most powerful communicators of the principles of leadership because a child, whether at home or in class, needs to be cared for, and then taught. Good parenting or teaching is about being sensitive to the child’s needs and aspirations.

So why not construct, in the safety and warmth of the home and the school, our heroes with ethics, human values, and later, with competencies and efficiencies? For, nothing is more powerful, emotionally and intellectually, than qualifying as a good human being in the eyes of our parents and teachers. Extending this to politics and the public space, a good leader is one who listens to and addresses the questions of the most vulnerable — the children among his followers. Who uses power as a tool for the empowerment of the unheard and unseen, celebrates courage and compassion, chooses peace over war, doesn’t stoke in one group of people fears about another. A good leader puts “what am I” above “who am I”, where being good is the one and only benchmark of leadership.

No wonder my friends from that beautiful island country found it hard to choose a leader from among those in the news.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 4, 2022 under the title ‘Looking for a good leader’. The writer is the author of Being Good, Aaiye, Insaan Banaen and Ethikos: Stories Searching Happiness. He teaches and trains courses on ethics, values and behaviour



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The effort now should be to create avenues for a face-saving back down. India has the credibility and international clout to help

Otto von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor of Germany, told the German parliament in 1876 that it would have been the height of folly to have invaded a weakened France the year before for fear that a resurgent and militarised France might attack Germany in the future. “Preventive wars,” he said, “are like committing suicide for fear of death”. I was reminded of this observation a few weeks back when I read that President Vladimir Putin had placed the Russian nuclear force on high alert in response to what he called the “aggressive statements by leading NATO powers”. It continues to reverberate in my head as the daily reports from Ukraine confirm that Putin has made a massive miscalculation and blunder.

I am of the view that continued discussions on the genesis of the crisis and the extenuating circumstances behind what is undoubtedly an egregious breach of the territorial integrity of a sovereign independent nation has limited value. What is now required are conversations on how to prevent a further escalation of this conflict. I am also of the view that India can and should play a role in driving such conversations. Its decision to abstain from the UN resolutions condemning Russia should give it negotiating heft with Putin; also, our PM is on friendly terms with him; and as the forthcoming chair of the G20 in 2023, India can claim locus standi.

President Putin has failed to achieve any of his objectives. That is an indubitable fact. He has not succeeded in overrunning Ukraine through a blitzkrieg military operation, in changing the Zelenskyy regime, nor in securing “imperia Rus” — a Russian sphere of influence comparable to what the 10th century Prince Vladimir of Kiev had created and which territorially extended even beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. In fact, on the contrary, Russian forces have got bogged down by the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian military and Zelenskyy has emerged as the exemplar of the soft power of moral rectitude and communication. His retort to the Americans who offered to help him leave the country, “I want ammunition, not a ride” will mark his epitaph; and most former members of the Soviet Union which are today independent sovereign states are scrambling to shelter under the security umbrella provided by Article 5 of the NATO agreement. Moreover, NATO countries have not fallen over themselves in disagreement over their response to the invasion but instead have conjointly imposed the severest of economic sanctions, which according to economists will knock between 10-20 per cent off Russia’s GDP and in the words of Raghuram Rajan, should be likened to “weapons of mass destruction” for the misery it will bring to the Russian public.

In the face of such a massive setback, the question has to be asked: What will President Putin do next? Will he look for a face-saving way out of the corner? Or might he compound his original sin by escalating the nature of the conflict? Might he, for instance, do what he did in Grozny and raze the Ukrainian cities to rubble? Might he unleash chemical weapons? Or in extremis, might he even cross the nuclear Rubicon?

I do not think anyone has an answer to these questions other than perhaps the psychiatrists who have had a chance to peer into Putin’s brain. But his biographers do provide useful guideposts and in the absence of alternative signage, these posts should be kept in sight whilst navigating the crisis. Putin grew up in straitened circumstances and lived in a communitarian establishment. He was short in stature and constantly set upon by the stronger boys in the neighbourhood. But instead of skirting confrontation, he took up martial arts and trained to give back as good as he received. He was determined not to allow his seemingly more powerful adversaries to cow him down.

This may be a leap too far but it is my view that these teenage experiences provide insight into the reasons for President Putin’s confrontational attitude towards the Western powers. He sees their actions through an ultranationalist lens and is convinced that they are looking to lever their economic and military superiority to check Russian nationalism and forestall Russia from regaining its rightful place in the pantheon of the international order. He may be bluffing but he has signalled that he is prepared to take the world to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon to counter these efforts.

The contemporary conundrum is how to get him to look at the world through a different lens. How to accept “defeat” without having to concede he has been defeated. Many argue that it would be a mistake to appease Putin and that given time and opportunity, he will return to the fray with the intent to secure his unrealised objectives. They refer to the Munich Pact of 1938 that did not bring “peace in our time” but triggered World War II. This is, I believe, a misleading equivalence. World War II was catastrophic but there was a victor. A nuclear conflict will be existential. There will be no victors. And, therefore, even though fraught with uncertainty and risk, the effort must be to crack this conundrum.

How can this be done? Again, there are no simple answers. But a good start would be to set out what should not be done. Putin must not be squeezed into a corner from which there is no escape. President Joe Biden’s obiter dicta that Putin must not be allowed to stay in power was in this context, therefore particularly injudicious. As also the comments that countries that buy Russian crude oil will find themselves on the “wrong side of history”. The effort now should be to create avenues for a face-saving backdown. India has the credibility and international clout and PM Modi has a personal equation with Putin. These should be leveraged to end this humanitarian tragedy.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 4, 2022 under the title ‘Reading his mind’. The writer is Chairman, Centre for Social and Economic Progress



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A report in Times of India said that senior bureaucrats during the course of a recent meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed concern about the situation in the fiscal position of states. They are reported to have said that “freebies” announced by state governments are unsustainable and drew comparison with the debt repayment problems currently experienced by Sri Lanka and a decade ago by Greece.

There are conceptual errors in the reported views of the bureaucrats. Indian states cannot go ‘bust’ because of constitutional constraints on their borrowing powers.

A federal system, like that of India, gives the central government more powers than the state governments. In practical terms, in India it means that the Government of India (GoI), exercising the power given by the Constitution, fixes borrowing limits for states at the beginning of each financial year. Consequently, the discipline imposed on states has meant that collectively they do better than GoI on key indicators such as the proportion of revenue and fiscal deficits to their respective gross state domestic product. Therefore, the pre-pandemic factual position in India is that states had better indicators of fiscal health.

Read also: Freebies unsustainable, states can go bust, say secretaries at meet with PM

So, how are ‘freebies’ paid for? By reallocating expenditure according to the political priority of the incumbent government. If free power has to be given to farmers as part of an election promise of an incoming government, then some other expenditure has to be reduced. At best, this reallocation can lead to questions on whether this is the best way to allocate resources to meet an incoming government’s stated objectives. However, it is conceptually wrong to link it to fiscal sustainability and fear of going ‘bust’, which can happen only if the borrowing is unsustainable. The check on that situation is superior power given to GoI.

In the case of Sri Lanka, it is the country’s central government which chose to borrow in foreign currency. It now finds itself struggling to repay that.
To help the cause of more informed discussions among our bureaucrats, perhaps the Reserve Bank of India, which manages borrowings of both GoI and states, can conduct online tutorials on the subject. It will lead to better policies.



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It was a political yorker or googly or a reverse swing – pick your cricket metaphor – but Imran Khan’s national assembly dissolution and calling for polls haven’t of course ended the match. For one, Pakistan’s Supreme Court is hearing the matter. And its decision can dramatically change the dynamics – breezily killing a no-confidence motion is dubious parliamentary practice, even in Pakistan. Two, after we chuckle at the claim by Pakistan army’s PR arm that the forces have no role in this soap opera, the generals will have their own calculations. Three, Imran, who seems to not have lost his ability to mobilise street protests, may not docilely follow whatever the court and the army decide – he has already become the first Pakistani PM to at least temporarily outmanoeuvre an army-backed de facto coup. Had the no-confidence motion been debated and voted on, and had, as was widely expected, Imran lost that vote, he would have been the first Pakistani PM to lose office through parliamentary means, and not via direct military or judicial intervention. But Pakistan can always surprise. So, all kinds of scenarios are possible, not excluding violence.

Whichever way Pakistan’s political crisis plays out and whoever is the country’s next PM, two things won’t change. First, despite General Bajwa’s recent comments on importance of talks with India, terror will continue to be a Pakistani policy against this country. Second, the country’s economic crisis will continue to deepen. Consumer price inflation is over 12%, Pakistani rupee has lost 50% of its value in five years, the country’s debt keeps piling higher, and minus IMF and occasional help from Saudis and Qataris, the country will go bankrupt. China’s infrastructure spend in Pakistan has predictably led to little economic improvement and, again predictably, added to its debt.

This economic crisis is no surprise but Pakistan’s generals still think that the country’s so-called strategic geographic position is a card that can be played to get help from a great power, China having replaced the US in this calculation. But that strategy may be running out of steam. China’s commitment is unlikely to match America’s when the latter was obsessively focussed on the so-called war on terror. Beijing’s global strategic view has many components of which using Pakistan to harass India is only one. For example, with the Quad becoming a more cohesive grouping, and given China’s big focus on Indo-Pacific and its geopolitical rivalry with the US, Islamabad’s utility as an India-baiter may be less valued than Rawalpindi’s brass reckons.



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India’s wrapping up of the free trade agreement with Australia soon after a deal with UAE sends global signals that its trade policy is moving into higher gear. By showcasing Indian readiness to lower import duties on a range of goods and Australia’s willingness to ease mobility for professionals, this deal could give greater impetus to other FTA negotiations. It is a win-win for both sides. Indian industry gets cheaper access to raw materials like coal, aluminium and metallic ores while Indian professionals secure liberal visa concessions. Australian wines, wool, sheep meat, onions, almonds and other horticultural products will benefit from tariff reductions.

Notably, India will reportedly highlight the mobility concessions for Indian professionals by Australia in its ongoing UK FTA negotiations. This had also hindered an EU FTA deal, which the commerce ministry is targeting for a mid-2023 inking, and will be an issue in any India-US deal. There is no alternative to realistic give-and-take on market access. The Australia FTA removes tariff disadvantages India suffered in merchandise exports of labour-intensive goods vis-à-vis China and Asean countries because of RCEP. Leaning towards import substitution will blunt India’s export competitiveness over time. It denies India cheaper components that reduce product manufacturing costs.

Dairy products, rice, wheat, sugar, apples and iron ore have been excluded by Oz, evidently due to Indian political and industry sensitivities. Hopefully, these won’t be dealbusters for FTAs with other key countries/trade blocs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with its impact on energy and farm supply chains and altering of geopolitics calls for India to firm up trade agreements faster. The India-Australia FTA may belong to the realm of trade, but it’s hard to miss the strategic considerations. As bilateral trade and thereby mutual trust grow, it will be easier for both sides to get on the same page in countering China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. FTAs offer India another shot at boarding the manufacturing bandwagon. Don’t lose this momentum.



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India's position is complicated - at least as complicated as the messiness 'out there'.

As the war in Ukraine drags, there is increased pressure on India to clarify its ambivalent position of 'strategic autonomy'. With shifting sands in the world order continuing, as a growing power straddling the world of developed and developing economies, India needs to find its place in this rework-in-progress.

India's position is complicated - at least as complicated as the messiness 'out there'. The latest events in Pakistan are a reminder of Rawalpindi running Islamabad. A rupture in the New Delhi-Moscow relationship could clear the way for a Russia-China-Pakistan partnership. Russia wants to bind India - the offer of heavily discounted Ural-grade fuel is a way to tip the scales of India's strategic autonomy. China continues to attempt to push the 'Asia vs the world' narrative to isolate India from the West. India must emphasise its spot in a complicated 'splattered Earth' scenario during its engagements with Western powers.

S Jaishankar's 'six principles' put India in Ukraine's corner - dealing with a powerful neighbour with designs on their territory. Not pulling its punches, New Delhi has told Moscow to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of countries. A continued Vladimir Putin-Joe Biden face-off will serve to make Russia weaker vis-a-vis China. A stronger China not being desirable for India and the world, Narendra Modi must leverage India's neutrality to nudge Putin to end the war and opt for dialogue. As the war's human toll rises, India's strategic autonomy feels more like opportunism. Accepting that trade-offs are inescapable, India must shed its post-colonial, Cold War-era mindset, rooting its response in its commitment to democracy, open societies and partnerships for prosperity - without overtly falling into camps.

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The logic for the merger, and earnings potential, become inescapable when HDFC Bank does not have to pay a premium over the market price for a business run extremely well within the family.

The question, till today, about HDFC's merger with HDFC Bank was: why haven't they done it already? India's largest mortgage lender stood to gain from the cheap funds the nation's largest private bank raises as deposits from clients. By passing on its mortgage business to HDFC, its sister bank was sweating its retail lending book more than it should have. It could always use a bulkier balance sheet to write bigger loan cheques. The two have very little overlap among customers, and the opportunity to cross-sell services from insurance to mutual funds in one financial supermarket was huge. And HDFC's exposure to affordable housing and microlending made it easier for its loan book to sit within HDFC Bank's development finance requirements.

So, why is the merger happening now? Simple answer: the regulatory arbitrage between Indian banks and shadow banks is about to end. The policy intent behind raising the regulatory bar was non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) shouldering an inordinate share of infrastructure lending. At this point in the interest rate cycle, HDFC should find it easier to adjust to a bank's liquidity requirements. The merger's costs have been brought down by new reporting and delinquency provisioning rules for NBFCs. Even core technology platforms have been aligned. A merger now expects to benefit as deleveraged Indian companies and a consolidating banking industry gear up for an investment super cycle.

The logic for the merger, and earnings potential, become inescapable when HDFC Bank does not have to pay a premium over the market price for a business run extremely well within the family. The gains in the market capitalisation sweepstakes may not extend immediately to being listed on indices passive foreign portfolio investors track. But the deal structure opens up headroom for international holdings. Domestic institutions may have to trim their holdings in the combined entity. Yet, a big slice of incremental household savings flowing into the stock market will continue to end up at the HDFC Bank counter.

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For a person who came to power after campaigning for years on an anti-corruption and pro-governance platform, Pakistan Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan has dealt a body blow to constitutionalism and the rule of law. Faced with a no-confidence motion that would certainly have resulted in his ouster, Mr Khan didn’t deliver on his promise to play till the last ball like a true sportsman. Instead, much like the player who picks up the wickets and runs off the field, he displayed utter contempt for Parliament by getting his law minister to oppose the no-confidence motion brought by the combined Opposition on the ground that it violated a constitutional provision requiring all citizens to be loyal to the State. The reason cited for this was a so-called “foreign conspiracy” based on a purported diplomatic cable sent by a former Pakistani envoy to the United States (US). The deputy speaker, who is from Mr Khan’s party, accepted the law minister’s argument and dismissed the trust vote motion.

Since then, the national assembly has been dissolved, Mr Khan has called for fresh elections and nominated former chief justice Gulzar Ahmed as caretaker PM. The entire episode reeks of impropriety and only served to further weaken the standing of Parliament and the Constitution, which had been somewhat strengthened after decades of being systematically hollowed out from the inside by a string of military rulers. Pakistani experts and commentators have likened Mr Khan’s actions to a “civilian coup” and the ease with which the PM’s aides have described them as a masterstroke is bewildering. No right-thinking person, and especially anyone interested in the strengthening of democracy in South Asia, will endorse Mr Khan’s actions. If there truly is evidence of an international conspiracy, Mr Khan should make it public.

For now, his repeated claims in this regard appear only to be appeals to his diehard supporters to keep backing him no matter what. Pakistan’s Supreme Court will now play a crucial role in finding a way out of this unnecessary constitutional crisis foisted on the nation by Mr Khan, but the judiciary has been found wanting in such high-profile cases in the past. Like Pakistan’s other neighbours, India certainly won’t be keen on any prolongation of this political crisis.



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The beleaguered Congress received some unexpected support this week from Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) chief Sharad Pawar, who told reporters that despite strong regional leaders making a play for power, the Congress was still the only Opposition party with a pan-India footprint. The Maratha strongman – often considered the glue holding together the Maha Vikas Aghadi alliance in Maharashtra — said even though the Congress was not in power, workers from the party could still be found in every district and village, making the case for including the Congress in any Opposition plan to challenge the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Mr Pawar is right. In the last two general elections, despite its dismal showing, the Congress retained roughly 19% of the vote when no other Opposition party even crossed double digits. Despite an atrophying leadership, it remains the principal challenger to the BJP – for example, every state election from now till 2024 will feature a largely bipolar contest between the two biggest national parties – and it will take newer players, such as the Aam Aadmi Party and Trinamool Congress, years to occupy that space.

The Congress’s problems are many. Research shows that once it falls below second place, or 20% of the vote share in a state, it never recovers. Its leadership appears listless in front of the BJP’s concerted political machine, and its old-style electoral politics is a misfit in the 24/7 era. But Mr Pawar, incidentally one of the most successful Congress dissidents who left the party two decades ago, underlines that the space to build a vibrant national Opposition exists and the Congress can still serve as the core of this exercise. Whether it can correct its course, and live up to this expectation, will be made clear in state polls later this year.



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Pakistan’s National Assembly (NA) met on April 3 to vote on a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan. His defeat was certain because defections and desertions had reduced his government to a minority. An embattled Khan had spent the previous week accusing the United States (US), at first indirectly but later directly, of conspiring with Pakistan’s Opposition for his removal from office. Khan asserted that a US official formally conveyed to the former Pakistani ambassador in Washington that if Khan survived the no-confidence process, US-Pakistan relations would remain negative. The US dismissed Khan’s claims.

When NA met, Khan resorted to a desperate and dubious parliamentary manoeuvre; the deputy speaker quashed the no-confidence motion, saying it was motivated by a foreign power, and hence violated the constitutional requirement of loyalty to the State. That enabled Khan to advise president Arif Alvi to dissolve NA. He did so. Under Pakistan’s constitution, Khan has to give way to an independent caretaker government, which will take the country to elections to be held within three months.

Khan’s extreme step surprised the country, throwing it into a constitutional and political crisis. The Supreme Court chief justice went into a huddle with some of his brother judges after NA proceedings. The Opposition also took the matter to the court, asking that the deputy speaker’s actions be annulled. The court has admitted the case. The chief justice observed that Alvi and Khan’s actions will be subject to the court’s orders, but will it be able to reach a decision soon? It will have to grapple with complex issues of constitutional law relating to judicial intervention in parliamentary proceedings and the extent of the president’s powers to dissolve NA.

Army chief General Qamar Bajwa was leading the army’s endeavours to defuse the political crisis. On May 3, however, he sought to swiftly distance the army from NA proceedings. The army spokesman said, “The army is not involved in the political process”. This is, of course, not correct for it is both a professional force and a political institution. Indeed, the present political situation can be traced to the transfer of director-general of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, Khan’s preferred general, last autumn. Khan ultimately accepted Hameed’s transfer, but Bajwa considered his defiance unacceptable interference in army affairs. He lifted the army’s protective shield over Khan. That encouraged the old established leaders — Asif Ali Zardari, the Sharifs and Maulana Fazlur Rehman — who are otherwise at odds with each other to join hands and purposefully move in for the kill.

Khan has now donned the garb of a martyr to Islam and Pakistan’s izzat (dignity). He has repeatedly told the country that it has to choose between the path of Prophet Muhammad or accept foreign manipulation through domestic traitors. Ironically, and clearly taking a dig at Pakistani politicians and generals for bending before outside powers, Khan praised India’s non-aligned and independent foreign policy on three separate occasions, including at the Islamabad Security Dialogue where foreigners were present. All this shows that he feels he has struck a chord with the people as a mard-e-momin, mard-e-mujahid — a pious and brave Muslim — who wants to redeem Pakistan, keeping it on the path of Allah.

As the crisis continues, the main consideration for the senior generals will be its impact on the appointment of the next army chief due in November when Bajwa’s extended term ends. During periods of civilian rule, the army leaves the choice to the PM, who is given a slate of eligible generals. In view of the army chief’s position in Pakistani affairs, the institution would like the transition to the next man to be a smooth affair under a PM it trusts. Certainly, as stated in these columns last October, the army would not like Khan to appoint the next army chief. Of course, some officers like Faiz Hameed may prefer Khan as PM for obvious reasons.

The next step in the Pakistani political drama will depend on the Supreme Court’s decision. It will either quash the developments of April 3 and the no-confidence motion will be restored and the vote will go ahead. Khan will be defeated and a coalition government likely led by Shehbaz Sharif will be formed. Unlike Nawaz, he has always accepted the reality of the army’s power and role in Pakistan’s national life. With vast administrative experience as Punjab’s chief minister, Shehbaz is pragmatic but the question is for how long will he be able to keep a coalition going. The country’s economic situation is dire and Khan will hit the streets. The army will attempt to keep the coalition going till the year’s end, by which time a decision on the next chief would have been made by Shehbaz.

If the court chooses not to interfere with the deputy speaker’s decision, Khan and Alvi’s actions will have to be upheld and Pakistan will have elections in July. The real electoral battle will be fought in Punjab between Khan and the Sharifs with the army helping the latter as long as Nawaz does not rock the boat. The army will discreetly do its utmost to ensure Khan’s defeat.

Meanwhile Bajwa will have to assuage the US. It does not want instability in a country with nuclear weapons, but the price it will demand is Khan in the political wilderness. That is how great powers act and Pakistan knows that.

Vivek Katju is a retired diplomat The views expressed are personal



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India and Australia have signed a historic interim economic cooperation and trade agreement (ECTA), which will give a fillip to India’s exports in the textiles, leather, gems, and jewellery sector Down Under. The two sides will now negotiate for a full-fledged comprehensive economic cooperation agreement (CECA). A conspicuous feature of ECTA is that it does not contain a chapter on foreign investment. As India unilaterally renounced its bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Australia in 2017, one expected that investment protection will be part of ECTA.

While ECTA makes references to investment as part of the trade in services, it lacks provisions on investment protection such as providing foreign investment most favoured nation and national treatment; protection from expropriation; assurance to provide fair and equitable treatment to foreign investment; recognising foreign investor’s right to bring claims against the State for alleged treaty breaches, among others. Arguably, this is an interim agreement and a full chapter on investment protection might be included in the final CECA. However, the possibility is remote. Article 14.5 of ECTA, which includes a list of topics on which negotiations will take place to transform the interim ECTA into a comprehensive CECA, does not talk of a chapter on investment protection.

It is unlikely that Australia is averse to including an investment protection chapter. In the last few years, Australia has signed comprehensive economic agreements with Peru, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. These treaties include a chapter on investment protection. In the case of Hong Kong, there is an investment agreement associated with the economic treaty. So, is India antagonistic to including the investment protection chapter in the final CECA? India’s recent CECA with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) does not include an investment chapter either. Article 12.1 of the India-UAE CECA refers to the existing BIT between the two sides and states that the countries agree to replace the existing BIT with a new agreement by June 2022. This indicates that the two sides will sign an investment treaty outside CECA. Likewise, an investment protection chapter is also missing in the India-Mauritius CECA, signed in 2021, despite the unilateral termination of the India-Mauritius BIT by India.

The pattern that seems to be emerging is that India is not too keen to include an investment protection chapter in CECAs. It will be interesting to see what India does with other CECA-negotiating countries such as the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada. Perhaps, India prefers signing BITs outside CECAs. If true, this approach is mystifying for several reasons. First, India’s rationale for signing a comprehensive economic agreement with these countries is to be part of the global value chains (GVCs). Both, trade and foreign investment are central to GVCs. Therefore, decoupling trade from investment in these CECAs defies economic sagacity. Many recent mega economic treaties such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership include chapters on investment protection. Second, if investment protection is made a part of these CECAs, India will have a better bargaining position to negotiate balanced investment chapters in comparison to a standalone investment treaty. When several related issues are part of the same deal, there is a greater likelihood of “give and take” and reaching a win-win compromise.

The elephant in the room is India’s overly defensive stand on investment protection under international law. Stung by several international claims under BITs, India is like a cat who, after sitting on a hot stove, refuses to sit even on a cold stove. Regrettably, India has failed to comprehend that most of the BIT claims arose due to poor regulation. It is imprudent to blame investment treaties. Thus, India should come out of its shell and accept investment protection as part of its broader economic commitments under international law. This will enable India to realise the full potential of these CECAs.

Prabhash Ranjan is a professor and vice dean, Jindal Global Law School The views expressed are personal



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Pakistan’s outgoing Prime Minister Imran Khan has been close to ouster for weeks as he parried a concerted attack by a united Opposition under the rubric Pakistani Democratic Movement (PDM). He had threatened to “play till the last ball”. But instead, he adopted the old Pakistani malaise of ball-tampering. Needing 172 members for a majority in the 342-member National Assembly, even some among his own 155 members of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party appeared ready to bolt.

Rule 37(8) of the National Assembly rules of procedure states that once a no-confidence motion has been permitted, the “Assembly shall not be prorogued until the motion is disposed of or, if leave is granted, the resolution has been voted on”. Instead, the deputy speaker chose to belatedly reject it on the pretext, completely unsubstantiated, of interference by the “foreign hand”. He recommended the dissolution of the House, forcing fresh elections. While the national security threat was brazenly paraded, what was surprising was that it was not India but Islamabad’s traditional friend, the United States, that was allegedly the culprit.

It had been speculated for months that relations had soured between the Pakistan Army and its favourite politician Imran Khan. The Army had hoped that his charisma, resting on his outstanding cricketing career and then charitable activities, would marginalise the two conventional parties that had alternated in power, interspersed with military rule. But a combination of hubris, failing economy, seeking an Opposition-free Pakistan by attacking the main Opposition parties as well as rabble-rousing anti-US rhetoric made the Army nervous. The public began to point fingers at them as the sponsors of the Khan dispensation.

The final straw was Imran Khan’s attempt to position his favourite general to head the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) wing of the military. The extended term of Pakistan Army chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa is till November 2022, well before the Prime Minister’s term was due to end in 2023. The Army felt the Prime Minister was trying to tweak the chain of succession in the Army. The Army’s supposed puppet was coming alive and snapping its strings.

In Pakistan, the invisible hand of the Army is forever on the political cradle. The Opposition can sense it when the hand stops rocking it. The PDM thus ratcheted up its eject-Imran game. Rumours began circulating that Imran Khan’s burqa-clad wife-cum-spiritual guru was involved with rampant corruption in the crucial province of Punjab, nearly half of Pakistan in demographic and economic terms. It was under the charge of

Imran’s handpicked chief minister Usman Buzdar. To retain support of his ally PML(Q), Imran Khan agreed to hand over Punjab to its leader Chaudhry Parvez Elahi. Thus, parallel political theatre was underway in Lahore.

In Punjab too, Imran Khan, no longer needing the PML(Q) in Islamabad as fresh elections had been ordered, delayed the change of command. The vote on electing a new chief minister has been deferred to April 6. The Punjab governor was also replaced. The whole issue has been taken to Pakistan’s Supreme Court by the Opposition, alleging constitutional impropriety. A bench has been constituted to urgently hear the matter.

Interestingly, Gen. Bajwa decided to contest Imran Khan’s anti-American diatribe. At an Islamabad forum, he argued that “we have a long and excellent strategic relationship with the US, which remains our largest export market”. But, he added, Pakistan also has a “close strategic relationship with China, demonstrated by our commitment towards the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”. And then, surprisingly he also went on to say: “Sadly, the Russian invasion against Ukraine is very unfortunate”. He explained that despite Russia’s legitimate security concerns, aggression against “a smaller country cannot be condoned”. The last argument obviously had India in mind.

This finally displayed the fracture lines that forced the Pakistan Army to cut its support to Imran Khan. I had argued on television earlier that the Pakistani Army’s discomfort must have grown with Imran beginning his two-day Moscow visit on February 24, the very day that President Vladimir Putin began his invasion (or “special military operation”) in Ukraine. With time it became clear that Imran Khan misread the likely direction of the Ukraine war. He misjudged, like Pakistan’s ally China, that the war was likely to end quickly and with the Russian objective of regime change achieved.

It is worth recalling how Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan’s President, did an instantaneous mid-air flip after 9/11 when the US President George W. Bush pointedly asked him if Pakistan was “with us or against us”. Armies can make tactical decisions much more quickly than democratically elected leaders. Gen. Bajwa has done likewise. Pakistan needed to be pulled out of the Russia-China corner with the war in Ukraine drifting towards stalemate or the Russians’ failure to achieve most of their principal objectives. Pakistan needs the United States for financial assistance from the IMF as well as to balance relations with China. Even more significantly, they probably think that it may be an opportune time to align with the US when India has been fence-sitting on Ukraine, thus creating questions about its reliability as a potential strategic partner.

What happens next depends on the Pakistan Supreme Court. If the deputy speaker’s ruling is struck down and the no-confidence vote resurrected, then Shahbaz Sharif may well become Prime Minister. It is an outcome Imran Khan would least want. One year of better governance by his successor can sink his ability to use emotional arguments to rabble rouse. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may allow fresh elections to enable the air to be cleared. But in any case, under Pakistan’s constitutional system, an interim Prime Minister would have to be appointed during the election period.

For India, the remarks of Gen. Bajwa about the need for normalisation of relations with India are important. But it is unlikely that any Pakistani Prime Minister would reach out to India until after the elections in his country. India will also have to show flexibility in moving Jammu and Kashmir towards statehood and a popular government. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may also not think of engaging Pakistan unless a leader is available who has the Army’s confidence and the courage to contain the jihadi organisations. The Sharifs have traditionally pandered to the Punjab-based militant outfits. However, Gen. Bajwa’s recent statesman-like remarks raise hopes of a new beginning, subject to the usual caveat of the jihadi tail often wagging the dog.



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