One of the questions long-time watchers of the United Nations like myself kept asking as the Ukraine crisis unfolded was what the UN Secretary-General, the able former Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres, was doing. When the Americans were crying themselves hoarse about an imminent invasion for weeks before it actually happened, did the Secretary-General seek to use his “good offices” to resolve the crisis? Did he send an emissary to Moscow to find out its intentions and understand its irreducible demands, then have the same person try in Kyiv to get Ukraine to agree to the terms of a compromise?
Hardly inspiring
While such efforts do not necessarily have to be public, there was no evidence of any “shuttle diplomacy” conducted by the UN Secretary-General. Indeed, there seems to have been no high UN official sent in the couple of months preceding the Russian invasion to either capital, nor even to Washington DC or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels. Unlike the legendary U Thant, who intervened between Moscow and Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (albeit through telegrams rather than travel), Secretary-General Guterres seems to have limited himself to earnest exhortations to Russia to observe the peace it had already violated when he spoke. The implication that when a Permanent Member is a belligerent, the UN is reduced to helplessness, is inaccurate. The Secretary-General can act. In 1998, when the United States was about to bomb Iraq, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan unilaterally undertook a trip to Baghdad (I was with him) to stave off the resort to war.
If the UN thought that brokering peace was a hopeless undertaking, this does not seem to have deterred Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who did travel to Moscow and is reported to have proposed a 15-point peace plan to his interlocutors. It seems to include provisions that would deny Ukraine the right to join NATO, disallow any foreign troops on its soil, and enable the Russians to keep some presence in the east while withdrawing the bulk of their forces and stopping their assault. The Ukrainians are already saying that this is a catalogue of Russian demands and does not fully reflect their point of view.
Putin and his objectives
I have long been of the view that having undertaken such a high-risk enterprise as launching a military invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to stop before his strategic objectives are realised. But what exactly are those objectives? Ending any prospect of NATO troops and weapons on his doorstep is obviously a priority. But to ensure that, does he aim to bring about “regime change” in Kyiv, replacing the defiant Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with the pro-Russian deposed former President Viktor Yanukovych? Does he intend to annex some of Ukraine’s territory? Is his aim to create a “buffer state” in Ukraine between Russia and the West? Or could he, as the Chinese did to India in 1962, declare that his enemies had been “taught a lesson”, decide to cut short his losses and unilaterally withdraw?
No one really knows, not even our omniscient mandarins in South Block. Russia is already paying a huge price, economically, geopolitically and diplomatically, for its Ukrainian adventure. The higher the price goes up, the greater will be Moscow’s unwillingness to end the conflict without some tangible gains that it can point to, in order to demonstrate to its own people that the price was worth paying. What might the key gains be that would fulfil Moscow’s war aims?
On neutrality
The first basic requirement for peace appears crystal clear: a declaration of formal, binding neutrality for Ukraine. Finland and Austria already have such neutrality embedded in their constitutions, as do Switzerland and Sweden by long-standing policy, and this has worked well, allowing these nations to appear indistinguishable from other western democracies while at the same time having no military relationship with NATO. Russia had believed it had assurances of Ukrainian neutrality in the past, but Kyiv’s flirting with NATO had raised the spectre of those assurances unravelling. Having them in writing, enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution and guaranteed by other powers, would seem to be a sine qua non for Moscow to end its military campaign.
But would neutrality alone (which President Zelensky has reportedly indicated his willingness to concede) be enough? I imagine that while Ukraine, as a sovereign state, would retain its army and related defence forces, Moscow would also want restrictions on the kind of weapons Ukraine could station on its soil, their power and range. Missiles that can strike Moscow, for instance, could be outlawed. Just before Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, Moscow officially recognised the independence of the two separatist provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Preserving that arrangement or at least ensuring de facto Russian control over the Donbas region, to which Luhansk and Donetsk belong, by retaining Russian “peacekeepers” there, would give Moscow the buffer zone it seeks. Moscow would probably also wish to achieve formal international recognition of its 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which did not attract the kind of condemnation its current actions have — since Crimea’s residents do largely see themselves as Russians, unlike the people of the rest of the country. A comprehensive peace settlement would probably have to include Crimea too.
A settlement covering the above elements would probably be enough for the Russians to declare victory and go home, but would Ukraine accept it? This is far from clear, as initial reactions to Mr. Bennett’s efforts suggest. And if Ukraine did — just to stop the suffering and destruction — what would they want in exchange? Some suggest Kyiv would only accept formal neutrality provided there were assurances from powerful western countries (especially the United States) to come to its aid if it were attacked in future. That, in turn, is unlikely to be acceptable to Moscow, which would see western security guarantees as the thin end of a NATO wedge into its neighbourhood. Could the United Nations be an acceptable alternative as a guarantor of Ukraine’s neutrality? That would have the merit, as well as the disadvantage, of involving Russia also, in committing itself to upholding such a guarantee of security.
EU membership
Ukraine may also seek to trade a surrender on NATO membership for a path towards joining the European Union (EU). Russia has so far said no to Ukrainian adhesion to the EU as well, but if peace is in the interests of both sides, this could be the one issue on which Moscow would have to concede. After all, Austria, Finland and Sweden have stayed neutral while serving as flourishing members of the EU. Perhaps Russia could bargain for an end to sanctions that are currently crippling its economy and trade, in return for making this concession.
In other words, the elements of a viable peace plan exist. What is needed is for someone to step forward and pursue it with urgency. Russia is already paying a higher price than it expected to, suffering greater battlefield losses than it anticipated, and making much slower progress than most experts had predicted when the invasion began. It may soon realise that winning the war militarily will take too long and cost too much to be worthwhile. That is the moment for a skilled peace-maker to move.
Mr. Secretary-General, could you get on a plane please?
Shashi Tharoor, a third-term MP and prize-winning author, served as Under Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2001-2007. His 29-year UN career included substantial stints in peacekeeping and in the Secretary-General’s office
Even before COVID-19, the unemployment rate touched a peak in 2017-18 at 6.1%. The urban unemployment rate was 7.8% and the rural unemployment rate was 5.3%. While the unemployment rate declined to 5.8% in 2018-19 and 4.8% in 2019-20, urban unemployment declined marginally to 7.7% and 6.9%, respectively. It was stubbornly around 7-8% during 2021 and later. If we consider the current weekly status quarterly unemployment statistics for urban areas, it was 9.4% in January-March 2021 and rose to 12.6% in April-June 2021. As per the Centre For Monitoring Indian Economy, the average urban unemployment rate remained higher at 9.04% in 2021 and above 7% in January-February 2022. Meanwhile, the rural unemployment rate rose to 8.35% in February 2022 after mild fluctuations around 5-7% since June 2021 (8.75%). Seen by any measure of unemployment or the statistical sources, urban unemployment is of grave concern, at least since the pandemic.
Does a satisfactory system of unemployment relief exist? Unlike in China, the labour laws do not expressly provide for unemployment benefits. However, under the Employees’ State Insurance Act (ESIA), 1948, the Rajiv Gandhi Shramik Kalyan Yojana (RGSKY) provides unemployment allowance to involuntarily unemployed insured persons who have made contributions for two years to ESI. The cash relief is at the rate of 50% of the last average daily wages for the first 12 months and 25% for the next 12 months. It covers unemployment due to retrenchment, closure or permanent invalidity. It provides medical care during unemployment tenure and vocational training.
In 2018, the government introduced the Atal Beemit Vyakti Kalyan Yojana (ABVKY) under which unemployed insured persons are provided allowance at the rate of 50% of the average per day earning of the claimant for 90 days on a pilot basis for two years. This was extended during the COVID-19 period.
Under the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), 1947, industrial establishments employing 100 or more workers must pay retrenchment compensation of 15 days of average pay for the completed years of service to workers in case they lose jobs due to government-sanctioned workers’ retrenchment or closures of establishments. Here, the burden of unemployment allowance is transferred to the employer. Employment-intensive industries like construction and services are excluded.
Though the Social Security Code (SSC), 2020, included unemployment protection in its definition of ‘social security’, it did not provide for a scheme for the same. When quizzed by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on this omission, the government said: “Unemployment allowance is already provided for under the ESI Act. For the unorganized workers basic social security has been taken care of in the proposed code.” It is another matter that the ESIA, despite a more inclusive coverage of 10 or more workers than the Employees’ Provident Fund Act (20 or more workers), covers fewer workers thanks to its limited and slow expansion of districts in India.
On the other hand, many States amended Chapter VB of the IDA to apply it to establishments employing 300 or more workers and offer higher retrenchment compensation rates of 45-90 days of average pay for every completed year of service. The Central government has retained the existent paltry retrenchment compensation benefits in the Industrial Relations Code (IRC). So, it is a double whammy for the organised sector workers.
Unsuccessful schemes
We have used the Annual Reports of the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) and the Standard Note on ESIS, as on July 1, 2021 to analyse the working of unemployment allowance schemes. Under the RGSKY, from 2007-08 to 2019-20, 13,341 insured persons availed of unemployment allowance (1,034 insured persons per year). To put this in context, 0.043% (13,341/3,09,66,930) of the employees availed of unemployment allowance during this period. Further, unemployment allowance’s share in total cash expenditure of ESIC ranged from 0.25% to 0.99%. The incredulously low off-take means that RGSKY is not successful. How can the government argue that this scheme will take care of unemployment contingencies for insured workers, let alone for all workers and persons waiting to enter the workforce?
Under ABVKY, from July 1, 2018 to March 31, 2020, 120 claims were made, which means a meagre average daily cash relief of Rs. 73.33. During COVID-19, the government extended ABVKY from July 2020 to June 2021. Only 45,311 persons benefited with an average daily cash relief of Rs. 147.65. So, these schemes did not matter to the organised sector workers even during the pandemic. These facts strengthen the case against the government’s sole reliance on these schemes. If this is the plight of workers in the so-called organised sector, one shudders to imagine the deprivations of those rendered workless.
On the other hand, during the pandemic, MGNREGA played a significant role in providing if only modest relief to millions of workers. Economists have shown that relief to workers does not cost much as a proportion of GDP. It is much lower than the relief given to corporates. Yet, governments of all hues have been continuing with their neoliberal policies with abandon.
The SSC offers the vague promise of schemes to the unorganised workers. It has no concrete provision relating to unemployment allowance for workers of the organised sector. The hire and fire reforms in the IRC will accentuate unemployment, especially in urban areas. The SSC must be amended to provide for a universal unemployment allowance scheme with tripartite contributions to be determined by an actuary — the second National Commission on Labour in 2002 recommended an unemployment scheme for organised workers financed by employers, workers and the government.
Retail inflation has been hovering around 6% and the wholesale price index around 12%. The EPFO reduced its interest rate to 8.1% for 2021-22. Add to this the higher level of unemployment. Laws and welfare schemes must offer relief to marginalised workers who are reeling under multiple blows. An urban employment guarantee scheme should be framed to alleviate the sufferings of workers in the urban labour market.
K.R. Shyam Sundar is Professor, HRM Area, XLRI, Xavier School of Management, Jamshedpur
Australia is celebrating India’s 75 years of Independence by making the largest single investment in our bilateral relationship.
We do so because Australia and India share a long and special relationship, one we are now working together to make even stronger.
Deep histories
We are natural partners because we are each ancient and modern countries and cultures, vibrant and full of energy and optimism.
Australia recognises the depth and diversity of India’s magnificent culture. We know the importance of connection to history.
Like India, Australia’s story stretches back tens of thousands of years. Australia’s Indigenous peoples are custodians of the oldest continuing civilisation in the world: which is why the Australian government was delighted to return 29 culturally significant artefacts to the people of India this month.
Even our words for friendship have a similar ring: India saysmaitri , Australians say mateship. Both stand for respect, understanding and equality. Friends looking out for each other.
That is the warm friendship shared between our Prime Ministers, The Hon Shri Narendra Modi and The Hon Scott Morrison MP.
On March 21, the two Prime Ministers held their Virtual Summit and took stock of the remarkable pace we are implementing the Australia-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. To drive closer cooperation and regularly review relations, the Prime Ministers also established an Annual Summit mechanism.
Since we elevated our relationship in 2020, we have advanced practical actions on cyber and critical technologies, maritime affairs, defence ties, economic and business links and Quadrilateral cooperation.
The Virtual Summit marked another milestone as our prime ministers announced a range of tangible and practical initiatives spanning the breadth of our shared economic, strategic, and regional interests.
These initiatives are an investment into the promise and potential of our nations. They address the most pressing challenges and opportunities of our time.
Because when it comes to friendship, we know actions speak louder than words.
Together, we are harnessing the technology, the talent, and the trading spirit of our people to deliver resilience, prosperity, and security.
Together, we are focused on the future.
Technology and research
We are working on a new and renewable energy partnership, to support the development of technologies such as green hydrogen and ultra-low cost solar. We are also supporting research and investment to unlock Australian critical minerals for Indian advanced manufacturing.
We will boost collaboration on innovation, science and entrepreneurship, to scale up ideas that address global challenges.
We are also increasing investments into our countries’ rapidly growing space sectors.
And we are establishing the Australia-India Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy — and a Consulate-General — in Bengaluru.
Our governments know that resilience relies on strong economies.
We have made significant inroads on negotiations on a deal that will open new two-way trade and investment opportunities, build more secure supply chains, and unlock our complementary economies, increasing the flow of goods, services and people.
Focus on students
We are investing in India’s talented young people through our new Future Skills Initiative between education and training providers and industry.
This complements the Australian government’s significant newMaitri scholarships and fellowships, giving Indian students and researchers the chance to experience Australia’s world class education system.
Australians value highly the Indian diaspora and student contributions to our community — whether economic, social, or cultural.
Prime Minister Morrison announced a dedicated Centre for Australia-India Relations to deepen that friendship between our communities.
Australia and India are also working to ensure a peaceful and stable region.
We are each committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific. We are advancing our cooperation all the way from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Islands.
Last month we announced initiatives to enhance Australia’s engagement in the Northeast Indian Ocean in support of India’s natural leadership.
In our defence relationship, we are enhancing information sharing and operational cooperation.
Such arrangements also help us continue delivering quality humanitarian support to the region, seen recently when India helped Australia’s Pacific family, Tonga and Kiribati.
Finally, Australia was saddened at the tragic loss of Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat last year. Our governments are recognising his contributions by announcing an Australia-India Young Defence Officer Exchange Program named in his honour.
These investments in our strategic, economic, and community ties show what we can achieve when two multicultural democracies join in a spirit of trust and understanding.
Australia knows that in India we have a natural partner who will help build a region where every nation can prosper.
I hope India sees a similar friend in Australia.
We are closer than ever and our transformational commitments and collaborations will continue to bring us together. We are realising the potential of ourmaitri and mateship.
Barry O’Farrell is the Australian High Commissioner to India
The road to a medical education in India is anything but smooth. One is not talking about the actual years of study and residency, but of making it to the portals of a decently equipped and staffed college. The competition is fierce. The National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test draws 16 lakh candidates for 88,000 MBBS seats, the preparation starts years ahead robbing the aspirants of the joys of childhood, coaching factories such as the ones in Kota proliferate, tensions mount, deaths by suicide increase, heartbreaks exceed exultation. And then there is the overarching shadow of reservations, the undoubted major premise in the prospectus. Starting with the advent of the Constitution in 1950 for a 10-year period, reservations have continued uninterrupted at an ever-increasing pace owing to a combustion of unrealised aspirations, increasing awareness of historical wrongs, political expediency and vote banks. As much as we have wanted to move away from a caste-based society, we have become even more wired into one where caste predominantly dictates reservation, and reservation determines accessibility to education and employment.
Courts and quotas
The courts have struggled to balance the competing demands of preference and unrestricted competition cast as merit. Initially the judiciary’s bent towards equality made it view reservations and quotas through a less-than-welcoming lens. Later on, it recognised that substantive equality does mandate a catch-up philosophy to bring the less fortunate up to levels where competition can be had on more equal terms. Courts have moved up the percentage scale of what they considered permissible, and come around to the halfway mark of 50%, the common negotiating point of resolution. The Supreme Court used a simple explanation to justify this stoppage point: reservations are an exception to the rule of equality, an exception cannot exceed the norm, ergo stop at 50%. It seems to have held on to this principle enunciated in theBalram (1972),Indra Sawhney (1992) and Maratha reservation (2021) cases.
How long more, one has to see, because the court is getting besieged by States which have a higher percentage of the population in the catchment area for reservation and see both social justice and electoral benefit converge in higher reservation points. Thus, there have been attempts to provide reservation to students of rural schools, students of State Board schools, etc. The latest is Tamil Nadu’s attempt to secure a 7.5% preference for governmental school students in an across-the-board horizontal reservation on the ground of a cognitive gap irremediable by (or some may say caused by) years of schooling in such schools; the Madras High Court is now testing its constitutional correctness. But one may take it that as long as ground conditions remain, the battle for increased reservations will continue and this will be the dominant player in determining who gets into, or is excluded from, medical colleges.
It needn’t be this way. We have become conditioned to the condition and mentality of shortages in education, and our courts have responded correspondingly with the jurisprudence of scarcity, perpetually grappling with large volumes of students chasing low numbers of seats, and in so doing balancing past wrongs against present denials, an exercise which can never be satisfactory. But rarely has the court taken it upon itself to ask the broader question: why are we consigned to be perpetually in this state of scarcity? Isn’t there a legal right for Indians to have a medical education system which is accessible and affordable, which can accommodate the youngsters who want to make this their profession? The country needs doctors, teachers need jobs, students need education. Every end of the triangle connects, but there is a yawning gap in the middle made up of enabling policy and action. The right to health and to a good education is part of the right to life, under our expanded conceptualisation of Fundamental Rights.
Turn around the dismal situation
The Prime Minister’s recent observations occasioned by the plight of the Indian medical students returning from Ukraine are on point. Why can’t we provide education to our students instead of them having to go abroad, he asked. Their travails arise not just out of the current situation; apparently, they are driven to seek unregulated agents to obtain indifferent quality education abroad with uneven chances of fitment into the medical system here. His query can well be the galvanising point for turning around the dismal medical education scheme. It does not take much to open up the field for investment and employment of capital and talent.
Restrictive rules limiting entrants should be pruned; why should only trusts or societies provide education? The more the restrictions, the more the ways to circumvent them. Focus on enabling and mandating quality infrastructure and capable teachers and keeping standards high. Have a sensible pricing policy, realise that investments need returns, and that there are students who are willing to pay. Don’t drive the commercials into the black market by unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions. Mandate scholarships as the social commitment of the institution. Calibrate a policy of reservation, total and partial scholarships with freedom to run the institution and make a reasonable profit. Let not the government appropriate the seats of private institutions; instead, it can focus on running its own colleges better. Structure tax benefits which will make it viable to start and run medical colleges, and allow minority institutions too to avail of the benefits of Section 80G of the Income Tax Act for donations to its colleges with perhaps a requirement that some, not excessive, seats are for general allotment. Beyond a wholesome regulation, let market forces operate to obtain the benefits of pricing and quality. Give up the substratum of power of officialdom, tailor policy and implementation to meet real needs, create the supply for the demand, and focus on capacity building of institutions and individuals. That’s good Atmanirbhar Bharat.
Sriram Panchu is a Senior Advocate at the Madras High Court. Email: srirampanchu@gmail.com
A conflict between honouring promises made to allies during seat allocation talks and upholding grassroots democracy came to the fore recently in Tamil Nadu following the indirect election of civic chiefs in urban local bodies. In many municipalities and town panchayats, where the posts of chairperson or deputy chairperson were allocated to the allies, contestants from the DMK’s local units entered the fray and defeated the official alliance candidates with the support of a majority of the elected councillors. Amid protests from alliance party leaders, DMK president and Chief Minister M.K. Stalin directed all such elected civic chiefs of his party to resign from their posts. He suspended district unit leaders including the Cuddalore MLA from the party for having acted against the official candidates of the DMK-led Secular Progressive Alliance. Eventually, a section of the elected civic chiefs resigned to accommodate the allies, while some defied Mr. Stalin’s diktat. He refused to meet rebels who sought an audience to explain their positions/ the ground situation and removed some party functionaries from key positions.
Such violations are not new. In 2006, DMK rebels ousted candidates of the PMK, then an ally, in indirect elections in many places. The DMK under M. Karunanidhi was then heading a minority government with external support from the allies. PMK leader S. Ramadoss declared then that his party would only extend “issue-based” support to the DMK. However, Karunanidhi, who still had a near full five-year term to complete, largely did not go beyond censuring his party functionaries and sought to pass off the breach of agreement as an “aberration” at the local level.
In contrast, Mr. Stalin, despite heading a majority government and being firmly in command of the alliance, came across as someone who did not want his smaller allies to feel the slightest discomfort and who wanted to present himself as a ‘supreme leader’ within the DMK. In doing so, he inadvertently triggered a debate on the righteousness of his action in a democracy where the choice of the majority prevails.
Votaries of the current grassroots democratic system argue that the election of the DMK ‘rebels’ was a “legitimate act” since the ‘rebels’ enjoyed the support of the majority of the members in the newly formed councils. They feel that a candidate of an alliance partner, who does not have the political wherewithal to garner majority support in a council, cannot be thrust on the members against their collective will.
Some others believe in the traditional political system, which requires compromises and adjustments with allies irrespective of their individual strength on the ground. They feel councillors, elected on the ticket of a political party, must be bound by the diktats of the leadership of the organisation and respect the terms of an alliance. They argue that most elected councillors owe their position to the organisation rather than their personal standing.
However, a practical question arises: can the head of a local body, who represents a party with fewer members in the council, function effectively during a five-year term? The answer to this perhaps lies in the context under which the DMK government in 2006 switched over to the indirect election system. The policy decision was influenced by Mr. Stalin’s experience as a directly elected Mayor (Chennai) in 2001 when he faced non-cooperation in the Corporation Council dominated by the AIADMK-led alliance’s councillors. With the DMK councillors now dominating most local bodies, it remains to be seen if civic chiefs representing alliance parties will have a smooth ride despite the uneasy truce.
sureshkumar.d@thehindu.co.in
Lakshya Sen’s run to the final of the All England Open Badminton Championships should rank high in the long list of great Indian sporting achievements. His crushing 10-21, 15-21 loss on Sunday to World No.1 and reigning Olympic champion Viktor Axelsen should not detract from the perception of his overall success. In terms of quality and prestige, no tournament quite comes close to All England. One of only three BWF Super 1000 tournaments — the crown jewels of the sport — it attracts the world’s best. And like Wimbledon in tennis, it is the first among equals, the oldest badminton tournament in the world with more than a century’s history. Indians have long had an emotional connect with All England, the acme of which came with the legendary Prakash Padukone’s stunning triumph at the 1980 edition. For Padukone’s protégé to come within one match of emulating his mentor, belying both his age and experience, is an astonishing feat. Lakshya is all of 20 and this was only his third-ever appearance at All England. But he shed the big-match nerves with ease, as he beat World No.3 and World Championships bronze-medallist Anders Antonsen (round-of-16), and World No.7 and defending champion Lee Zii Jia (semifinal) to go into the history books as the youngest of four players from independent India to reach the All England final (others being Padukone, P. Gopi Chand and Saina Nehwal).
It is fair to say that Lakshya has been building up to this. He was marked out for success since young, and he lived up to that promise with medals at the Youth Olympic and junior World and Asian levels. While excellence in the juniors is no harbinger of success at the senior level, Lakshya, under the tutelage of Dronacharya awardee U. Vimal Kumar, has transitioned rather well. The last four months’ performance, in fact, proves this. In December 2021, he secured a bronze medal at the World Championships to join a select band of seven Indians to have stood on the podium at the Worlds. In January, at the India Open, he beat the reigning World Champion, Loh Kean Yew, to win his first BWF Super 500 title. In the German Open earlier this month, he defeated Olympic bronze medallist Anthony Ginting and then shocked Axelsen himself en route to a runner-up finish. He is no longer just an object of observation but the provider of that emotional hook for many a young Indian fan and player. Elite badminton is no doubt an unforgiving and unrelenting genre, as he found out against Axelsen on Sunday. But if Lakshya continues to sharpen his game, spruce up his body and develop a champion’s mindset, the possibilities are endless.
In choosing to retain Nongthombam Biren Singh as the Chief Minister of Manipur, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has decided to go with continuity in a State where only one former Chief Minister, i.e., Okram Ibobi Singh of the Congress, had managed to carry on after a full five-year term. This should not come as a surprise even though there was speculation in the run-up to the announcement that other contenders had thrown their hats into the ring. It was under Mr. Singh’s leadership that the BJP not only increased its seat share in the Manipur Assembly, from 21 (in 2017) to 32 (in 2022), but had also managed to weather several storms while running a minority government in the last five years. Unlike 2017, when the BJP formed the government in dubious circumstances — the Congress had emerged as the single largest party with 28 seats — the ruling party had a clear-cut majority on its own this time. Besides, the BJP government has received post-election support from the Janata Dal (United) and the Nagaland Peoples’ Front, with six and five MLAs each. The clear verdict from the electorate this time should help Mr. Singh run a stable government free of the shenanigans that dominated his previous tenure. Mr. Singh also ran a spirited campaign to secure an electoral majority for the BJP, with some of his initiatives such as the “Go to Hills” and “Go to Villages” bearing fruit.
The stable majority should give Mr. Singh the ballast to focus more on governance and address the immediate needs of the State. Manipur has a higher literacy rate — 79.85% compared to the country’s average of 74.04% — besides achieving a medium human development index of 0.697, as of 2019. Only Sikkim and Mizoram have better indices in the North-east. But chronic unemployment, especially of the youth, remains a key concern that needs to be tackled by the Government. The recurring border conflicts in villages in Manipur and Nagaland, with strikes and blockades, need to end quickly, and a majority government will be better placed to address this ticklish problem. While the BJP remained silent on the unpopular Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in the course of the election and still managed to win handily in the State, it cannot assume that the electorate agreed with the views of the Union government and the party on the Act. This could come up as a problem, yet again. As for the weakened Opposition in the State, the BJP’s facile victory opens up fresh challenges for the Congress’s beleaguered leadership even as smaller parties such as the National Peoples’ Party have tried to warm up to the BJP by offering outside support. Manipur is a vital border State, with a history of extremism and ethnic violence whose embers still remain. While a stable government is best placed to work out a lasting peace and focus on livelihood issues, it will be in the Opposition’s best interests to keep the Government on its toes by acting maturely.
New Delhi, Mar, 21: Embassies in New Delhi having their own aircraft have been told by Government that they can no more use their private planes for travel of the ambassadors within India. They have been advised to use the Indian Airlines services instead. The United States Embassy and the French embassies have their own aircraft. While the United States has been having it from before Independence, the French brought it in 1967. These embassies were advised during the recent emergency not to use their aircraft but to avail of the I.A. They were also told that if they had any difficulty in securing passage in the I.A., the Government would help them. After the recent hostilities the U.S. Embassy sought permission to use its plane twice and the permission was given. But permission was refused early this month when the U.S. Ambassador wanted to go to Jamshedpur. He was advised to reach Jamshedpur by the I.A. via Calcutta or Ranchi.
The Janata Party is taking all possible steps to ensure unity of opposition parties, Chandra Shekhar said on Sunday. However, since certain complexities were involved, it would take some time to achieve the ultimate goal. Chandra Shekhar, in an apparent appeal to all concerned, said pre-conditions should not outweigh the existing circumstances demanding the unity. An executive member talked about setting a deadline for forging unity.
Tense But Peaceful
Aligarh was tense but peaceful on Sunday, the second day of the curfew. No report of any untoward incident was received. The district authorities arrested 12 people in connection with the disturbancesT in town. The district magistrate R R Shah said that there was no question of relaxing the curfew.
Closer Ties
The draft political resolution of the Communist Part of India which will be considered by the 12th party congress to be held on Monday, underscores the need for a left and democratic national alternative to the bourgeois rule represented by the Congress-I government, both at the Centre and in many states. In this task, the draft resolution calls for closer understanding and a new and higher level of unity in action between the CPI and the CPIM while ruling out the immediate possibility of unification of the communist movement in the country.
Usual pattern
The Congress-I list of nominees for the Rajya Sabha poll from 13 states follows the usual pattern. Indira Gandhi has made no effort to induct new talent who can be depended on to refurbish the sagging image of her council of ministers. Barring a sprinkling of lawyers, most other candidates are politicians
Lakshya Sen’s defeat in the All England finals, combined with the enduring memory of what Prakash Padukone (1980) and Pullela Gopichand (2001) achieved by nailing the title, points to the evolved standards that a sport seeks to achieve. A huge gulf exists between contending in a final and crossing the threshold of winning. Respecting this gap and being aware of just how significantly superior a gold is to a silver, can help Indian badminton move forward while pursuing excellence.
Lee Chong Wei carried the whole of Malaysia along with him through his pursuit of the elusive gold at the Olympics and World Championships. Chen Long’s China and Anthony Ginting’s Indonesia believed that the silver and bronze won at the Tokyo Olympics were sub-par for these talents. Sen would be the first to know the difference between winning the title and winning just the 25 points against Axelsen’s 42. History demands great fervour in its pursuit, and India is learning that through PV Sindhu and Kidambi Srikanth’s silvers at world events — before Sindhu grabbed gold in 2019, and now Sen’s runner-up position. Every silver can also potentially trigger the start of a new exciting journey of upgrading the game, and Indians will be giddy partisans as the 22-year-old goes back to the drawing board, and views the inadequacies of his game.
For a country that has settled into watching badminton with anticipation, these Finals Sundays also offer a great non-cricket option to watch sport. There’s a plethora of storylines to follow — Sen’s pursuit of titles of course, but also the emergence of doubles — Satwiksairaj Rankireddy and Chirag Shetty in men’s and now Treesa Jolly-Gayatri Gopichand in women’s doubles. Sindhu’s resurgence and Srikanth’s continued search for the big title will keep sports TV viewing exciting. The real joy in sport is in watching the rollercoaster of playing action. The way he plays, Sen is a wonderful mascot of what sport ought to be — an irresistible watch.
This editorial first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘Striving for gold’.
The directive of the Congress leadership in Kerala to its leaders against speaking at seminars organised as part of the CPM party conference in the state next month is a churlish step that shows the party in poor light. In its best version, the Congress prides itself on being a centrist outfit that upholds the ideals of free speech and the spirit of dialogue. Its diktat to former Union minister K V Thomas and Thiruvananthapuram MP Shashi Tharoor gives a lie to that claim, or boast.
Congress state chief K Sudhakaran, who issued the directive, has said that party leaders must not be seen on CPM platforms at a time when the latter, which heads the government in Kerala, is pursuing “anti-people policies”, particularly the controversial semi-high-speed railway project. He has threatened disciplinary action against those who refuse to heed the leadership’s order. Tharoor has been invited by the CPM to speak on challenges facing secularism whereas Thomas was asked to address a session on Centre-state relations. Both leaders are eminently qualified for the tasks assigned to them — Tharoor has written extensively on the idea and practice of secularism and its legacy in India while Thomas headed important parliamentary panels such as the Public Accounts Committee in the course of multiple terms in the Lok Sabha. The Congress and the CPM — bitter rivals in Kerala, but electoral allies in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal — profess and project similar views on both secularism and Centre-state relations, which their leaders spell out on national platforms regularly. Relations between the two parties in the state have deteriorated in recent times, with top leaders stooping to name-calling and amusing their respective cadres by recalling violent encounters from college days. But it is a first for the state when a PCC chief bans even intellectual engagement with the CPM. In fact, the presence of Tharoor and Thomas at the CPM party conference would not only deepen the deliberations but also foster a much-needed dialogue in a polarising time.
Ever since his appointment as PCC chief, Sudhakaran has been focused on transforming the Congress from a mass party to a cadre-centric outfit, a sort of mirror image of the CPM. His insistence on breaking all contact with rivals too stems from a notion that the Congress needs to be more aggressive in its pursuit of office, and that it must not leave any opportunity to frame the rival as an enemy. This is an impoverished notion which only makes the Congress look more insecure and ill-tempered while further shrinking spaces of public discourse.
This editorial first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘Ill-tempered party’.
The unexceptionable point made by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng in his barely-veiled attack on the Quad — the grouping consisting of India, Australia, Japan and the US — was this: “No country should pursue its so-called absolute security at the expense of other countries’ security.” He drew a parallel between the situation in Ukraine — according to him, a result of “the NATO strategy of eastward expansion” — and the several provocations perceived by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. The analogy does not hold. After all, it is China that has become an assertive power in the region and beyond, often at the “expense of other countries’ security”. US forces and allies have been a presence in the region since the end of the Second World War, and unlike NATO, the Quad is not a military alliance. As a former ambassador to India and rising star in China’s foreign policy establishment, Le may understandably be taken seriously in Delhi. But it is important to note that amid recent geopolitical developments, India’s foreign policy priorities and the ties fostered with members of the Quad are holding fast.
The Quad is a response to China’s rising ambitions, which have manifested in the form of occupying islands and trying to control sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its activities along the Line of Actual Control with India. On the other hand, as recently as February 4, China and Russia declared a “no-limits” partnership, effectively creating an alliance where they would back each other’s plans in Ukraine and Taiwan. In other words, China may be doing precisely what it is accusing the West and countries in the Indo-Pacific of doing. Le’s offensive against the Quad also comes on the heels of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s summit-level meetings with the prime ministers of Japan and Australia this week. With both countries, the level of bilateral economic cooperation and strategic convergence has only deepened: Japan has committed to investments of about $4.2 billion over five years and Australia too is likely to unveil new projects and investments in India. Both visits took place following reports of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s offer to visit India.
New Delhi must engage in talks with Beijing, while, as it has done so far, looking out for its best interests. It is also clear that China continues to be seen as the primary challenge by the Quad. Both the Japanese and Australian prime ministers have reportedly discussed the situation in Ukraine with PM Modi, and have not insisted that India echo their position. New Delhi has also reiterated that China’s belligerence — whether on its borders or in the Indo-Pacific — stands in the way of a thaw in ties with Beijing. No amount of grandstanding by China changes that reality.
This editorial first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘A matter of Quad’.
The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 and India ushered in economic liberalisation in 1991. They are not unrelated events, as they may seem. Global geopolitical events can impact domestic policies in profound ways that one may not usually fathom.
At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, India’s economy was confronted with a balance of payments and a foreign exchange crisis. Similarly, when the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted, India was already staring at a fragile economic state with slowing growth, rising inflation, weak demand and tepid private sector investment. The Union budget presented in February 2022 planned to ameliorate the economic situation through increased government spending on infrastructure and other capital expenditure projects. The global conflict has upended these plans.
Global crude oil prices have now risen above $100 a barrel for the first time in the Modi government’s tenure. Low oil prices since 2014 were a big blessing for India’s economy, though much of the windfall was recklessly squandered away by the Modi government. The government collected fuel taxes to the tune of Rs one lakh from every Indian family over the last seven years, which helped shore up government finances. Low oil prices also helped keep inflation under control, ushered in a low-interest rate regime and boosted GDP growth by two to three percentage points between 2014 and 2020.
With oil above $100, the government now has to spend twice as much to import oil as it did earlier. It cannot pass on these high oil costs to consumers amid such rapidly rising inflation and weak demand. So, it will have to bear these costs, which then severely hampers its ability to spur the economy through increased capital expenditure, as planned. Against this gloomy backdrop, Russia has offered to sell oil at lower prices to India. It is a hard temptation for India to resist. But one that comes with profound and long-lasting consequences.
In 1991, the IMF offered help to India to tide over the balance of payments crisis that came attached with conditions of an open economy policy and a liberalised trade regime. The demise of the Soviet Union at that time made it easier for India to abandon the Soviet-influenced ideology of a planned economy and veer towards the American version of a market economy. Now, in the reverse ideological direction, Russia’s offer of cheaper oil has hidden and direct costs that India will have to deliberate upon.
Whenever global crude oil prices have risen above $100 in the past, India was able to cushion that shock primarily through growth in exports. In the UPA’s tenure, when oil prices were similarly high, exports rose to nearly 25 per cent of nominal GDP, which helped India withstand the shock. However, exports in the last seven years have fallen dramatically to 18 per cent of GDP, which must be revived. With weak domestic demand, lack of private investment and fiscal bottlenecks to government expenditure, the only viable option for India now is to export its way out of economic misery.
The US is India’s biggest export market. The US has already cautioned India about abetting Russia by buying Russian oil. It remains to be seen if the US will impose secondary sanctions against India for buying discounted Russian oil, but that threat looms large. India’s precarious economy cannot withstand trade sanctions or barriers to exports by other nations in the western world.
There is another issue with buying Russian oil. Typically, when India trades with any nation, it is invoiced and paid in US dollars. But with US sanctions against Russia, it will insist on payment in rubles. If India is forced to accept trading in rubles with Russia, then it is very likely that China, which is India’s second-largest trading partner, may also insist on payments in Chinese yuan. Saudi Arabia may also insist on trading in a currency other than the US dollar. This cascading “de-dollarisation” phenomenon will further irk and antagonise the US, since it weakens the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. The real geo-economic battle in the world today is the “exorbitant privilege” of the dollar that the US is keen to preserve and China to dismantle. If India is forced to purchase Russian oil in rubles and potentially trade in yuan with China and others, it can catapult India into the centre of a geo-economic war that it can ill afford.
Exports remain India’s biggest hope for a long-term sustainable economic recovery with ample job creation. The Russia-Ukraine conflict can be an opportunity for India to step up and capture global market share in goods and services. There is already talk of India capitalising on wheat exports, albeit a tiny share of India’s overall exports, as a fallout of global sanctions against Russian wheat. India cannot risk being isolated in future global trade for near-term discounted oil deals with Russia.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict and China’s unambiguous support for Russia have reshaped the world order once again along two axes, pitted against the US and its allies. The US and China are India’s largest trading partners. New Delhi’s best bet now is to negotiate with all its trading partners equally and extract the best possible support for India’s long-term interests.
This column first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘A slippery slope’. The writer is a political economist and Chairman of Data Analytics of the Congress.
In a paradoxical turn of events, the brutal invasion of the democratic state of Ukraine by Russia has, despite its many international condemnations, fostered a certain convergence of views in India between the government, opposition, and various sections of the intelligentsia. For instance, the argument that NATO’s expansionism is comparable to the Russian invasion has found common resonance.
The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) defensive military alliance membership to central European nations after the Cold War has been invoked by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar as an explanation of the current crisis. This argument helped to justify the noncommittal attitude of India, which abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the UN Security Council. This vote was consistent with India’s repeated abstentions against the Soviet Union and then Russia in this forum. Here, India’s longstanding dependency on Russian armament (including the recently purchased S-400 air defence missile systems) to manage its security needs to be factored in too.
Besides, promoters of Hindutva also find in the conflict an opportunity to project their version of ethnic nationalism. The Hindu Sena, for instance, organised a march in Delhi on March 6 to praise Putin’s attempt to recreate “Akhand Russia”. In popular right-wing media, warmonger Putin is not just an executive head, he is seen as the global leader of a virilist mode of governance, characterising what scholars term populist authoritarianism.
Even more troubling is the ambiguous stance of several Left parties, which justify Russia’s invasion on grounds that Ukraine might be a “puppet” of American imperialism. In continuity with Noam Chomsky’s line of thought, US interference would be epitomised in the 2014 Maidan Revolution, a social movement in Ukraine that led to the election of pro-European President Petro Poroshenko. CPI(M)’s official communiqué on the Russian offensive stated that “NATO would pose a direct threat to Russia’s security” and CPI general secretary D Raja claimed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict was forced by the “US’s expansionist tendencies.”
The “Western imperialism (NATO) vs threatened nation (Russia)” argument is grounded in a selective reading of the postcolonial order. Colonial rule by European nations should exhort us to identify similar power relations in history and condemn infringements of self-determination. Instead, many prefer to see the conflict as a possibility to avenge and mitigate the European democratic appeal in Ukraine by terming it imperialist, while a true military empire — Putin’s Russia — invades, bombards, kills and terrorises. By reducing Ukraine’s war to a territorial conflict between two comparable evils, abstentionists invisibilise civilian resistance, dilute the responsibility of the Russian aggression, call for international passivity and make the struggle for justice by “smaller” nations appear illegitimate.
As indicated by historian Klaus Richter, states situated in the Russian borderlands were not “seduced” into accessing NATO. Instead, they sought membership to protect themselves against history repeating itself. Experienced hardships include military occupations (those of Abkhazia and Crimea are recent instances — India preferred to abstain and not condemn Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014), loss of sovereignty (e.g., USSR’s crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956), politically motivated famines (1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine), Gulag terror and deportations (population transfers of Poles in 1939–1941). Emergency applications to the European Union by Georgia and Moldova are testimony to these aspirations to security, with Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili declaring on March 3: “You can try to frighten countries, but that does not mean that you can change their determination to keep their independence.”
Yes, Ukraine is not a “perfect” democracy; its nationalist movement entails Neo-Nazi elements, such as Mariupol’s Azov Battalion. Today, however, it is the exacerbated nationalism of the Russian state that has unleashed its despotism on a non-belligerent country. Putin has claimed in his pre-invasion television address that Stalin’s historical mistake was not the “creation of a tightly centralised and absolutely unitary state”. Rather, it was his unwillingness to dispose of the federal varnish that Lenin (and then the Central Rada in January 1918) introduced, which served as the constitutional framework for the secession of former Soviet republics in 1990-1991.
According to writers Vladimir Sorokin and Catherine Belton, the Russian President’s willingness to restore parts of this empire against the will of its neighbours is not only a denial of statehood, it is also a by-product of Tsarist-cum-Soviet nostalgia and KGB capitalism.
Our ability to tolerate, nuance and divert such colonial and predatory attitudes in the name of either NATO’s expansionism, ethno-nationalism or diplomatic realism is not only cruel, it belittles the agencies of “small” nations by obliterating their democratic aspirations. It is not NATO’s troops or agents of Western interests that are fighting Russian occupation, but common Ukrainians moved by wider aspirations for freedom, independence and self-rule. Let us not forget that those principles were also, in their own way, at the core of India’s freedom struggle.
If realpolitik finally prevails and overdetermines India’s foreign policy, New Delhi may change its discourse because of push and pull factors. First, the Russia-China rapprochement may lead to some qualitative change during this crisis — if, for instance, Beijing sends arms to Moscow, India cannot ignore it. Second, the West may appreciate less and less India’s abstention in the UN if the war lasts for months, resulting in a humanitarian disaster, geopolitical destabilisation and an economic crisis, that will not spare India. An equidistant form of plurilateralism, then, may not be tenable.
This column first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘The abstention trap’. Martelli is a researcher at the Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH) in New Delhi; Jaffrelot is senior research fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s India Institute, London.
If the accidental firing of an Indian missile into Pakistan earlier this month reminded us of the Subcontinent’s old paradigm, a series of other developments highlight new structural trends within South Asia.
On the external front, Russia’s Ukraine war and the Sino-Russian alliance are setting the stage for a reordering of South Asia’s great power relations.
If it looks beyond the region’s immediate response to the war in Ukraine, Washington can seize the current opportunity to elevate the US’s salience for the Subcontinent in partnership with India. The Indo-Pacific strategy offers new pathways for the US to limit the traditional economic and military weight of China and Russia in the Subcontinent.
In the wake of the missile accident, all the familiar themes of the traditional US debate on South Asia — crisis management, strategic stability, nuclear arms control, Kashmir solutions — welled up to the surface. As always, Islamabad moved to seek international intervention, including from the UN Secretary-General. But there were few takers for this old South Asian formula, except in Beijing. The Western capitals have long moved away from the old policy tropes for the Subcontinent. Underlining the peremptory dismissal of Islamabad’s concerns is a deeper trend — the relative decline of Pakistan’s international standing. To be sure, Pakistan still has nuclear weapons and can always be a spoiler like Vladimir Putin’s Russia. But unlike Moscow, where President Putin has spent the last couple of decades setting the Russian house in order, Pakistan has squandered its energies in pursuing unrealisable geopolitical goals in Kashmir and Afghanistan and neglecting the modernisation of its economy and the stabilisation of its polity. If Putin had a decent material basis on which to make a terrible miscalculation in Ukraine, Pakistan has none.
Rawalpindi’s “selection” of Imran Khan to reboot Pakistan a few years ago has gone terribly wrong. By going “rogue” and refusing to work with the military establishment, Imran Khan has done more damage to Pakistan than Delhi could ever imagine. Khan has pushed Pakistan into a deep constitutional crisis, ground its economy into dust, and undermined relations with long-standing benefactors in the US, Europe and the Gulf. Since his election, US President Joe Biden has refused to call Imran Khan, who runs a “major non-NATO ally”; high-level visitors from Washington now skip Pakistan during South Asia visits. Chinese and Russian official visitors are among the few to combine trips to Delhi and Islamabad.
For decades, Pakistan dominated American mindspace in the Subcontinent. Islamabad’s decline after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to accelerate amidst Pakistan’s deepening domestic political chaos. With an economy that is smaller than that of Bangladesh and limited prospects for rapid growth in the coming years, Pakistan will find it hard to match its traditional claim for “strategic parity” with India.
The focus on the economic brings us to the second regional trend — the declining charm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia. Just a couple of years ago, China’s commercial march into South Asia seemed unstoppable. Not any longer. Today, the region can’t ignore an important fact staring at its face. Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which embraced the BRI with great gusto, are South Asia’s two worst-performing economies. Questions are being asked on the costs of BRI projects in Islamabad and Colombo. The deepening economic crises are compelling the elites of Pakistan and Sri Lanka to focus on non-Chinese financial sources to stabilise their economies. Pakistan turned to the IMF with great reluctance under Imran Khan but abandoned the adjustment programme to play populist politics against the “deep state” that is trying to unseat him. Whoever succeeds Imran is likely to go back to the West to put the Pakistan economy back on track. Sri Lanka, which ostentatiously refused to accept $480 million developmental assistance from the US in 2020, is now desperately looking for hard currency support for its sinking economic fortunes. Earlier this month, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa ended Colombo’s reluctance to engage the IMF.
In a twisted logic of its own, the South Asian political class convinced itself that economic engagement with the US would “undermine sovereignty” while uncritically embracing costly commercial cooperation with China. In Nepal, the dominant communists had made political opposition to US infrastructure assistance of $500 million as a life and death issue for a decade. At the end of last month, Nepal’s Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his Nepal Congress have finally broken through this surreal debate by getting the parliament to ratify the US loan that will facilitate Nepal’s infrastructure development and its economic integration with the Subcontinent. That Deuba resisted significant pressures from China to reject US economic assistance underlines the possibilities for the US, India, Japan, Australia and the European Union to blunt Beijing’s economic offensives through greater coordination on regional infrastructural investment.
Third, is the growing possibilities for US security cooperation with the Subcontinent. During the Cold War, the US military engagement was limited to Pakistan. In the 21st century, there has been a steady expansion of US defence cooperation with India. The current focus on the Indo-Pacific is getting Washington to modernise the defence partnerships with the smaller countries of the region.
The Trump Administration discarded the traditional obsession with Pakistan and began to recognise the strategic significance of the smaller South Asian states for its Indo-Pacific strategy. It signed a defence cooperation agreement with the Maldives in September 2020. It also began a diplomatic outreach to Bangladesh — which was long-neglected in Washington. The Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh publicly warned Dhaka against welcoming the US Indo-Pacific framework.
The Biden Administration seemed to drop the ball by focusing initially on human rights issues in Bangladesh, but it appears to be making some amends this week by reviving political engagement with Dhaka. The visit of US Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland to Bangladesh over the weekend saw progress towards signing the so-called GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) that codifies the commitment to protect classified military information. The US would also like Dhaka to sign other foundational agreements that would facilitate deeper bilateral defence cooperation. During her visit to Colombo later this week, Nuland and her team might want to pick up the threads on security cooperation with Sri Lanka that were initiated when the Rajapaksas were out of power.
The prolonged military involvement with Afghanistan and the emphasis on “Pakistan first” led to extended US neglect of the smaller countries in the Subcontinent. To make matters worse, Washington’s temptation to throw the smaller states to “single-issue wolves” in the Beltway that demand a constant feed on human rights and other issues has seen the US lose ground to China and Russia on defence diplomacy in the region.
Reversing that must necessarily involve deeper security cooperation with the region and developing alternatives to military dependence on Beijing and Moscow. This is best done in partnership with Delhi. Two decades ago, George W Bush sought to strengthen India’s global position — through the historic civil nuclear initiative and more expansive defence ties. Bush also recognised that the US would be better off letting India take the lead on regional issues in the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. But resistance in Washington and Delhi made it hard to translate that into reality. The changed regional circumstances and the new geopolitical imperatives are now nudging India and the US in that direction.
This column first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘Washington in South Asia’. The writer is a senior fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express.
As a young woman, I was relieved to read the triple talaq judgment of the Supreme Court in August 2017. The judges, led by the Chief Justice J S Khehar, set aside instant triple talaq in the case otherwise known as the Shayara Bano versus the Union of India and others. Coming after several lynching incidents, beginning with Mohammad Akhlaq in Dadri in September 2015, the verdict went a long way towards assuaging the fears of the minority. The Indian government wanted to get rid of patriarchal practices happening in the name of religion but there was no attempt to tamper with the religious rights of the minorities. It was heart-warming to see the five judges from five different religions – Chief Justice Khehar, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice R F Nariman, Justice U U Lalit and Justice S Abdul Nazeer – quoting from the Quran’s Surah Baqarah and Surah Talaq to rebuff any allegations that they had gone against either the letter or spirit of the Quran in their verdict. Besides giving the strength to fight fundamentalists within the community, the verdict also reinforced my confidence as a Muslim woman in India.
Unfortunately, those feelings are endangered following the Karnataka High Court judgment in the hijab case. “We are of the considered opinion that wearing of hijab by Muslim women does not form a part of essential religious practice in Islam,” the bench of three judges said, thereby refusing to strike down the state government’s order restricting Muslim women from wearing the hijab in educational institutions. When sundry maulanas insist on Muslim women wearing a hijab or, in many cases a full burqa, they do not ask a woman’s views on the subject. Likewise, the three judges have taken into account neither a woman’s view on the hijab nor the condition of one habituated to the hijab having to step out without it. Would such a woman still step out or just retreat to the privacy of her home? The Prime Minister, soon after coming to power, started a “Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao” campaign to protect and educate the girl child.
Today, the Karnataka HC verdict is a setback to Muslim girls in their pursuit of education. Is uniformity of dress more important than dissemination of education? Can India afford to send back these students, many of whom would have struggled to convince their parents to send them out for education in the first place, back home, or into the clutches of conservative clerics? Take the case of Tamil writer Salma, whose parents withdrew her from school at the onset of puberty. Salma managed to pursue her dreams of becoming a writer from the confines of her marital home. Do we want more girls to face similar challenges in Karnataka and elsewhere?
In today’s India, the attempt to invisibilise Muslims is an ongoing project. It began with their alleged dietary habits, when the supposed gaurakshaks started attacking unarmed Muslim men over unsubstantiated allegations of cow slaughter. More recently, we had the sorry spectacle in Gurugram where right-wing mobs disrupted Friday prayers for weeks on end. The administration, instead of protecting the worshippers, asked them to reduce the number of prayer sites in the city. From over 130, the prayer sites came down to 20. Muslims were effectively invisibilised in Gurugram. The Karnataka verdict will similarly invisibilise Muslim women.
This verdict seems to be putting Muslim women in a lose-lose position when it could have simply upheld the idea of education. The hijab issue is important as the stakeholders here are young, female students who wish to cover their head in an educated, democratic state. These students come with the desire to learn and become independent, without it taking away from their personal religious identity. Women’s oppression is multifaceted and when the state takes away the choices of a Muslim female student at the level of the classroom, can we expect a brighter future for the girl child? Far from enabling them to enter the mythical mainstream, it will send Muslim girls back into their little islands of domestic life with no opportunity for professional attainment. The hijab ban in the classroom is not only a ban on identity but also on female expression, choice, development and the ability to break away from the shackles of chauvinists, whether judges or religious fundamentalists.
India’s population has been ravaged by the Covid-19 pandemic. As per official statistics, millions have been infected, while around half a million have died. But the indirect evidence suggests a far larger impact, with over 65 per cent of the population having been infected, with perhaps five million excess deaths.
While the country’s health has suffered greatly, economic data paints a more complex story. India’s economic experience has two parts — during the national lockdown and after it. At a macro level, it is well known that GDP fell sharply during the lockdown. After the lockdown, there has been a largely V-shaped recovery, even though the main waves of the pandemic occurred well after India’s lockdown.
But what happened at the micro-level? How did the very poor fare? Did inequality rise? We used monthly data of roughly 2,00,000 households with one million members from the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS) to examine these questions. The answers are somewhat surprising.
During the lockdown, poverty and inequality spiked as economic activity grounded (almost) to a halt. The fraction of the population in extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as those with income below $1.90, rose from 7.6 per cent in November 2019 to 50.5 per cent in April 2020. While both the rich and the poor suffered, the poor were hit harder. In 2019, the average monthly household income of the top and bottom quartiles of the income distribution were approximately Rs 45,000 and Rs 8,000 in urban areas respectively and Rs 22,500 and Rs 7,500 in rural areas. During the lockdown, in urban areas, incomes of the top quartile fell by roughly 35 per cent and the bottom quartile by 55 per cent. The rural numbers were 35 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Overall, income inequality, measured by the ratio of the average income in the top quartile and in the bottom quartile, spiked by almost 25 per cent and 15 per cent in urban and rural areas respectively.
After the lockdown, poverty began to decline but did not return to the pre-pandemic levels. As of July 2021, 11.7 per cent of households remained in extreme poverty, about 4 percentage points higher than before Covid-19.
The surprising finding, however, is that income inequality declined after the lockdown to below pre-pandemic levels. Pre-pandemic, the top quartile earned on average four times that of the bottom quartile in urban areas, and three times in rural areas. Now, it earns three times more in urban areas, and twice in rural areas. Even more remarkably, the higher the income was at nearly every point in the income distribution, the economic harm from the pandemic has been worse: The 95th percentile households were hurt more than the 90th percentile, and the 10th percentile more than the 5th percentile.
This decline in inequality was driven largely by an increase in social mobility. The change in a person’s income has two parts: The change in her income percentile and the change in income for that percentile. The first change is called social mobility, while the second change is related to the Gini coefficient which measures the fraction of income attributable to different percentiles of the income distribution. India had a relatively high Gini coefficient of 0.4 before the pandemic. Unfortunately, it returned to that level after the lockdown. However, the probability that a household fell from the top or rose from the bottom quartile jumped by roughly 10 percentage points.
No data is perfect, and the CPHS — the data we employ — is no exception. For example, the response rates in CPHS fell sharply during the lockdown. Our analysis suggests, however, that the non-response was almost random, so CPHS remained representative. More importantly, CPHS is still the “best game in town” for understanding the pandemic. Government microdata will not be available for some years.
Some economists have questioned whether the CPHS adequately represents poor communities. In our opinion, the jury is still out. But, even if CPHS is not fully representative of the very poor in rural areas, that would not alter our conclusions. Our evidence shows that the negative effects of the pandemic fell with each lower percentile, even below the 10th percentile. If CPHS sampled those percentiles more, we would find that inequality fell even more than what we suggest above.
One might object that our analysis does not pass the eyeball test. Urban residents, especially in the top 1 per cent, might argue that the ultra-rich saw their stock portfolios grow even as they worked safely from home. We do not disagree. Almost no data, including the CPHS, captures the top 0.1 or even the top 1 per cent of income in cities. These individuals do not respond to such surveys. Yet the top 0.1 per cent are not the only measure of inequality. The top 0.1 per cent may be quite visible to the top 1 per cent, but they are still only 0.1 per cent of the population. The 75th percentile is far more visible to the 25th percentile than is the top 0.1 per cent.
It is important to clarify what our analysis does not show. First, it does not dispute that there is substantial inequality in India. As of July 2021, the top quartile average household income was still Rs 15,000-20,000/month greater than the bottom quartile. Second, we do not show what will happen when the pandemic ends. While there were some signs that inequality was falling before the pandemic, we cannot be sure that the pattern will return after the pandemic.
Most importantly, while one might view the reduction in inequality as a positive, we would not call it a silver lining. The pandemic was overwhelmingly a disaster for the country. But our findings suggest that it could have been worse — inequality could also have spiked. Fortunately, after the lockdown was lifted, it did not.
If there is a deeper lesson, it is that there is no clear pattern between growth or poverty on the one hand, and inequality on the other. Personally, we believe that policies should focus on growth and poverty. While inequality is problematic, it is a more elusive target.
This column first appeared in the print edition on March 22, 2022 under the title ‘The pandemic puzzle’. Malani is the Lee and Brena Freeman Professor at the University of Chicago. Gupta is Assistant Professor at NYU Stern School of Business. Woda is a research specialist at University of Chicago
In a welcome announcement yesterday, UGC has confirmed that for the upcoming 2022-23 academic year admissions to undergraduate courses in all central universities and their affiliated colleges will be via the Common University Entrance Test (CUET).
So far 14 central universities have been undertaking admissions this way, but the chaotic and stressful admission process of the last two pandemic years underscored the need for all 45 central universities to go this route. The National Testing Agency (NTA) already conducts JEE and NEET exams, so CUET is in expert hands. The shift promises a much more student-friendly entrance process, which willing state, private, and deemed universities can also join.
Because the shift was announced last year, all stakeholders have had time to prepare for it, although focussed preparation will gather pace subsequent to NTA releasing the specific modalities of CUET. One shock, however, has been the UGC also declaring yesterday that no weightage will be given to board exam performances, while leaving open a window for allowing universities to set a minimum eligibility on board exams. Remember this will be after a year in which students have had to take not one but two board exams – split over two terms. While UGC justifies its move as mitigating the diversity of boards and evaluation systems, the broader point is that the project of smoothening the admission process should minimize surprises. Consult stakeholders before announcing the rules, then stick to them.
Suzuki Motor Corporation on Saturday signed an MoU with Gujarat to invest about Rs 10,440 crore over a four-year period to manufacture electric vehicles and related batteries. Almost 70% of the proposed investment will go into battery manufacturing. The real significance of this investment is the transition it represents in the automobile world. The internal combustion engine (ICE) is being replaced by EVs. It’s a monumental shift, powered globally by generous regulatory incentives in the backdrop of anxiety over climate change.
To get a sense of the scale of transition ahead, consider the following data. In 2020, electric cars were 4.6% of the total car sales globally. By 2030, the EU aims to ensure 60% of new sales comprise EVs. India is moving in the same direction, with a goal to ensure at least 30% of new vehicle sales by 2030 are electric. Niti Aayog estimates it presents a cumulative investment opportunity of Rs 19.7 lakh crore over the next eight years. There’s been policy action at the level of both GoI and states to realise these goals. There are demand side incentives for potential customers through fiscal measures. Equally important are the supply side measures to encourage investment and manufacturing.
Supply side incentives need to be located in a global context, given the nature of the industry. Batteries are the most valuable parts of EVs, with estimates putting them at 40% of the total value. Japan, South Korea and most importantly China dominate this segment. China is the major player along the entire lithium-ion cell supply chain. Given this context, does India have the best possible supply side incentives through GoI’s Production-Linked Incentive Scheme and also individual state government policies?
India’s policies are designed to encourage investment through subsidies. These subsidies are linked to investments made by firms and subsequent sales. What’s odd is the extent of domestic focus in sales and value addition in an industry with a very global supply chain. There’s a risk that India’s policies will not result in a globally competitive scale in production, which will then influence both products and their cost of manufacture. Separately, the demand side incentives need a lot more work on public charging infrastructure, which influence operating costs of EVs. EVs present India a great opportunity, particularly with China losing its sheen on account of geopolitical risks. To capitalise on it, our policies need to be more outward looking.
In a correct but much-delayed move, the National Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation has recommended reducing the minimum gap between two Covishield does from 12 weeks to 8 weeks; the maximum interval is unchanged at 16 weeks. Reportedly, the Centre is also evaluating the need to expand the booster programme. As we have argued repeatedly, this is prudent. Although fresh Covid cases and deaths in India are at a two-year low – weekly inflections are down by 40% at just over 15,800 cases while weekly fatalities are below 200 – global Covid cases have surged by 4% in the last seven days. The current fall in Indian Covid numbers should therefore be no basis for comfort.
Around 81% of Indians over 15 have been covered by the two doses – Covishield being the most prominent – while around 96% have received at least one shot. In absolute terms, therefore, the number of adults yet to take the second dose is not small, and the new Covishield interval will help. Also note that by May 20, of India’s estimated 345 million people above the age of 45, around 53% who have received their second shot will complete six months. This likely means they may have little to no protection going forward.
The latest WHO data shows an appreciable decline in vaccine-induced immunity – including that produced by Covishield – against both severe and symptomatic disease at the six-month threshold. Another study by University of Edinburgh notes a fourfold rise in chance of death and hospitalisation four months from the second dose compared to two weeks. Therefore, greenlighting boosters for all above 45 and reducing the interval between second and third doses to 6 months from 9 months are essential. Shortage of vaccines is not the issue, neither is availability of different vaccines if GoI decides on a mix and match option, as it should. The unconscionable delay in reducing the Covishield interval shouldn’t be repeated in booster dose expansion.
State-owned oil refiners have begun to increase the retail prices of petrol and diesel after a four-and-a-half-month pause - the last hike having taken place in November 2021 - over the course of which crude oil prices climbed from $80 a barrel to $139 a barrel due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Crude is now trading at $118 a barrel and the less-than-₹1-hike per litre in automotive fuel prices is a tentative attempt at correction when bulk diesel buyers are paying an extra ₹25 per litre. The pass-through in retail petrol, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) prices could be gradual and partial because of improved refining margins and expectations that crude prices will remain elevated, but not at unmanageable, levels as Russian oil finds its way to a new set of buyers.
Indian consumers may be spared big moves in retail fuel prices if crude remains below $100 a barrel in the main, interspersed with a few spells above it. The transmission to bulk buyers will, of course, work its way through higher cargo haulage rates. The view that retail inflation is within the policy comfort zone if it stays below 6% for the better part of the year would suggest a soft landing on interest rates. With fuel subsidy largely off the government's books, the budget arithmetic, too, is affected principally by any excise rollback.
The most likely scenario would be limited crude supply disruption and partial pass-through to consumers, with tax cuts and aggressive inflation targeting kept in abeyance. The destruction of consumption demand in India has been caused by shrinking incomes during the Covid-19 pandemic and not so much by war-spurred energy inflation. Policy can be expected to be guided by this understanding, unless, of course, the oil shock becomes overwhelming. Prices of cooking and transport fuels are playing into this theme. Crude at 50% above its baseline would require a 25% hike in pump prices, with a grave impact on disposable incomes. For now, that possibility looks remote.
<
Read in source website
GoI must expand India's booster programme soon. The decision must be based on the scientific analysis from the ongoing Covid vaccination programme. With cases at a record low now and the world opening for work, study and leisure travel, this is the right time for a decision.
Omicron-related hospitalisation and deaths were much lower, despite a higher number of cases, than in the earlier Delta wave. Globally, hospitalisation in the Omicron wave was mostly of the unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated. There is no doubt of the protective value of vaccines. But declining vaccine efficacy is a concern. Studies conducted outside India on commonly used vaccines produced by Oxford-AstraZeneca, Pfizer, Biotech and Johnson & Johnson show a decline in efficacy after 6-9 months of the protocol, especially among older populations. These studies and World Health Organisation (WHO) analysis led many countries to include booster shots in the protocol. India should undertake efficacy studies for administered vaccines based on real-life vaccination data that must be peer-reviewed and published. These studies will help in determining the need for boosters and recognition of 'full vaccination' protocol. In many countries, vaccine protocol comprises a two-dose primary and an mRNA booster. Which is why even Indians with a third 'precaution' dose are treated as incompletely vaccinated in these countries. The studies are critical for standardising protocols across jurisdictions.
Boosters are critical for continued protection, given the resurgence of Covid cases in some parts of the world. India's vaccination programme covers more than 1 billion individuals. Organising timely supply of the most effective booster vaccines is not an easy task. GoI needs to get going before it becomes an emergency demand.
<
Read in source website
Non-performing assets (NPA) or bad loans of banks have come down to their lowest levels, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor Shaktikanta Das said at a Confederation of Indian Industry event on March 21. When seen in the context of gross NPA share falling to 6.9% of all loans, according to RBI’s Financial Stability Report released in December 2021 — the latest number is 6.5% — the comments are not surprising. The fall in NPA ratio is accompanied by an improvement in capital adequacy of banks and interest coverage ratio of companies. Deterioration in these two factors led to the twin balance sheet (TBS) crisis in India’s financial system in the last decade.
To be sure, bad loans could see a marginal rise due to stress among small borrowers when the moratorium announced during the pandemic comes to an end later this year. However, most analysts agree that the rise will not be significant. Also, some of the bad loans have been written off, the cost being borne by the exchequer.
What does this development mean for the Indian economy at large? It is good news as far as financial sector stability is concerned. The TBS crisis was an important headwind to India’s growth prospects in the last decade. The growth challenge, at the moment, is different in nature though. It is lack of demand rather than past baggage of bad loans that is holding back investment and demand for credit. For this to change, improvement in mass incomes will matter more than the state of bank and corporate balance sheets. Persistence of inflation due to the ongoing geopolitical disruptions is bound to increase the squeeze on purchasing powers at large. This underlines the importance of continued policy vigilance.
Sky high cutoffs, students with 100% scores jostling for seats and universities struggling to maintain parity between boards with wildly varying marking standards. These scenes may soon be consigned to history as India’s higher education regulator moved to formalise a standardised multiple-choice examination for central universities. The Common University Entrance Test, or CUET, is compulsory for undergraduate admissions in 51 central universities from this year.
There is no doubt the Indian higher education system has been in dire need of reform for decades now. As Class 12 marks have skyrocketed, so have the anxiety levels of parents and students, their desperation underlining the reality that only a handful of public universities can compete with global standards of teaching. That students with 90+ scores in Class 12 would almost certainly be denied admission at Tier-1 institutions or that higher education opportunities are increasingly concentrated in five or six metropolises show the need for standardising admission norms. But the architecture of the examination is of paramount importance. The government has announced that it will be conducted in 13 languages, which is a good move, but people administering the test will have to keep in mind that the pool of applicants is far more diverse than in any examination (say for engineering, legal or medical seats) currently run in India, and also such an examination for humanities subjects has never been conducted at the national level. Policymakers will have to ensure that this doesn’t lead to a mushrooming of coaching centres — a practice which ultimately harms holistic education, inculcates rote learning, and handicaps students from marginalised communities. And finally, the role of classroom learning and board examinations will have to be clarified, so that they don’t end up being hollow, perfunctory exercises.
CUET is a big leap, one that comes at a time when prominent universities across the world, and especially in the United States, are moving away from standardised testing over complaints that the system is biased against marginalised groups. How to best educate school students and evaluate them fairly has been an enduring puzzle of India’s higher education system. CUET will need to be nimble, detail oriented and, above all, just and unbiased to the diverse cohort that is the country’s college hopefuls.
Over the past few weeks, India Inc. was rocked by the Ashneer Grover-BharatPe controversy and the revelations around the National Stock Exchange (NSE)-Chitra Ramkrishna-Himalayan yogi saga. The fact that BharatPe, a celebrated start-up that became a unicorn last year with a subsequent three-fold valuation jump within six months, and NSE, a shining star in the evolution of India’s capital markets, were allegedly run arbitrarily with little or no internal check mechanisms points to gaping holes in India’s corporate governance system.
Beyond co-founder Grover’s now-infamous outburst against a bank employee, BharatPe’s bigger problems include alleged malpractices, financial irregularities and a toxic work culture. What is surprising was the silence of many reputed venture capitalists (VCs) who are investors and have board seats in the company. The fact that the board ordered an inquiry only after Grover’s purported audio clip went viral raises larger questions. What if the public relations disaster had not happened? Perhaps then the alleged mismanagement of the company’s funds and related party transactions, all unconfirmed and likely to be the basis for a protracted dispute, may never have come to light.
Grover is not the only founder facing ouster from his company. In 2015, Housing.com chief executive officer (CEO) and co-founder Rahul Yadav was fired after repeated run-ins with investors and the media.
Neither is the issue of poor governance and reckless CEOs restricted to India’s startups and promoter-driven companies. Former ICICI Bank CEO Chanda Kochhar’s fall from grace following allegations of quid pro quo in a loan case is another key lesson in weak corporate governance. The board’s role in this case, too, left a lot to be desired. Initially, the board of directors rallied behind Kochhar and gave her a clean chit. As the case caught public attention and came under intense media scrutiny, the bank was left with no option but to form an internal probe panel. The rest is history.
The revelations emerging from the NSE investigation seem outlandish, with Ramkrishna’s admission of depending on a mysterious yogi for her business decisions. Equally bizarre was her appointing Anand Subramanian as a strategic advisor at a salary that was 10 times more than what he was drawing at the time, and his rapid elevation to group operating officer in a span of two years, at a trebling of salary. It is hard to believe that this happened unbeknownst to the board in such a critical organisation. The board’s actions could at best be described as irresponsible and at worst, complicit.
The sordid saga at NSE revealed how arbitrarily one of the country’s most important market institutions was run. Other recent governance lapses resulted in the IL&FS collapse, the Yes Bank crisis and the DHFL scandal. In all these cases, the shareholders’ interest seemed to be the least priority. Each of these crises laid bare India’s weak corporate governance system.
Many issues plague corporate governance in India. First is the lack of accountability of controlling shareholders or promoters who pursue policies and practices in their own interest at the expense of minority shareholders. Many appoint friendly independent directors, ensuring them a free run. Next is the lack of transparency and inadequate disclosure requirements. This is compounded by weak enforcement of regulations by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the country’s market regulator. As a result, cases of management lapse may take years to resolve and end with warnings or mild punishments. Just last week, SEBI backtracked on a rule requiring the separation of the roles of the chairperson and MD/CEO for India’s top 500 companies that was to come into effect on April 1– a recommendation made by the Uday Kotak committee on corporate governance in 2017.
And, finally, the fact that markets in India do not punish poorly managed companies adequately for their misdeeds adds to the problem.
Last year, India’s startup ecosystem mopped up record investments of nearly $36 billion amid massive demand for digitisation due to the pandemic. At a time when India is rapidly emerging as the start-up capital of the world, it’s critical to fix the inadequacies in our corporate governance system to pave the way for future growth.
Analysts and investors have serious concerns about weak corporate governance ranging from opacity, lack of diversity and related party transactions, to concentration of powers and authority in promoters. India must seriously penalise auditors and boards of companies for overlooking management follies. A combination of disclosure, regulation, enforcement and investor activism can improve corporate governance.
Trust, transparency and accountability are hallmarks of strong corporate governance that can help build investor confidence and earn their trust. Companies where promoters act in the interests of shareholders tend to do better in the long run. What we need to remember is that global investors are watching the lacunae in our current corporate governance structure and, more importantly, if we are serious about fixing them.
Lloyd Mathias is a business strategist and angel investor
The views expressed are personal.
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s recent report is a dire warning about the consequences of climate inaction. At COP26, India announced its ambitious aim to achieve net-zero emissions by 2070 and reduce its emissions intensity by at least 45% by 2030. As a global climate leader, shaping the language of climate action at important world forums, India has a responsibility to head to COP27 with stronger Nationally Determined Contributions to get the world on the crucial 1.5°C pathway.
However, climate action at the domestic front presents a challenging picture. Despite a high degree of priority accorded to delivering India’s global climate commitments in the Union Budget 2022-23 speech, the government fell short of making the required allocation to key climate action sectors such as energy, sustainability, and clean tech. Even for a handful of climate action sectors, where there was a rise in budgetary allocation such as electric vehicles (EVs), there is no concrete action plan to guide effective implementation.
With such low budget allocations, how will India effectively accelerate its progress? How can India’s domestic policy decisions and public expenditure be aligned to its global climate commitments? Going forward, what structural and conceptual frameworks need to be adopted to achieve its climate pledges?
First, to effectively address the climate crisis, India needs to redefine growth. India’s policymaking still suffers from a classic struggle between development, ie infrastructure creation, boosting the economy and jobs versus the environmental footprint of such development. This was evident from this Budget, too, where announcements for climate action were not linked with announcements for economic development, and vice-versa. India must make a paradigm shift from measuring economic growth through the conventional statistics of gross domestic product (GDP) to integrating sustainable, inclusive, and green metrics that can capture the interactions between the economic, social, and environmental pillars of development to monitor the “quality of growth”.
Second, bridge the gap between infrastructure creation to provide “futuristic” growth and accounting for the magnitude of future environmental risk and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. With this year’s Budget, the government has been consistent in making big public investments for modern infrastructure. Yet, there continues to be a lack of synergy on how adverse climate, environmental, and socioeconomic impacts will be addressed, including displacement.
Third, shift the focus from a mitigation-dominated climate strategy to one that accords equal importance to adaptation and resilience. India is projected to lose between 3-10% of its GDP annually by 2100. The major brunt of this loss will be borne by the socio-economically vulnerable population. This requires institutionalising resilience as a strategy in climate actions.
The Budget mentioned various mitigation-based efforts such as setting the target of 280 GW of solar energy by 2030, or hefty support to the EV ecosystem or announcement of ₹19,500 crore for the Production Linked Incentive scheme for solar manufacturing. However, budgetary allocations for biodiversity conservation and the National Adaptation Plan were substantially reduced and financial support to institutions fostering climate action such as the Solar Energy Council of India and Central Pollution Control Board also took a hit. To support adaptation and resilience efforts, strengthening these institutions becomes indispensable.
Fourth, adopt systems that attract climate finance. One of the major drawbacks of the current climate finance regime is its volatility given that the majority of existing global climate finance is coming through private investors. Therefore, enhanced public spending by the government and public sector undertakings towards climate-based projects is vital.
As India prepares its strategy for COP27, the adoption of such strategies will impart the much-needed coherence between India’s existing global climate commitments and domestic policy decisions such as the ones announced in the Union Budget.
Aparna Roy is research lead, climate change and energy, and associate fellow, ORF
The views expressed are personal
In evaluating the most appropriate financing options for digital ecosystems, policymakers must identify the objectives they are looking to achieve and select the funding option most appropriately aligned with those objectives.
In certain circumstances, public financing is unavoidable. For instance, where the information system in question provides essential government services such as tax (Goods and Services Tax Number or Tax Identification Number), there is no option but to ensure that these digital ecosystems are financed using public funds. Similarly, in the context of government databases with access to sensitive information, safety considerations might prohibit private sector participation.
That said, with the exception of digital systems that relate to essential State functions, as a general rule, government funding should only be availed of where necessary to avert possible market failures. Consider, for instance, the development of a consumer-facing application in a new and, as yet unproven, digital ecosystem. Private enterprise is unlikely to invest in developing such an app, considering that there is not yet a market for it. In these situations, the government could step in to fund its development to catalyse a demand.
The best example of this, in the Indian experience, is the government-funded BHIM app that virtually single-handedly kickstarted private sector interest in India’s digital payments infrastructure. Today, private payment service providers dominate the space, but had it not been for the government’s initial investment in the development and proliferation of BHIM, UPI may never have achieved the success it enjoys. The market failure here, was a missing market. Had the government not intervened, we might never have been able to develop the commercial ecosystem in the digital payments space.
Governments face soft-budget constraints that end up causing budget deficits, ultimately leading to “government failures’’. Philanthropic funding is often an appropriate alternative in these circumstances. It is not a coincidence that most open stacks tend to be initially funded by philanthropies. A case in point is MOSIP, the open source identity platform that offers technological building blocks for foundational identity programmes. MOSIP is being used by countries such as Ethiopia, the Philippines and Morocco to build their ID platforms. Other examples of community-driven initiatives include mapping services such as OpenStreetMap that offer geographic information systems that can subsequently be incorporated into digital ecosystems.
Modern digital ecosystems are typically modular, making it possible for various components of the ecosystem to be funded differently. In most instances, the edges of the ecosystem — the customer-facing apps and user interfaces through which users interact with the system — can be funded using private capital. This is the portion of the ecosystem that will benefit the most from the operation of market forces that will both encourage proliferation and incentivise innovation. On the other hand, core elements of the infrastructure (the registries that determine the roles and permissions of ecosystem participants) are susceptible to negative incentives like rent-seeking and nepotism.
While we can rely on private capital for these elements, care should be taken to safeguard them against unfavourable outcomes by putting in place regulatory oversight. In the context of technologically complex systems, this could be extraordinarily challenging, given that regulators often lack the competence to even understand the complex systems over which they have oversight. When Boeing designed the 737 Max, they gave the 40-year-old aeroplane design a software upgrade — introducing the new MCAS system that took so much control away from the pilots that it resulted in two crashes within a few months of its launch. While Boeing admitted, in court documents, to having withheld relevant information from the regulator, what was even more disturbing was that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had virtually abdicated its responsibility, allowing Boeing engineers to prepare the safety analysis document themselves, confirming that the aircraft complied with FAA regulations. Since they did not fully understand how this fly-by-wire technology operated, the regulator had allowed the regulated entity to certify itself.
It is in order to avoid such situations that regulators need access to reliable institutional support that can help them deal with rapidly evolving standards in cutting-edge technical domains. Technical standards organisations perform this role, providing regulators with the advice they need to evaluate how existing standards need to evolve to both meet the demands of the market and keep up with improvements in technology. These institutions should ideally be funded using philanthropic capital to prevent regulatory capture by private entities while at the same time ensuring that the organisation has the level of sustained investment that it needs.
There is no standard prescription for the split between public, private and philanthropic capital in our digital ecosystems set-up. The complexity of these digital ecosystems requires us to arrive at an appropriate balance for each system that ensures that citizens are both empowered by technology while at the same time protected from its most harmful side-effects.
To paraphrase former Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, we need to cross this digital river while feeling the stones.
Rahul Matthan is partner at Trilegal and Prakhar Misra is PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University
The views expressed are personal
It took 24 hours for the Chinese foreign ministry to acknowledge what its ambassador to Ukraine, Fan Xianrong, told Lviv regional military administration chief, Maksym Kozytskyi about Beijing-Kyiv ties on March 15.
“China and Ukraine are strategic partners… China is a friendly country for the Ukrainian people… I can responsibly say that China will forever be a good force for Ukraine, both economically and politically… We will respect the path chosen by Ukrainians because this is the sovereign right of every nation… China will never attack Ukraine, we will help, in particular in the economic direction,” Fan told Kozytskyi in what, frankly, read like a burst of emotion, shared, if not entirely in spontaneity, at least in some patronising sense of solidarity.
Questioned about Fan’s comments, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian said: “China surely supports these remarks by our ambassador in Ukraine. China supports all efforts that are conducive to easing the situation and for a political settlement.”
So, what’s China doing, or planning to do to stop the war that Russia has launched against Ukraine?
So far, Beijing’s publicised efforts have included phone and video calls by President Xi Jinping and meetings held by China’s two top diplomats Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi with counterparts besides dispatching humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Friday’s 110-minute video call between Xi and President Joe Biden was one such effort.
“The world is neither peaceful nor tranquil,” Xi said, according to an official readout.
“The Ukraine crisis is something we don’t want to see.”
Right.
But as expected, Xi did not explicitly denounce Russia.
Mediation?
Given Beijing’s so-called “pro-Russia neutrality”, there’s a divergence of views on Beijing’s potential as a mediator in resolving the conflict in the east European country.
Some like Alex Younger, former head of the British secret service, have talked about China’s criticality in stopping the war.
Younger told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme: “Of all the people in the world that can assert influence on Vladimir Putin, who is in his bunker and who is obsessed by achieving greatness through the restoration of the Russian Empire... of all the people that can talk sense to him, it’s (Chinese President) Xi.”
For Beijing, it’s easier said than done.
Beijing knows the war is not only being fought between Russia and Ukraine; Moscow is also fighting a united West comprising the US, its allies and the European Union in a war of diplomacy and global opinion.
Does Beijing want to step on to this diplomatic minefield given its support for Russia, even if it has not given its wholehearted backing for Moscow’s “special military action” in Ukraine?
China certainly stands to gain from a negotiated settlement as the war rages on, as its, pre-war, relatively cost-free partnership with Moscow is weighed down by geopolitical, economic and reputational risks for Beijing, Helena Legarda, lead analyst at the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), told HT.
But it’s unlikely to jump into the arena to negotiate.
“China, however, is very unlikely to mediate between Russia and Ukraine itself. Despite the clear gains if it were able to broker a ceasefire, also in terms of its global image, Beijing will not want to increase its exposure to the conflict and to shoulder the responsibility (and potential backlash) in case the negotiations go wrong,” Legarda said.
It’s not Beijing’s misgivings alone why it might not directly take part – the West will not trust Beijing.
“Besides, China’s official position so far has been one of tacit support for Russia’s interests, and is therefore unlikely to be seen as an impartial actor by Kyiv or other parties in Europe or the US,” Legarda said.
Given Beijing-Moscow’s strategic ties, China will not be seen as objective.
“In the 6-party talks on the Korea (Korean Peninsula), China was the lawyer for North Korea, not impartial,” Joseph S Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University said.
“China would like to avoid a choice and have things both ways, but if it has to choose it prefers to keep close to Russia as a counterbalance to American power. However, if Russia seeks a mediator, this would ease China’s dilemma,” Nye told HT over email.
There are arguments in favour of China being part of a multilateral team of negotiators.
It could help China, for example, in polishing its sullied global image in the backdrop of supporting (since the Ukraine war) a mostly reviled Russia, repressive policies in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet and being diplomatically and militarily aggressive against Taiwan; and, as we know, running a dragging border conflict with its Himalayan neighbour, India.
There are reasons also for Beijing not to directly intervene or assume some kind of leadership position in mediation efforts.
For one, this is a politically sensitive year for China with the twice-in-a-decade Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress – reshuffle of the party elite – coming up later in 2022.
Xi is expected to be confirmed for a third term as CPC general secretary at the 20th CPC Congress this fall and secure a precedent-breaking third term as China’s president in March 2023.
Would Xi want to get into a potentially messy multilateral negotiation without the guarantee of success?
By China’s own version of events, it wasn't aware of Moscow’s plans to invade Kyiv despite the Xi-Putin camaraderie — notwithstanding a strong sense of disbelief about this convenient narrative of ignorance among China watchers.
Anyway, Xi wouldn’t want to portray a picture of failure to his captive domestic audience if negotiations implode.
It will be a loss of Xi’s carefully cultivated face as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, and an erosion of the CPC’s stature among the masses, fed on an all-encompassing hyper-nationalist narrative of a successful and glorious China, rising tall in the post-pandemic-ravaged world.
China does not have a long history of mediating in foreign conflicts either, MERICS’ Legarda pointed out.
China’s rising graph of involvement in mediation activities is parallel to the expansion of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — as a way to try to restore and/or preserve stability mostly in BRI countries.
China, Legarda said, also tends to favour multilateral initiatives, like the Six-Party Talks, in which it can be one of the several powers around the table, allowing Beijing to present itself as a responsible global power but evade full responsibility if efforts are unsuccessful.
“This approach has advantages for Beijing, but it has so far failed to produce long-term positive outcomes. Focused on restoring stability, rather than long-term conflict resolution, China’s approach often lacks in impartiality, inclusivity and national ownership.”
Sutirtho Patranobis, HT’s experienced China hand, writes a weekly column from Beijing, exclusively for HT Premium readers. He was previously posted in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where he covered the final phase of the civil war and its aftermath, and was based in Delhi for several years before that
The views expressed are personal
Do you use a tailor? I am willing to bet that a) you almost never get anything tailored and b) that it was different in your grandfather's time because he probably had lots of clothes tailored. The tailor has gone the way of the ‘suit piece’ and the ‘trial’; both phrases we don't hear very much these days. (Also read: The Taste With Vir: Time for food writers to serve readers again)
In the West, the decline of tailoring was based primarily on economic considerations. As incomes went up, tailors began expecting to be paid more. This pushed up the cost of tailored clothes. Around the same time, industrialisation made it cheap and easy to mass manufacture garments. So, people stopped going to tailors and bought their clothes off the peg.
This was as true for women as it was for men. The ‘ladies dressmaker’ survived as a profession in the West till the 1940s and was then gradually replaced by shops selling readymade goods.
By the 1960s, fashion had followed that trend. Most designer clothes are now readymade. You can still get couture, that is, clothes made specially for you by top designers but prices are so high (around ₹40 to 50 lakh per outfit is not uncommon) that only the very rich can afford couture.
The slow death of men's tailoring in the West led to the birth of the men's fashion industry. Would you care about Giorgio Armani or Tom Ford if your clothes were still made for you by a tailor? It is the rise of readymade garments that made these designers rich and famous.
For some reason, most of us have adopted the western way with ready-to-wear even though it is not prohibitively expensive to get clothes tailored in India. In fact, it is often much cheaper than buying a branded suit. But because we regard tailoring as being old-fashioned and downmarket, most men would rather go to a shop and buy something made in a factory.
I can understand why you would want to do this. It is easy and convenient if you are buying say, jeans or casual shirts. But does it make sense if you are buying a suit or a formal shirt?
I don't think so. Yes, it is true that there are fewer and fewer good tailors. But there is a chicken and egg principle at work here. If we hadn't stopped getting clothes made for us, there would have been more tailors. By denying them our custom we have driven them out of business.
I am a firm fan of tailoring. It has been at least 15 years now since I have bought say, a suit or a formal shirt off the peg. If you have a good tailor, why would you want to wear anything made in a factory along with thousands of identical pieces like it?
Given a choice between a designer and tailor, I will take the tailor nearly every time.
And I am not the only one. When you see Hollywood stars looking so good in their suits, don't believe all the publicity material about how they bought their clothes at Tom Ford or Brioni and Giorgio Armani. Even if you have a figure like Daniel Craig and can afford to buy a Tom Ford suit, you still won't look like James Bond if you buy your suits from shops run by these designers.
Because the fictional James Bond and the real Daniel Craig do not buy their suits from the Tom Ford shop or a Brioni store. They have them tailored for them. Tom Ford or Brioni will get an old-fashioned tailor to take the star's measurements and then make the clothes from scratch.
The most famous men's tailors in the world are, of course, the tailors of London's Savile Row. Nearly every iconic men's movie outfit you can recall will have been tailored on Savile Row. Remember the suit that Cary Grant wears throughout Alfred Hitchcock's classic North By Northwest? That was made for him on Savile Row. What about all the clothes that Roger Moore wore as James Bond? They were made for him by Dougie Hayward, his regular tailor.
Even stars who have tried ready-to-wear have found that they need the Row's cutters to look better in their movies. When Tom Cruise came to London to shoot the first Mission Impossible movie, the film's costume designer gave him a wardrobe designed by Donna Karan. Cruise had worked out for the role so he had muscular shoulders and none of the Karan suits felt right. He was taken to Timothy Everest, then part of Savile Row's new generation. Everest made suits specially for Cruise who looked great in Mission Impossible and has remained a Savile Row loyalist ever since.
Interestingly, famous men's designers prefer to wear Savile Row suits themselves when they are not promoting their own brands. Calvin Klein has a whole wardrobe of suits from the Row. Tom Ford is such a Savile Row fan that the suits he sells are patterned on the classic Row cuts. (But they can be tighter as anyone who has seen the suits Ford tailored for Daniel Craig's Bond will know). Ralph Lauren wore Savile Row suits before launching Purple Label as a tribute to the Row.
Savile Row suits cost a lot. On the other hand, they don't cost much more than many off-the-peg Tom Ford suits. So why do people go for the off-the-peg look? Perhaps because it is quicker. The first time you order a bespoke suit, it will take a month for the first fitting. By the time you try the suit, at least 52 man hours will have gone into making it by hand. There will be two more fittings. So, the process can take over two months
A simpler option is made-to-measure. This is nowhere near as evolved as bespoke. For a bespoke suit, a master cutter will draw a pattern for the suit and the canvas will be cut according to the drawing. The suit will follow that pattern. The suit will not accord to any regular size (say 52 or 54). It will be made to your exact specifications.
A made-to-measure suit (favoured by most Italian men's brands now), on the other hand, is a standard pattern (say a 52 or a 54), adjusted to make room for the imperfections in your body. Many rich Indians like made-to-measure because Indian men tend to have larger waists and thinner legs than most western men which is why readymade suits never look right. Made-to-measure takes that into account at less than half the price of bespoke (and only a little more than readymade) and requires only one fitting.
Regular Indian tailors still try and go with the bespoke style. All of my formal shirts, my bandis and many of my suits are made for me by Vaish at Rivoli in Delhi using classic Savile Row techniques. I also like the Canali made-to-measure service which is an extremely well-run operation in India.
Sadly, I can't afford to buy too many Savile Row suits. But I shifted from Gieves and Hawkes to Whitcomb and Shaftesbury, partly because it is Indian-owned and their cutters often fly to India for fittings but mostly because the suits are elegant and comfortable.
None of this is cheap. But the suits last a lifetime and if your weight fluctuates, all of them (Vaish, Canali, Gieves and Hawkes and Whitcomb and Shaftesbury,) will be happy to adjust the suits.
The problem with all this, of course, is that it is now difficult to go back to buying readymade clothes. I have a strange body (shoulders too broad, paunch too big etc.) and readymade always looks wrong on me. Fortunately, we still have the luxury of tailors like Vaish at Rivoli in India and the travelling culture of Whitcomb and Shaftesbury.
All good suits are luxuries. But given that most of us need only one or two good suits, they do not overstrain the wallets of anyone who already wears readymade suits from fancy designer brands. Why pay for an off-the-peg designer suit when, for just a little more, you can get a tailor to make you look like a movie star?
Sometimes the old ways are the best.