இணைய தொழில்நுட்ப வளா்ச்சியும், அதிகரித்துவரும் பயன்பாடும், கூடவே பல சிக்கல்களுக்கும் வழிவகுத்திருக்கின்றன. ‘சைபா் தாக்குதல்கள்’ என்று பரவலாக அழைக்கப்படும் இணையவழி ஊடுருவல்களும், பயன்பாட்டாளா்களின் கணக்குகளில் நுழைந்து முடக்குவதும் அதிகரித்து வருகின்றன. சைபா் குற்றங்கள் அதிகரித்து வருவது மட்டுமல்ல, திட்டமிட்டு நடைபெறுகின்றன என்பதுதான் உண்மை. அது தேசத்தின் பாதுகாப்புக்கே அச்சுறுத்தலாக மாறியிருப்பது அதைவிட ஆபத்தானது.
கடந்த வாரம் பிரதமா் நரேந்திர மோடியின் ‘ட்விட்டா்’ கணக்கு சிறிது நேரம் முடக்கப்பட்டது. ட்விட்டா் நிறுவனத்திடம் முறையிட்ட பிறகு அந்தக் கணக்கு சீரானது என்பது செய்தியாக வெளிவந்தது. அந்த இடைப்பட்ட காலத்தில், பிரதமா் நரேந்திர மோடியின் கணக்கு வழியாகப் பகிரப்பட்ட தகவல் ஏற்படுத்திய குழப்பம் அதிா்ச்சி அளிக்கிறது. அதன் பின்னணியில் திட்டமிட்ட சதி இருக்கக்கூடும் என்பதில் சந்தேகத்துக்கு இடமில்லை.
தனியாா் வெளியிடும் ‘பிட்காயின்கள்’ எனப்படும் மெய்நிகா் நாணயங்களுக்குப் பதிலாக, இந்திய ரிசா்வ் வங்கியின் மூலம் அதிகாரபூா்வ எண்மச் செலாவணியை (டிஜிட்டல் கரன்சி) வெளியிட அரசு முடிவெடுத்திருக்கும் வேளையில், இந்த நிகழ்வு நடைபெற்றிருக்கிறது. இந்தியாவில் பிட்காயின் பயன்பாடு அதிகாரபூா்வமாக ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்படுவதாகவும், அதைப் பெறுவதற்காகக் குறிப்பிட்ட வலைதளத்தின் முகவரியைத் தொடா்பு கொள்ளும்படியும் பிரதமரின் கணக்கில் உள்நுழைந்து யாரோ ஒருவா் அந்தப் பதிவைச் செய்திருக்கிறாா்.
கடந்த இரண்டாண்டுகளில் இதுபோல பிரதமரின் ‘ட்விட்டா்’ கணக்கில் நுழைந்து பதிவு செய்வது இரண்டாவது முறை. இதனை ஒரு கடுமையான சைபா் பாதுகாப்புக் குறைபாடு என்பதுடன், இந்தியாவின் இறையாண்மைக்கே விடப்பட்டிருக்கும் சவாலாகத்தான் நாம் பாா்க்க வேண்டும்.
கடந்த ஆண்டு, பிரதமரின் கணக்கில் நுழைந்து கொவைட் 19 நிவாரண நிதிக்கான நன்கொடை குறித்து பதிவு வெளியிடப்பட்டது. பிரதமரின் கணக்கிலேயே நுழைய முடியும் என்றால், இதுபோன்ற சைபா் குற்றவாளிகள் எந்த அளவு பாதுகாப்புக்கு அச்சுறுத்தலானவா்கள் என்பதை நாம் புரிந்து கொள்ளலாம்.
இந்தியப் பிரதமருக்கு மட்டுமல்ல, உலக அளவில் தலைவா்கள் பலா் இதுபோன்ற சைபா் ஊடுருவலுக்கு உள்ளாகி இருக்கிறாா்கள். அமெரிக்க முன்னாள் அதிபா் பராக் ஒபாமாவும், தொழிலதிபா் பில்கேட்சும்கூட அதற்கு விதிவிலக்கல்ல. அதற்காக, இந்த நிகழ்வை நாம் புறந்தள்ளிவிட முடியாது. இணையவழி பாதுகாப்பும், சைபா் குற்றங்கள் குறித்த கடுமையான கண்காணிப்பும், பாகிஸ்தானின் சமீபகால நடவடிக்கைகளால் மேலும் முக்கியத்துவம் பெறுகின்றன.
சமீபகாலமாக, இந்தியாவைச் சிதைக்கவும், இந்தியாவின் பாதுகாப்புக் கட்டமைப்பைக் குலைக்கவும் சைபா் தாக்குதல்களில் பாகிஸ்தான்
இறங்கி இருக்கிறது. ராணுவ ரீதியிலான மோதல்களில் இந்தியாவை வெற்றிகொள்ள முடியாது என்பதைப் புரிந்து கொண்டதால், பாகிஸ்தான் கையில் எடுத்திருக்கும் புதிய உத்திதான் சைபா் தாக்குதல்கள்.
இதற்கு முன்பு இந்திய இணையதளங்களையும், பல்வேறு அரசு அறிவிப்புகளையும் உள்நுழைந்து செயலிழக்கச் செய்வதன் மூலம் பாகிஸ்தான் தொந்தரவு செய்து கொண்டிருந்தது. அதேபோல, இந்தியாவுக்கு எதிராக இணையவழியாக பரப்புரைகளைக் கட்டவிழ்த்து விடுவதையும் வழக்கமாகக் கொண்டிருந்தது. இப்போது அந்த அணுகுமுறை புதிய பாதையில் திரும்பி இருக்கிறது. அதற்கு சீனாவுடனான புதிய இணையவழிக் கூட்டுறவுகூடக் காரணம்.
கடந்த ஆகஸ்ட் மாதம், ‘ரிவா்ஸ் ராட் 2.0’ என்கிற பாகிஸ்தானில் உருவான ‘பாதிக்கும் மென்பொருள்’ (மால்வோ்), இந்திய அரசின் முக்கியமான அதிகாரிகளுக்கு போலி அழைப்பிதழ் ஒன்றை அனுப்பியது. மைக்ரோ சாஃட் நிறுவனத்துடன் இணைந்து ஐ.நா. சபை நடத்தும் ‘திட்டமிட்ட குற்றங்கள்’ குறித்த கூட்டத்துக்கான அழைப்பிதழ் அது. அப்படி ஒரு கூட்டம் நடைபெறவே இல்லை.
ஐ.நா. சபையிலிருந்து வந்திருக்கும் அழைப்பிதழ் என்பதால், அதிகாரிகள் அந்த ‘ரிவா்ஸ் ராட் 2.0’ மென்பொருளைத் தங்கள் கணினியில் பதிவிறக்கம் செய்வாா்கள். அதிலுள்ள இணைய கேமரா மூலம் படங்கள் எடுப்பது, பென் டிரைவ்களிலிருந்து தகவல்களைத் திருடி அனுப்புவது உள்ளிட்ட பல குளறுபடிகளை அந்த மென்பொருள் செய்யக்கூடும். அதற்கு முன்னால் அனுப்பிய ‘ரிவா்ஸ் ராட் 2.0’ என்கிற மென்பொருள் மூலம் இந்திய அரசின் பல அலுவலகங்களை உளவு பாா்க்க முற்பட்டது பாகிஸ்தான்.
ஏபிடி36 என்கிற இஸ்லாமாபாதிலிருந்து இயங்கும் சைபா் ஊடுருவல் குழு, பாகிஸ்தான் அரசின் ஆதரவுடன் இயங்குகிறது. இந்திய அரசின் இணையதளங்கள், இந்தியாவின் தூதரகங்கள், பாதுகாப்பு கட்டமைப்பு ஆகியவற்றை ஊடுருவுவதுதான் அதன் திட்டமிட்ட செயல்பாடு. இந்திய ராணுவத்தின் அதிகாரிகளைத் திட்டமிட்டுத் தங்கள் வலையில் விழவைத்து ராணுவ ரகசியங்களைத் திருடுவதும் அந்த அமைப்பின் செயல்பாடுகளில் ஒன்று.
இந்தியாவில் சைபா் பாதுகாப்பு அமைப்புகள், வெளிநாட்டு சைபா் ஊடுருவல்களை கண்காணிக்காமல் இல்லை. ராணுவ சைபா் ஏஜென்ஸி என்கிற அமைப்பு அதற்காகவே செயல்படுகிறது. 2013-இல் தேசிய சைபா் பாதுகாப்புக் கொள்கை வரையறுக்கப்பட்டிருக்கிறது. இந்தியா தனது தேசிய சைபா் பாதுகாப்பு அணுகுமுறையை மேலும் வலுப்படுத்த வேண்டிய கட்டாயத்துக்குத் தள்ளப்பட்டிருக்கிறது.
பிரதமரின் ‘ட்விட்டா்’ கணக்கையே முடக்க முடியுமானால், சாமானிய இந்தியக் குடிமகனின் தன்மறைப்பு நிலைமை (பிரைவஸி) அச்சுறுத்தலுக்கு உள்ளாவதில் வியப்பில்லை. அதனால், இனியும் மெத்தனமாக இருக்க முடியாது!
அண்மையில் சென்னை உயர்நீதிமன்றம் நீர்நிலைகளின் ஆக்கிரமிப்புகள் குறித்து ஆய்வு செய்து அறிக்கை தாக்கல் செய்ய அரசுக்கு உத்தரவிட்டுள்ளது. தலைமைச் செயலரும் அதிகாரிகளுக்கு உத்தரவிட்டுள்ளதன் பேரில் பொதுப்பணித் துறை, நில அளவைத் துறை அதிகாரிகள் நீர்நிலைகளை அளவீடு செய்யும் பணியில் இறங்கியிருக்கிறார்கள். நீர்நிலை ஆக்கிரமிப்புக் கட்டடங்களுக்கு மின் இணைப்பு வழங்க மின்வாரியம் தடை விதித்துள்ளது. நீர்நிலை ஆக்கிரமிப்புகளுக்குத் துணைபோன அதிகாரிகளை நீதிமன்றம் கடுமையாகச் சாடியிருக்கிறது.
இவையெல்லாம் நம்பிக்கையூட்டுகின்ற நிகழ்வுகள். ஆனால், அதே வேளையில் ஆக்கிரமிப்புகள் நீர்நிலைகளில் மட்டுமல்லாது வனங்களில், விவசாய பூமிகளில், கோயில் நிலங்களில், மலைகளிலும் நடக்கின்றன என்பதை அரசு கவனத்தில் கொள்ள வேண்டும். மழைநீர் வடியாமல் வெள்ளம் ஏற்பட இவையும் காரணங்களாகின்றன என்பதை உணரவேண்டும்.
சென்னை, கடலூர், காவிரி டெல்டா மாவட்டங்கள் வெள்ளத்தினால் பாதிக்கப்படுவது ஊடகங்கள் மூலம் மக்களுக்குத் தெரிகிறது. ஆனால், கோவை, நீலகிரி, ஈரோடு மாவட்டங்கள் இந்த வருடம் வடகிழக்குப் பருவமழையில் பட்ட பாடு அங்கு வசிப்பவர்களுக்கு மட்டுமே தெரியும். இங்கு நடந்திருக்கும், நடந்துகொண்டிருக்கும் ஆக்கிரமிப்புகள் எண்ணிலடங்கா!
மழை பொழிவதற்கு முக்கிய காரணம் காடுகள். அந்த வனங்களிலே நெடுங்காலமாகக் குடியிருக்கும் ஆதிவாசிகளின் உறைவிடம், உணவு, வாழ்க்கை முறை எல்லாமே, வனங்களின் சூழலைச் சற்றும் சிதைக்காத வகையில் இருந்தன. நவீன நாகரிகம் உள்ளே நுழைந்ததால் காடுகளுக்கு வந்தது கேடு. கான்கிரீட் வீடுகள், இருசக்கர வாகனங்கள், டிஷ் ஆன்டெனா, ஜீப்புகள், டெம்போக்கள், வாகனங்களை நிறுத்த சிமென்ட் தளமிட்ட இடங்கள் என்று பெருகிக்கொண்டே போனதால் ஏராளமான மரங்கள் வெட்டப்பட்டிருக்கின்றன.
காடுகளைப் பொறுத்தவரை ஒரு மரம் வெட்டப்பட்டால் கூட அது விபரீதத்திற்கு வழிவகுத்துவிடும். வனங்களுக்குள் ஒரு குறிப்பிட்ட அளவுக்குத்தான் விவசாயம் செய்ய முடியும்; குறிப்பிட்ட சில பயிர்களைத்தான் பயிரிட முடியும். அளவுக்கு மீறிய விவசாயமும், பொருந்தாத பயிர்களும் மனிதர்களுக்கும் விலங்குகளுக்கும் மோதலை உருவாக்கிவிடும். இதனால்தான் வனத்துறை இவ்விடங்களில் சில கட்டுப்பாடுகளை விதித்திருக்கிறது.
அரசியல்வாதிகளுக்கு இவையெல்லாம் தெரிவதில்லை. வாக்குவங்கியை மட்டுமே கருத்தில் கொண்டு, காப்புக் காடுகளுக்குள்ளேயே இருந்த ஆதிவாசிகளுக்கு பட்டா அளித்து உத்தரவிடுகின்றனர். அவர்களோ கொடுக்கப்பட்ட இடத்தைவிடக் கூடுதலாக ஆக்கிரமித்து வீடுகளைக் கட்டிக் கொள்கின்றனர். வால்பாறையில் சமீபத்தில் இந்த பிரச்னையினால் வனத்துறையினருக்கும் பழங்குடிமக்களுக்கும் மோதல் உருவானது. அரசு ஆதரவும், பொதுமக்களின் ஆதரவும் பழங்குடியினருக்கே உள்ளது.
வனத் துறை குற்றமிழைத்ததாகக் கூறப்படுகிறது. அரசே ஆக்கிரமிப்பாளர்களை ஆதரித்து, சட்டத்தை நிலைநாட்டப் பணியாற்றும் வனத்துறையைக் கண்டித்தால், பின் அந்த ஊழியர்கள் எப்படி வேலை செய்வார்கள்? ஆக்கிரமிப்பாளர்கள் எப்படி அவர்களுக்குக் கட்டுப்படுவார்கள்? இது மிக மோசமான முன்னுதாரணம். மேலும் மேலும் ஆக்கிரமிப்புகளுக்கே இது வழிகோலும்.
அரசே வனங்களை ஆக்கிரமிக்கும் விநோதமும் சில இடங்களில் நடக்கிறது. வனங்களுக்குள் தார்ச்சாலைகளும் ரயில் பாதைகளும் அமைப்பதால் எத்தனையோ விலங்குகள் உயிரிழந்துள்ளன. சமீபத்தில் கோவைக்கு அருகே ரயிலில் அடிபட்டு மூன்று யானைகள் இறந்ததும், அஸ்ஸாமில் இரண்டு யானைகள் இறந்ததும் வன ஆக்கிரமிப்பினால் நிகழ்ந்த அவலங்கள் அல்லவா? சூழல் சுற்றுலா என்ற பெயரில் அரசே காடுகளைப் பலவிதங்களில் ஆக்கிரமித்துள்ளது.
வனத்துறை அதிகாரிகளுக்கென ஒவ்வொரு வனச்சரகத்திலும் ஒன்றோ இரண்டோ ஓய்வு விடுதிகள் தேவைதான்; வனத்துறை ஊழியர்களுக்குக் குடியிருப்புகளும் அவசியம்தான். அவை தவிர வனப்பகுதிக்குள் இருக்கும் சுற்றுலாப் பயணிகளுக்கான தங்கும் விடுதிகள், சாலை வசதிகள், கேளிக்கை வசதிகள், தகவல் மையங்கள் போன்றவை ஆக்கிரமிப்புக் கட்டுமானங்களே. "சூழல் சுற்றுலா' என்பது மாநில அரசின் கொள்கை முடிவே தவிர, அது அரசாணையாக வெளியிடப்படவில்லை. எனவே, சுற்றுலாவுக்கென அரசு வனங்களை ஆக்கிரமிப்பது தவறு.
பெரும் கட்டுமான நிறுவனங்கள், விவசாய நிலங்களை குறைந்த விலைக்கு வாங்கி அவற்றில் குடியிருப்பு வளாகங்களையும், ஓய்வு இல்லங்களையும் கட்டும் போக்கு இப்போது அதிகரித்துள்ளது. இவை பெரும்பாலும் அனுமதி இல்லாமல்தான் கட்டப்படுகின்றன. கன்னியாகுமரி பகுதியில் வயலுக்கு நடுவில் மிகப் பெரிய ஆடம்பர மாளிகை ஒன்று கட்டப்பட்டிருந்த புகைப்படம் வலைத்தளங்களில் பரவ, அந்த மாவட்ட ஆட்சியரால் நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கப்பட்டது.
அந்த மாளிகை ஒரு நாளிலா கட்டப்பட்டிருக்கும்? அடித்தளம் போடப்பட்டபோதே அதிகாரிகள் அதைத் தடுத்திருக்கலாமே? பணம் பாதாளம் வரை பாய்ந்ததால், வீடு வானம் வரை எழும்பியுள்ளது. நகரங்களை விட்டுத் தள்ளி விலை குறைவாக விற்கப்படும் மனைக்கட்டுகள் எல்லாமே ஒரு காலத்தில் விளைநிலங்களாக இருந்தவைதான். உரிய அனுமதியின்றித்தான் இவை விற்கப்படுகின்றன. தெரிந்தோ தெரியாமலோ மக்கள் அவற்றை வாங்குகிறார்கள்; வீடு கட்டுகிறார்கள். இவை எல்லாமே அரசு அதிகாரிகளுக்குத் தெரிந்துதான் நடக்கிறது.
சென்னை நீர்நிலைகளின் ஆக்கிரமிப்புகள் மட்டுமே பொதுவெளியில் விவாதிக்கப்படுகின்றன. கோவையில் பல குளங்களும் ஏரிகளும் வருடக்கணக்காக ஆக்கிரமிக்கப்பட்டுக் கரையோரங்களில் ஏகப்பட்ட வீடுகள் வந்துவிட்டன. அங்கு குடியிருக்கும் மக்களுக்கு, குடும்ப அட்டை, மின்வசதி, குடிநீர் இணைப்பு கொடுக்கப்பட்டு விட்டன. ஆக்கிரமிப்பு இடத்தில் அரசே இத்தனை வசதிகள் செய்து தந்ததால், மக்கள் அங்கு வசதியாக வாழ்ந்து வந்தார்கள்.
திடீரென்று அரசு விழித்துக்கொண்டு அவர்களைக் காலி செய்யச் சொல்லி உத்தரவிட்டது. மாற்று ஏற்பாடாக வேறு இடத்தில் குடியிருப்புகளும் கட்டிக் கொடுத்தது. மக்கள் போவார்களா? மறுத்தார்கள். மாநகராட்சி நீதிமன்றத்துக்குச் சென்றது. மக்களும் சென்றார்கள். பல வருடங்களாக இவ்வழக்கு இழுபறி நிலையில் இருந்து வந்தது.பொலிவுறு நகர் (ஸ்மார்ட் சிட்டி) திட்டத்தின் கீழ் பல நீர்நிலைகளை மேம்படுத்தும் பணியைச் செய்து வரும் கோவை மாநகராட்சி நீதிமன்றத்தின் உத்தரவோடு அந்த ஆக்கிரமிப்புகளில் பெரும்பகுதியினை அகற்றியது.
இதில் வேதனையான விஷயம் என்னவென்றால், ஆக்கிரமிப்பு இடிபாடுகளை அப்படியே அந்த நீர்நிலைகளிலேயே தள்ளிவிட்டுவிட்டது. ஆக்கிரமிப்பு என்று கூறிக் குடியிருப்புகளை அகற்றிய அதே மாநகராட்சி, இப்போது நகரவாசிகளின் உல்லாசத்துக்காக அதே இடத்தில் கேளிக்கை வசதிகளுக்காக பல கட்டுமானங்களைக் கட்டியுள்ளது; உணவுக்கூடங்களை நடத்தத் தனியாரிடம் ஒப்பந்தப்புள்ளி கோரியுள்ளது. பொதுமக்கள் குடியிருந்தால் ஆக்கிரமிப்பு; மாநகராட்சி செய்தால் பொலிவுறு நகரம். விந்தைதான்.
கோவையில் மேற்குத்தொடர்ச்சி மலையின் பல பகுதிகள் ஆக்கிரமிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளன. இங்கு எந்தவொரு கட்டுமானமும், வேளாண்மைத் துறை, சுரங்கம் - கனிமவளத் துறை, மலைப்பகுதி பாதுகாப்பு ஆணையம் ஆகியவற்றின் அனுமதி பெற்றே மேற்கொள்ளப்பட வேண்டும். விதிகளை மீறி சில கட்டுமான நிறுவனங்கள் பல ஏக்கரில் குடியிருப்பு வளாகங்களையும், முதியோருக்கான ஓய்வு இல்லங்களையும் கட்டி வருகின்றன. இதனால் மலையிலிருந்து இறங்கி வரும் மழைநீர் ஓடும் பாதைகளான கால்வாய்கள் அடைபட்டு நொய்யலாற்றுக்குச் செல்ல வேண்டிய நீர் விளைநிலங்களில் புகுந்து சேதம் விளைவிக்கிறது.
கேரளத்திலிருந்தும் கர்நாடகத்திலிருந்தும் முதுமலைக்கு இடம்பெயரும் யானைகளின் வழித்தடங்கள் அடைபட்டு விட்டதால் அவை ஊருக்குள் நுழைகின்றன. சின்னத் தடாகம், கணுவாய் போன்ற இடங்களில் விளைநிலங்களை ஆக்கிரமித்து அனுமதியின்றிச் செயல்பட்டுவந்த செங்கல் சூளைகள் பசுமைத் தீர்ப்பாயத்தின் உத்தரவுப்படி மூடப்பட்டன. என்றாலும் அந்த ஆக்கிரமிப்பாளர்கள் சிறிது சிறிதாக தொண்டாமுத்தூர், போளுவாம்பட்டி ஆகிய பகுதிகளில் தங்கள் தொழிலைத் தொடங்கி விட்டார்கள். இவை குறித்து சம்பந்தப்பட்ட துறைகளுக்குப் புகார் செய்தும் எந்த நடவடிக்கையும் எடுக்கப்படவில்லை.
கொச்சியில், கடற்கரைக்கருகில் விதிகளை மீறி கட்டப்பட்ட அடுக்கு மாடிக் குடியிருப்பை இடிக்கச் சொல்லி நீதிமன்றம் உத்தரவிட்டது. அது போன்றே நொய்டாவில் கட்டப்பட்ட நாற்பது மாடி அடுக்குமாடிக் குடியிருப்பை இடிக்கச் சொல்லி நீதிமன்றம் ஆணை பிறப்பித்துள்ளது. இதைப்போல் இங்கும், விதிகளுக்குப் புறம்பாக நீர்நிலைகள், வனங்கள், வேளாண் நிலங்கள், மலைப்பகுதிகள் ஆகியவற்றை ஆக்கிரமித்துக் கட்டப்பட்டுள்ள கட்டடங்களை இடித்துத் தள்ள நீதிமன்றம் உத்தரவிடவேண்டும். அவற்றுக்கு அனுமதி வழங்கிய அதிகாரிகள் பணிநீக்கம் செய்யப்படவேண்டும். அதிகாரிகளை கட்டாயப்படுத்திய அரசியல்வாதிகளுக்கு அபராதமும் சிறைத்தண்டனையும் அளிக்க வேண்டும். அப்போதுதான் ஆக்கிரமிப்புகளும் அவற்றால் விளையும் அவலங்களும் குறையும்.
கட்டுரையாளர்:
சுற்றுச்சூழல் ஆர்வலர்.
சர்வதேச வர்த்தகத்தில் கிட்டத்தட்ட 11.2 லட்சம் கோடி ரூபாய் (150 பில்லியன் டாலர்) மதிப்புள்ள கடல்வாழ் உயிரின உணவுப்பொருட்கள் ஏற்றுமதி செய்யப்படுகின்றன. நீர்வாழ் உயிரின உணவுச் சந்தையினை விரிவுபடுத்திய உலகமயமாக்கல், பண்ணைகளில் வளர்க்கப்படும் நீர்வாழ் உயிரினங்களுக்கு புதிய சந்தை வாய்ப்புகளை உருவாக்கியுள்ளது. ஆனால், அதேவேளை நோய்க்கிருமிகளும், நோய்களும் எளிதாக பரவுவதற்கும் அது காரணமாக அமைகிறது.
மீன் பண்ணைகளில் நோயின்றி மீன்களை வளர்த்தெடுக்க பயன்படுத்தும் பல்வேறு மருந்துகளின் தொடர் பயன்பாடு நுண்கிருமிகளின் எதிர்ப்பாற்றலுக்கு (ஆன்டி மைக்ரோபியல் ரெசிஸ்டன்ஸ்) காரணமாக அமைகிறது. நோய்களுக்கு எதிராகப் பயன்படுத்தப்படும் பல உயிர் காக்கும் மருந்துகளின் சக்தியை இந்த நுண்கிருமிகளின் எதிர்ப்பாற்றல் இழக்க செய்யும். மீன் வளர்ப்பினில் பாக்டீரியா நோய்களைத் தணிக்க உதவும் எதிர்உயிர்மிகளின் (ஆன்டி பயாட்டிக்) தொடர்ச்சியான பயன்பாடு நுண்கிருமிகளின் நிலைப்புத் தன்மைக்கும், அந்த நுண்கிருமிகள் பரவுவதற்கும் காரணமாக அமைகிறது.
இவ்வாறு மீன் பண்ணைகளில் உருவாக்கப்படும் நுண்ணுயிர்க்கொல்லி எதிர்ப்பு பாக்டீரியா எதிர்உயிர்மி எதிர்ப்பு மரபணுக்கள் உருவாகக் காரணமாக அமைகிறது. நுண்ணுயிர்க்கொல்லி எதிர்ப்பு பாக்டீரியாக்களின் ஆபத்து நிறைந்த இடமாக இருக்கும் மீன் பண்ணைகளில் ரெசிஸ்டோமின் என்ற மரபணு மதிப்பீடு உலக அளவில் நடைபெறும் ஆராய்ச்சிகளில் முக்கியத்துவம் வாய்ந்தது.
மீன் வளர்ப்பில் பயன்படுத்தப்படும் பெரும்பாலான எதிர்உயிர்மிகள் மனித மருத்துவத்திலும் பயன்படுத்தப்படுவதால் மனித உடலிலும் நுண்கிருமிகளின் எதிர்ப்பாற்றலில் தாக்கத்தை ஏற்படுத்தும் என்றும் இத்தாக்கம் மனித சமூகத்தின் தீவிர நோய் பரவலுக்கும் நோய்த் தொற்று சிகிச்சை தோல்வி அதிகரிப்பிற்கும் காரணம் ஆகும் என்றும் ஆராய்ச்சியாளர்கள் தெரிவித்துள்ளனர்.
ஆந்திர பிரதேசம், மேற்கு வங்கம் போன்ற முக்கிய மீன் உற்பத்தி மாநிலங்களில் உள்ள கடல் நீர் மற்றும் நன்னீர் மீன்பண்ணைகளில் எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்துகளின் பயன்பாடு அதிகமாக காணப்படுகிறது. பிகார், ஜார்க்கண்ட், ஒடிஸô போன்ற மாநிலங்களில் இத்தகைய மருந்துகளின் பயன்பாடு மெல்ல மெல்ல அதிகரித்து வருகிறது.
ஏற்றுமதி சார்ந்த கடல்நீர் மீன் வளர்ப்பில் எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்துகள், மருத்துவ ரீதியான பொருட்களின் பயன்பாட்டைக் கண்காணிக்கவும் நிர்வகிக்கவும் தரநிலைகள், வழிகாட்டுதல்கள் வழங்கக்கூடிய நிறுவனங்கள் உள்ளன. ஆனால் இந்தியாவின் மீன் உற்பத்தியில் மூன்றில் இரண்டு பங்கு வகிக்கும் நன்னீர் மீன்வளர்ப்பினை கண்காணிக்க எவ்வித ஒழுங்குமுறை அமைப்பும் இல்லை.
அதாவது ஏற்றுமதியாகும் கடல் உணவு வாடிக்கையாளர்களின் ஆரோக்கியம் பாதுகாக்கப்படும் அதே வேளை உள்நாட்டு நுகர்வோர் ஆரோக்கியத்தின் மீது எவ்வித அக்கறையும் எடுக்கப்படுவதில்லை.
உணவிற்கான மீன் உற்பத்தியில் மட்டுமின்றி அலங்கார மீன் உற்பத்தியிலும் எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்துகள் பெரிய அளவில் பயன்படுத்தப்படுகின்றன. இந்தியாவில் அலங்கார மீன் வளர்ப்பு சமீப ஆண்டுகளில் பல மாநிலங்களில் அதிகரித்துள்ளது என்றும் இது நோய்களுக்கும் நீரின் தரம் குறைவதற்கும் காரணமாக அமையும் என்றும் ஆய்வுகள் தெரிவிக்கின்றன.
பெரும்பாலான இறால் பண்ணைகள் தங்களுக்கு தேவையான இறால் குஞ்சுகளை பாதுகாக்கப்பட்ட குஞ்சு பொரிப்பகங்களில் இருந்து பெறுகின்றன. குஞ்சு பொரிப்பகங்களில் இருந்து பண்ணைகளுக்கு கொண்டுவரும் போது ஏற்படும் இறால் இறப்பினை தவிர்க்க அல்லது குறைக்க தவறான அனுமானத்துடன் எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்துகள் பயன்படுத்தப்படுகின்றன. எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்துகளின் பயன்பாடு விஞ்ஞான ரீதியிலன்றி பண்ணை விவசாயிகளின் அனுபவத்தை கொண்டு உபயோகிக்கப்படுகின்றன.
எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்து கொண்டு வளர்க்கப்பட்ட இறால்களை நிராகரிக்கும் ஐரோப்பிய ஒன்றியத்தின் கொள்கை இறால் வளர்ப்பில் மிகப்பெரும் தாக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்தியுள்ளது. பல்வேறு சர்வதேச நிறுவனங்கள் வகுத்துள்ள ஏற்றுமதி தர நிர்ணய கோட்பாட்டினை உறுதி செய்யும் வகையில் கடல் பொருட்கள் ஏற்றுமதி மேம்பாட்டு ஆணையம் தற்போது இறால்கள் மீது தர ஆய்வுகளை நடத்தி வருகிறது. ஆனால், இந்த ஆய்வுகள் ஏற்றுமதியாகும் இறால்களுக்கு மட்டுமே பொருந்தும். உள்நாட்டு நுகர்வுக்கான இறால் உணவுகளுக்கு எவ்வித ஆய்வுகளும் இல்லை.
கேரளம், தமிழ்நாடு, ஆந்திர பிரதேசம் போன்ற தென் இந்திய கடலோர ஈரநிலங்களில் அதிக அளவு எதிர்உயிர்மி எதிர்ப்பு பாக்டீரியாக்கள் இருப்பதாக ஆய்வுகள் கூறுகின்றன. சந்தைகளில் இருந்து பெறப்பட்ட மீன்களில் எடுக்கப்பட்ட மாதிரிகளின் மூன்றில் இரண்டு பங்கில் காணப்படும் சால்மோனெல்லா பாக்டீரியாக்கள் குறைந்தது இரண்டு எதிர்உயிர்மி மருந்துகளின் எதிர்ப்பிகளாக செயல்படுவதாக தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.
மருத்துவ சிகிச்சையில்லா பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு எதிர் உயிர்மி மருந்துகளின் பயன்பாட்டைத் தடுக்க கடுமையான சட்ட விதிகள் இருக்கும்போதிலும் இம்மருந்து பயன்பாட்டினை கண்காணிக்க செயல் திட்டம் இல்லாததால் மீன்வளர்ப்புத் துறையில் இதற்கான கொள்கைகளை வகுப்பது கடினமாக இருக்கிறது.
சுகாதாரச் சூழலை மேம்படுத்துதல், ஆரோக்கியத்தை மேம்படுத்துவதற்கான நொதியூக்கிகள் (என்சைம்கள்), நலம் பயக்கும் பாக்டீரியாக்கள் (புரோபயாடிக்குகள்), அவற்றுக்கான உணவுப் பொருள்கள் (ப்ரீபயாடிக்குகள்), அமிலங்களின் பயன்பாடு, எதிர் உயிர்மி மருந்துகளுக்கு மாற்றாக எதிர் நுண்ணுயிரிப் புரதங்கள் (பாக்டீரியோசின்கள்), நுண்ணுயிர்க் கொல்லி புரதத்தூண்டிகள் (ஆன்ட்டிமைக்ரோபியல் பெப்டைடுகள்), பாக்டீரியா உண்ணிகளின் (பாக்டீரியோபேஜ்கள்) பயன்பாடு மீன் வளத்தினை மேம்படுத்தவும், அவற்றின் தொற்று நோய்களைக் குறைக்கவும் செய்யும் நல்ல வழிமுறைகளாக இருக்கும்.
தற்போதைய சூழலில் இந்திய மீன்வளர்ப்பில் எதிர் உயிர்மி மருந்து பயன்பாடு குறித்த கடுமையான கண்காணிப்பு மனித ஆரோக்கியத்திற்கும் மீன்வளர்ப்பு மேம்பாட்டிற்கும் அவசியமாகும்.
மகாராஷ்ராவில் மீண்டும் மாட்டு வண்டிபந்தயம் நடத்த உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் அனுமதி வழங்கியுள்ளது. சுமார் 400 ஆண்டுகள் பழமையான இந்த விளையாட்டு, புனே மற்றும் மேற்கு மகாராஷ்டிரா பகுதிகளில் கோலாகலமாக நடைபெறும்.
மாட்டு வண்டிபந்தயம் உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் சொல்வது என்ன?
<1960 ஆம் ஆண்டு விலங்குகள் வதை தடுப்புச் சட்டத்தின் திருத்தப்பட்ட விதிகள் மற்றும் மாநிலத்தில் மாட்டு வண்டிப் பந்தயத்திற்கு வழங்கிய மகாராஷ்டிரா அரசின் உத்தரவுகள் செல்லுபடியாகும் என உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் தெரிவித்துள்ளது. தமிழ்நாடு, கர்நாடகா போன்ற மாநிலங்களில் மாட்டு வண்டிப் பந்தயம் நடத்தப்படுவதால், மாட்டுவண்டிப் பந்தயத்துக்கு விதிக்கப்பட்ட தடையை நீக்க வேண்டும் என்று மகாராஷ்டிரா அரசு உச்ச நீதிமன்றத்தில் வாதிட்டது.
வழக்கை விசாரித்த நீதிபதி, ஒரே நாடு, ஒரே இனம், நாம் ஒரே மாதிரியாக இருக்க வேண்டும். அனைவருக்கும் சமமான விதிகள் இருக்க வேண்டும். மற்ற மாநிலங்களில் பந்தயங்கள் நடைபெறும் போது, அதை ஏன் மகாராஷ்டிராவில் அனுமதிக்கக் கூடாது என கேள்வி எழுப்பியது.
மாட்டு வண்டி பந்தயத்திற்கு தடை விதித்தது ஏன்?
2014 ஆம் ஆண்டு மத்திய சட்டத்தின் விதிகளை மீறுவதாக உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் அறிவித்ததைத் தொடர்ந்து மகாராஷ்டிராவில் மாட்டு வண்டி பந்தயம் தடை செய்யப்பட்டது. பின்னர், தமிழ்நாட்டில் ஜல்லிக்கட்டுக்கு அனுமதி வழங்கியதை தொடர்ந்து, மகாராஷ்டிராவில் மாட்டு பந்தயந்துக்கு அனுமதிக்க கோரிக்கை எழுந்தது.
இதையடுத்து, ஏப்ரல் 2017 இல், மகாராஷ்டிரா சட்டப்பேரவை மாட்டு வண்டி பந்தயங்களை மீண்டும் தொடங்குவதற்கான சட்டத்தை நிறைவேற்றியது.
‘விலங்குகள் வதை தடுப்பு (மகாராஷ்டிர சட்டத் திருத்தம்) மசோதா’ என்ற தலைப்பில் அனைத்துக் கட்சிகளின் ஆதரவுடன் ஒருமனதாக நிறைவேற்றப்பட்டது. பதவி விலகுவதற்கு சில நாட்களுக்கு முன்பு அப்போதைய குடியரசுத் தலைவர் பிரணாப் முகர்ஜியால் இதற்கு அனுமதி வழங்கப்பட்டது.
புதிய சட்டத்திருத்ததின்படி, காளை மாடுகளுக்கு வலியோ துன்பமோ ஏற்படாமல் பாதுகாத்து, மாவட்ட ஆட்சியரிடம் முன் அனுமதி பெற்று பந்தயம் நடத்தலாம் என தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது.
தொடர்ந்து, ஆகஸ்ட் 2017 இல், மும்பை உயர்நீதிமன்றம் மகாராஷ்டிர அரசின் மாட்டு வண்டி பந்தயங்களுக்கு அனுமதி உத்தரவுக்கு இடைக்கால தடை விதித்தது. இதுதொடர்பாக அரசு தரப்பில் விளக்கமளித்தும், இடைக்கால தடையை நீக்க மும்பை உயர் நீதிமன்றம் மறுத்துவிட்டது. காளைகள் பந்தயங்களில் பங்கேற்க உடற்கூறியல் ரீதியாக வடிவமைக்கப்படவில்லை. அதனை அப்படி யன்படுத்தினால் கொடுமைக்கு ஆளாக நேரிடும் என தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது.
மகாராஷ்டிரா அரசு ஏன் உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் சென்றது?
நவம்பர் 2017 இல், மகாராஷ்டிரா அரசு காளைகளின் திறனை கண்டறிய குழு ஒன்றை அமைத்தது. பந்தயங்களில் காளைகள் பங்கேற்கையில் அதற்கு உடலியல் மற்றும் உயிர்வேதியியல் மாற்றங்கள் குறித்து ஆய்வு செய்ய குழுவுக்கு உத்தரவிடப்பட்டது.
அப்போது, குழுவின் அறிக்கை அப்போதைய பாஜக-சேனா அரசுக்கு சாதகமாக வந்ததையடுத்து, உச்ச நீதிமன்றத்தில் 2018இல் வழக்கு தொடரப்பட்டது.
மாட்டு பந்தயத்திற்கு உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் வழங்கிய அனுமதியை, அரசியல் கட்சியினர், பந்தய வீரர்களும் உற்சாகமாக கொண்டாடி வருகின்றனர்.
தாய் தமிழைப் போற்றிப் பாடப்படும் தமிழ்த் தாய் வாழ்த்து என்ற பிரார்த்தனைப் பாடலை மாநிலப் பாடலாக (கீதமாக) தமிழக அரசு அறிவித்துள்ளது.
மாற்றுத்திறனாளிகள் தவிர, தமிழ்த் தாய் வாழ்த்து பாடல் ஒலிபரப்பின்போது கலந்து கொண்ட அனைவரும் எழுந்து நிற்க வேண்டும் என்று அரசாணை பிறப்பிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதாக முதல்வர் மு.க.ஸ்டாலின் வெள்ளிக்கிழமை (டிசம்பர் 17) தெரிவித்தார்.
55 வினாடிகள் கொண்ட இந்தப் பாடல், தமிழ்நாட்டில் உள்ள அனைவருக்கும் தெரிந்ததே, இது தேசிய கீதம் போல, அனைத்து கல்வி நிறுவனங்கள், அரசு அலுவலகங்கள், பொதுத்துறை நிறுவனங்கள் மற்றும் மாநிலத்தில் உள்ள பொது நிகழ்ச்சிகளின் தொடக்கத்தில் பாடப்படுகிறது.
“தமிழ்த்தாய் வாழ்த்து பாடப்படும்போது கலந்துகொள்பவர்கள் எழுந்து நிற்க வேண்டும் என்ற சட்டப்பூர்வ அல்லது நிர்வாக உத்தரவு எதுவும் இல்லை” என்று சென்னை உயர் நீதிமன்றத்தின் மதுரைக்கிளை கூறிய இரண்டு வாரங்களுக்குள் அரசின் இந்த உத்தரவு வெள்ளிக்கிழமையன்று வந்துள்ளது.
உயர்நீதிமன்ற வழக்கு
தமிழ்த்தாய் வாழ்த்து பற்றிய கருத்துகள் நீதிபதி ஜி.ஆர்.சுவாமிநாதன் டிசம்பர் 6 அன்று கன்.இளங்கோ எதிர் மாநில காவல் கண்காணிப்பாளர் மற்றும் பலர் சார்பில் வழங்கப்பட்ட உத்தரவில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது. 2018-ம் ஆண்டு ராமேஸ்வரத்தில் உள்ள காஞ்சி மடத்தின் கிளைக்குள் நுழைந்து கோஷங்கள் எழுப்பி, மடத்தின் மேலாளரை கிரிமினல் மிரட்டல் விடுத்த கன்.இளங்கோ தலைமையிலான தனிநபர்கள் குழு மீது பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட எஃப்ஐஆர் வழக்கை நீதிமன்றம் ரத்து செய்தது.
காஞ்சி மடத்துக்குள் கோஷங்கள் எழுப்பியவர்களில், திரைப்பட இயக்குனரும் தமிழ் தேசியவாத அமைப்பான நாம் தமிழர் கட்சியின் தலைமை ஒருங்கிணைப்பாளருமான சீமான் தலைமையிலான நாம் தமிழ் கட்சியைச் சேர்ந்தவர்களும் அடங்குவர். காஞ்சி காமகோடி பீடத்தின் பீடாதிபதி விஜயேந்திர சரஸ்வதி சுவாமிகள் சென்னையில் நடைபெற்ற நிகழ்ச்சியின் போது தமிழ் தாய் வாழ்த்து இசைக்கப்படும் போது அமர்ந்திருந்ததை கண்டித்து அவர்கள் போராட்டத்தில் ஈடுபட்டனர்.
ஜனவரி 24, 2018 அன்று மியூசிக் அகாடமியில் நடைபெற்ற விழாவில், தமிழ்-சமஸ்கிருத அகராதியை அப்போதைய தமிழக ஆளுநர் பன்வாரிலால் புரோகித் வெளியிட்டார். காஞ்சி மடாதிபதியைத் தவிர அனைவரும் வழக்கம் போல் அன்னைத் தமிழுக்கான வாழ்த்துப் பாடல் ஒலித்தபோது எழுந்து நின்றிருந்தனர்.
“இது கணிசமான சீற்றத்தைத் தூண்டியது” என்று நீதிமன்றம் குறிப்பிட்டது. பாடலாசிரியர் வைரமுத்து பேசுகையில், ‘தேசிய கீதம் நாட்டை மதிக்க வேண்டும், தமிழ் கீதம் தமிழ் மொழியை மதிக்க வேண்டும். இரண்டும் சமமாக மதிக்கப்பட வேண்டும் என்றார்.
ஆனால், தமிழ்த்தாய் வாழ்த்து என்பது ஒரு பிரார்த்தனைப் பாடல், அது ஒரு கீதம் அல்ல என்றும், “தமிழ்த்தாய் வாழ்த்துக்கு மிக உயர்ந்த பயபக்தியும் மரியாதையும் காட்டப்பட வேண்டும்” என்றும், அதற்காக எழுந்து நிற்க வேண்டிய அவசியமில்லை என்றும் நீதிமன்றம் தீர்ப்பளித்தது.
மேலும், “மனுதாரரும் நடைமுறை புகார்தாரரும் சமாதானமானதால், விசாரணையைத் தொடர்வதில் எந்த நோக்கமும் இல்லை” என்று நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது. மேலும், குற்றஞ்சாட்டப்பட்ட எஃப்ஐஆர் ரத்து செய்யப்படுகிறது என்றும் நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது.
நீதிமன்றத்தின் காரணம்
பெ.சுந்தரம் பிள்ளை எழுதிய புகழ்பெற்ற தமிழ் நாடகமான ‘மனோன்மணீயம்’ இலக்கியத்தில் இடம்பெற்றுள்ள தமிழ் தாய் வாழ்த்துப்பாடலை அரசு துறைகள், உள்ளாட்சி அமைப்புகள் மற்றும் கல்வி நிறுவனங்கள் ஏற்பாடு செய்த அனைத்து நிகழ்ச்சிகளின் தொடக்கத்தில் பிரார்த்தனைப் பாடலாகப் பாடப்பட வேண்டும் என்று தமிழ்நாடு அரசு ஜூன் 17, 1970 தேதியிட்ட GO மூலம் உத்தரவிட்டதை நீதிமன்றம் நினைவு கூர்ந்தது.
இதையடுத்து, எம்.எஸ்.விஸ்வநாதன் இசையமைத்த திஸ்ர தாலாவில், ராக மோகனத்தில் பாடலைப் பாட வேண்டும் என மெமோ வழங்கப்பட்டது. எனவே, தமிழ்த்தாய் வாழ்த்து ஒரு பிரார்த்தனைப் பாடலே தவிர, கீதம் அல்ல என்று நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது.
மேலும், பிஜோ இம்மானுவேல் எதிர் கேரளா மாநிலம் (1986) வழக்கில், தேசிய கீதத்தைப் பாட மறுத்ததற்காக வெளியேற்றப்பட்ட யெகோவாவின் சாட்சிகள் பள்ளியின் மூன்று குழந்தைகளை பள்ளியில் மீண்டும் சேர்க்க உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் உத்தரவிட்டதை உயர் நீதிமன்றம் குறிப்பிட்டது. “தேசிய கீதம் பாடுவதற்கு யாரையும் கட்டாயப்படுத்தும் சட்டம் எதுவும் இல்லை என்று உச்ச நீதிமன்றத்தால் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டுள்ளது” என்று உயர்நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது.
மீண்டும், உச்ச நீதிமன்றம், ஷியாம் நாராயண் சௌக்சே எதிர் இந்திய அரசு (2017) வழக்கில், அனைத்து திரையரங்குகளிலும் படம் திரையிடுவதற்கு முன் தேசிய கீதம் இசைக்கப்பட வேண்டும் என்றும், அங்குள்ள அனைவரும் நிற்க வேண்டும் என்றும் உத்தரவிடப்பட்ட நிலையில், அசல் வழிமுறைகளை மாற்றி அமைத்து, இது “விருப்பம் மற்றும் கட்டாயமில்லை” என்று உயர் நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது.
“தமிழ்த் தாய் வாழ்த்து பாடப்படும்போது பார்வையாளர்கள் வழக்கமாக எழுந்து நிற்பது உண்மைதான் என்றாலும், இந்த முறையில் மட்டும்தான் மரியாதை காட்ட முடியுமா என்பதுதான் கேள்வி” என்று உயர்நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது. “நாம் பன்மைத்துவத்தையும் பன்முகத்தன்மையையும் கொண்டாடும் போது, பாசாங்குத்தனத்தை மதிக்க ஒரே ஒரு வழி இருக்க வேண்டும் என்று வலியுறுத்துகிறோம்.” என்றும் நீதிமன்றம் கூறியது.
தமிழ் தாய் வாழ்த்துப் பாடலுக்கு காஞ்சி மடாதிபதி காட்டிய அவமரியாதை குறித்து நீதிபதி சுவாமிநாதன் கூறுகையில் “ஒரு சன்யாசி முதன்மையாக பக்தியுடன் வாழ்கிறார். பிரார்த்தனையில் இருக்கும் போது, அவர் ஒரு தியான தோரணையில் எப்போதும் காணப்படுவார். தமிழ் தாய் வாழ்த்து ஒரு பிரார்த்தனைப் பாடல் என்பதால், ஒரு சன்யாசி தியானத்தில் அமர்ந்திருப்பது நிச்சயமாக நியாயமானது. இந்த வழக்கில், காஞ்சி மடாதிபதி கண்களை மூடிக்கொண்டு தியான தோரணையில் அமர்ந்திருப்பதைக் காணலாம். இது தாய் தமிழ் மீது அவர் கொண்டிருந்த பயபக்தியையும் மரியாதையையும் வெளிப்படுத்தும் விதமாக இருந்தது என்று கூறினார்.
‘உண்மையான’ மரியாதைக்கான வாதம்
சென்னை உயர் நீதிமன்றத்தின் ஓய்வுபெற்ற நீதிபதியான நீதிபதி கே.சந்துரு, தி இந்தியன் எக்ஸ்பிரஸ்ஸிடம், மக்கள் எதையாவது சட்டத்தால் மட்டுமே மதிக்கிறார்கள் என்றால் அது “தவறான மரியாதை” என்றும், இந்த சட்டம் அவர்களுக்காக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட சட்டம் என்றும் கூறினார்.
“அனைவரும், மாநிலத்தில் 99 சதவீத மக்கள், சட்ட உத்தரவுகளின்றி தமிழ் தாய் வாழ்த்துப் பாடலுக்கு எழுந்து நின்று மரியாதை காட்டுகிறார்கள். எல்லாவற்றுக்கும் மேலானவன் என்று நினைக்கும் ஒருவர் தான் நிற்க மாட்டேன் என்கிறார். நீங்கள் அவரை விட்டுவிடவும், புறக்கணிக்கவும். அந்த ஒருவருக்கு ஏன் சட்டம் போடுகிறீர்கள்? சட்டத்தால் மட்டுமே நாம் எதையாவது மதிக்கிறோம் என்று நீங்கள் காட்டினால், அது தவறான மரியாதையைத் தவிர வேறில்லை” என்று நீதிபதி சந்துரு கூறினார்.
From the time he began voting, Kurunegala farmer B.M.H. Jayatilleka has not backed any party other than the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) at the polls. By extension, his vote in recent elections went to the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP or People’s Front) that the Rajapaksas carved out of the SLFP where they made their political careers.
In the presidential poll of 2019, Jayatilleka voted for Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In the 2020 general elections, he campaigned hard for Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa who contested from Kurunegala district, located in Sri Lanka’s North Western Province and home to a large population of farmers and military families. Prime Minister Mahinda polled a record 5,27,364 preferential votes in that election, reflecting his enduring electoral appeal a decade after the armed forces under his leadership defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ending the country’s long civil war.
In the last few months, though, Jayatilleka feels very differently about his hitherto favourite political camp, with his staunch loyalty giving way to seething anger. “I will never vote for them [Rajapaksas] again in this lifetime,” vowed the farmer leader, nearing 70. His shift is drastic, much like President Gotabaya’s overnight policy switch to ‘organic only’ agriculture that triggered it.
No transition plan
On May 6, President Gotabaya issued a gazette banning the import of chemical fertilizers, in what was widely seen as a rash embrace of organic farming promised in his poll manifesto. At a time when all sectors, including agriculture, were reeling under the persisting economic impact of the pandemic, the Rajapaksa administration’s announcement, perhaps the most consequential change to agriculture policy in the region in recent decades, came with no consultation, forethought, or convincing transition plan apparent. In a curiously belated effort months after changing policy, the Ministry of Agriculture on Thursday (December 16) said it was setting up a task force to study and report on the “adverse effects of the use of chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides on the human body.”
President Gotabaya has defended his ambitious initiative locally and at international fora. “We need a new agricultural revolution that is not against nature,” he said, speaking on the sidelines of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow held in October-November. Acknowledging there was “some criticism [of] and resistance” to his government’s ‘organic only’ policy, he told the summit: “In addition to chemical fertilizer lobby groups, this resistance has come from farmers who have grown accustomed to overusing fertilizer as an easy means of increasing yields.” He did not mention Sri Lankan scientists, who have slammed the initiative, terming it “ill-advised” and “a catastrophe” in the making.
“The ban was a big jolt,” Jayatilleka said, seated in a community hall adjacent to a Buddhist temple in Ibbagamuwa, about 13 km from Kurunegala town. “Paddy is our livelihood, our main source of income for generations. And that is under serious threat now.”
In the face of criticism, government spokespersons have sought to justify the move with more than one reason. They pitch it as a necessary step to prevent a chronic kidney condition – loosely attributed by non-scientists to chemicals in the soil – and to save dollars spent on fertilizer import [about $300 million annually] for the country that is in a dire forex and economic crisis.
But the argument did not find many takers among farmers, who came under enormous pressure soon after the new policy took effect. They had no source of chemical fertilizer when sowing season — one of two tied to Sri Lanka’s monsoons — began in September. As for organic fertilizers, farmers are caught in uncertainty — over its availability, quality and potential effect. “It is all just chaotic,” said Jayatilleka, who heads a farmers’ society in the district.
E.P.D.K. Atugalage even considered quitting farming. “The pressure to buy organic fertilizer, the transport costs and the uncertainty about the quality of organic fertilizer... all this made me think why I must farm hereafter. Is it worth growing paddy with all these risks,” she asked.
The district, with over 4 lakh farmers, is among the top paddy producers in the country. For paddy cultivators like Jayatilleka and Atugalage, whose farming lives began in the 1960s, coinciding with the Green Revolution that aimed to increase productivity, organic agriculture is alien. The abundance and security they are used to are a consequence of using chemical fertilizer, one of the chief drivers of the Green Revolution, and the subsidy — promoted especially by the earlier Rajapaksa administrations from 2005 to 2014 — that made it easily accessible to them all this time.
Some 1.8 million farmers across the island are engaged in paddy production, delivering an average yield of over 3 million tonnes a year, data published by Sri Lanka’s Rice Research and Development Institute showed. Like many other countries, Sri Lanka too witnessed a marked increase in productivity in the last five decades, achieving self-sufficiency.
From importing 60% of the country’s rice requirement in the 1940s, when Sri Lanka’s population was about 6 million, to producing more than what is consumed now (barring a small percentage of foreign varieties still being imported) — when the population is nearly 22 million — is a significant leap, remarked Buddhi Marambe, a senior professor at the Department of Crop Science at the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, located in the central Kandy district.
Top crop in peril
The government’s ban, while putting Sri Lanka’s top staple crop in peril, also endangers the country’s food security achieved through decades, experts like him fear. “With this decision, the government has taken the entire country for a ride. The policy will affect the next crop, the farmers who grow them, and subsequently the whole society. A food crisis is imminent,” Prof. Marambe noted, reflecting a sentiment that several fellow scientists have aired from the time President Gotabaya imposed the ban.
Critics of the move are not necessarily opposed to organic farming. As academics studying the science of food production, they were only voicing concern that a transition that ought to take place in phases, over years, was being rushed through without a plan. Now, the implications of the abrupt shift are beginning to manifest. Farmers are dreading their next paddy harvest in January and February, with most fearing their yield would drop by 50%.
Those growing vegetables and fruits are also already noticing worrisome changes, according to W.A.D. Sylvester, a 65-year-old farmer. “The quality of bananas has suffered. Earlier, one large bunch would weigh 25 kg to 30 kg, but now it’s barely 15 kg. For coconuts grown commercially, we use chemical fertilizer once in six months. Now I see that coconuts have shrunk without the fertilizer,” he said.
The ban will also adversely impact Sri Lanka’s $1.3-billion tea industry, a vital foreign exchange earner for the country, planters have warned. They anticipate a 40-50% slash in production, despite the government relaxing the chemical fertilizer ban for the sector in October after their repeated appeals. Even for other crops, the government partially revoked the ban last month. Agriculture Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage on November 24 said the private sector would be allowed to import agrochemicals, but the part-reversal is too little too late, in farmers’ view.
Farmers’ resistance
Their resentment over the government’s policy change is no secret. Men and women who rely on agriculture for a living have been agitating across the country for months. Visuals of angry farmers, anti-government slogans, and protestors burning effigies of the Agriculture Minister dominated prime time news. As Prof. Marambe observed: “Instead of spending their time on their lands cultivating, farmers were forced to take to the streets.”
But the government did not budge, even a little, until late November. Addressing a special meeting on organic farming on November 22, President Gotabaya said there was no change in the government’s green agriculture policy, and that subsidies would be provided only for organic farming. Farmers were “organising protests and delaying cultivation” because “they have not been properly educated,” he said, as per a statement issued by his office. “If officials who do not agree with the government policy wished to leave, there would be no obstacle,” he said.
The government’s stubbornness for almost seven months, despite its fast-declining popularity and mounting protests, baffled some of its own supporters. It defied popular analysis that the Rajapaksas are more politically astute than their rivals.
It was also amply clear that the ruling regime despised any resistance or challenge, even if it came from subject experts. Minister Aluthgamage removed Prof. Marambe, who earlier questioned the government’s policy in the media, from an experts’ committee advising the government on the national agriculture policy. However, the government’s emphatic claims of supporting farmers in the long run could not drown the criticism, by now widespread and loud in the public sphere.
Far from being able to locally produce all the organic fertilizer required in the country, Sri Lanka was, rather ironically, importing organic inputs, including from India and China, despite banning agrochemicals in order to preserve draining foreign reserves. In what turned out to be an unexpected diplomatic confrontation, Sri Lankan authorities in October rejected the Chinese company’s fertilizer consignment on grounds that it was “contaminated”. As the dispute escalated, China blacklisted a top public sector bank in Sri Lanka, and the Chinese firm filed a lawsuit in Singapore, challenging Colombo’s “backtracking and insincerity”. The government has said it would pay $6.7 million to the Chinese company, amid criticism from detractors accusing the government of “succumbing” to pressure.
Meanwhile, farmers are watching an unprecedented crisis unfold in their plots, just as a growing fear of a food scarcity next year grips the country.
Confusing messages
Just like the ban in May, the government’s decision in late November to permit the private sector to import chemical fertilizers also came all of a sudden. A gazette on November 30 repealed the May 6 gazette, along with another issued on July 31 on the subject.
A series of announcements was made around the time by top officials including the Cabinet Minister, State Minister and a senior bureaucrat attached to the Ministry, none clarifying the part-reversal of policy. In fact, farmers and scientists did not know what to make of their statements – some pointing to an exemption for paddy, and others denying the same. They found the messages conflicting and confusing.The Hindu’s attempts to reach the Minister and Secretary for a comment were unsuccessful.
Gleaning the essence of their statements, farmers found two takeaways — neither of the two state-owned fertilizer companies would now be involved in importing agrochemicals; and the government was doing away with subsidies on chemical fertilizers, that they received at heavily discounted rates or for free thus far, they deduced.
According to Namal Karunaratne, National Convener of the All Ceylon Farmers’ Federation (ACFF), there is currently a small stock of imported chemical fertilizers that is grossly inadequate to fulfil the nationwide requirement. It takes months to import a large consignment of chemical fertilizers, from the time of placing the order until it reaches the farmer. Even if the chemical fertilizers were immediately available, few farmers would be able to afford it, spending tens of thousands without the subsidy anymore.
Moreover, with 75% of the current crop’s life cycle already over, chemical fertilizers will not be of much help to paddy growers, who add it at different stages after the sowing season, he pointed out. “It might make a difference to farmers growing vegetable and fruits, though,” he added.
Karunaratne is now a familiar name in the media in recent months. He has been consistently challenging the government’s policy shift, countering its claims with hard data and prevalent scientific opinion. The ACFF is affiliated to the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) — currently in Opposition with just three seats in the 225-member House. It is the largest organised body of farmers in the country.
In his assessment, the government’s ban on chemical fertilizers and subsequent tweak in policy allowing private players alone to import the same reveals its “actual agenda”. “They just wanted to cancel the fertilizer subsidy, which they know will be an unpopular decision at any time,” he said. “Sadly, because of the route they took, our farmers will now forever be repulsed by the idea of organic farming, averse to exploring its merits.” The government’s efforts, he said, is the “greatest disservice” to the concept of organic farming.
Speaking more broadly about the country’s “much-neglected” agriculture sector, Karunaratne said it was naïve on the part of the government to think that they could “simply tinker with” one aspect – fertilizer use – of farming, without reviewing Sri Lanka’s water policy that is “heavily tilted towards hydropower” generation, and much less towards agriculture.
The “neglect”, he said, began after Sri Lanka liberalised its economy in 1977, ahead of any other country in the region. “Before 1977, agriculture contributed 74% to our GDP. After opening up, it has reduced to about 7%, despite employing 28% of our labour force,” he said. The thrust gradually moved to agro business, with successive governments failing to look at value addition, or value chains within the market. “In that way, agriculture in Sri Lanka is still at a very primitive stage,” he remarked.
Short-sighted policy
Regardless of how the government changes its fertilizer policy, the farmers’ protests through the last seven months have “built political momentum,” he noted. “They [Rajapaksas] promised national security, but fail to realise that a crucial component of national security is food security. And that is in complete disarray now. This is bound to have a political cost.”
What began as a farmers’ problem is already manifesting as a problem of all consumers – seen in the soaring costs of rice and vegetables, and the fear of an imminent shortage, he pointed out. “LPG cylinders are in short supply, or are exploding,” he said, referring to a series of recent accidents amid shortage. “People are just frustrated.”
It was this frustration that Jayatilleka voiced, while swearing never to vote for the Rajapaksas again. “It is time to weed out the old crop of politicians; they don’t care about us,” he said. The fertilizer controversy has upset his decades-old voting reflex, while also making him averse to “all politicians — those in government, those in opposition, everyone.”
The sentiment is not insignificant, just two years into President Gotabaya’s term. Coming from a senior citizen in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala Buddhist heartland — no less than Prime Minister Mahinda’s own constituency — it begs the question of whether the sheen of the Rajapaksa brand might be wearing off now.
On the one hand, it is evident that the Rajapaksa administration’s biggest slip yet was not on account of a challenge thrown by the political opposition or due to pressure from the international community. It was its own short-sighted policy change that is proving a costly political error. On the other, with no imminent election or formidable opposition – the ruling coalition has a two-thirds majority in Parliament – it is difficult to see what might come of the disillusionment voiced by traditional supporters.
Although vehement in their condemnation of the government’s fertilizer policy dilemma, farmers are barely preoccupied with its political implication now. They have more pressing concerns like the next harvest, and what that could mean to their families’ three meals in the coming year. “My father was a farmer. I am 65, and I have grown food all my working life. I never thought I would be facing a food shortage at home,” Sylvester said.
The National Statistical Office (NSO) released the second quarter gross value added (GVA) and gross domestic product (GDP) numbers on November 30, 2021, indicating the pace of economic recovery in India after the two COVID-19 waves. The contraction was highest in the first quarter of 2020-21, gradually easing off in the subsequent quarters. The resultant base effect was the strongest in the first quarter of 2021-22 as reflected in real GDP and GVA growth rates of 20.1% and 18.8%, respectively. The base effect weakened in the second quarter with GDP and GVA growth rates at 8.4% and 8.5%, respectively. Considering these two quarters together, the real GVA for the first half of 2021-22 at Rs. 63.4 lakh crore has remained below the level in the first half of 2019-20 at Rs. 65.8 lakh crore by (-)3.7%. This difference is even larger for GDP which at the end of first half of 2021-22 stood at Rs. 68.1 lakh crore, which is (-) 4.4% below the corresponding level of GDP at Rs. 71.3 lakh crore in 2019-20. As the base effect weakens in the third and fourth quarters of 2021-22, a strong growth momentum would be needed to ensure that at the end of this fiscal year, in terms of magnitude, GVA and GDP in real terms exceed their corresponding pre-COVID-19 levels of 2019-20.
Sectors that improved
In the first half of 2021-22, on the output side, only four of the eight GVA sectors have exceeded their corresponding 2019-20 levels. These are agriculture; electricity, gas, et al.; mining and quarrying; and public administration, defence and other services. Of these, the first and second quarter growth of public administration, defence and other services was at 5.8% and 17.4%, respectively. The upsurge in the growth of this sector in the second quarter of 2021-22 reflects the Central government’s emphasis on capital expenditure which started gathering momentum in recent months. The Central government capital expenditure grew by 38.3% during the first half of 2021-22. This emphasis on government investment expenditure, supplemented by recovery of private investment expenditure, resulted in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) showing a positive growth of 1.5% in the second quarter of 2021-22 over its corresponding level in 2019-20. However, even in this case, the level of GFCF in the first half of 2021-22 has remained below its corresponding level in 2019-20 by a margin of Rs. 1.93 lakh crore. Overall, domestic demand including private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) in the first half of 2021-22 remains below its corresponding level in 2019-20 by nearly Rs. 5.5 lakh crore. This indicates that investment as well as consumption demand have to pick up strongly in the remaining two quarters to ensure that the economy emerges on the positive side at the end of 2021-22 as compared to its pre-COVID-19 level. Private consumption demand would pick up with employment and income growth, especially in the small and medium sectors, which is linked to the recovery in the services sectors, particularly the trade, hotels et al. sector. This may happen in the second half of 2021-22 provided economic activities are not beset again by COVID-19’s new strain, Omicron.
Annual growth prospects
To realise the projected annual growth at 9.5% for 2021-22 given both by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we require a growth of 6.2% in the second half of 2021-22. This will have to be achieved even as the base effect weakens in the third and fourth quarters since GDP growth rate in these quarters of 2020-21 was at 0.5% and 1.6%, respectively. Thus, achieving the projected growth rate of 9.5% is going to be a big challenge. Had the growth rate of the second quarter been higher, the task would have been easier. If, in fact, we achieve the growth rate 9.5% in 2021-22, we can be confident that 2022-23 will see a growth rate of 6% to 7%.
The policy instrument for achieving a higher growth may have to be a strong fiscal support in the form of government capital expenditure. This is currently being facilitated by the buoyant Centre’s gross tax revenues. The Centre’s gross tax revenues have shown an unprecedented growth rate of 64.2% and a buoyancy of 2.7 in the first half of 2021-22. The nominal GDP growth at 23.9% and the implicit price deflator-based inflation at 9.0% in H₁FY22 is the key reason for the buoyant tax revenues. The fiscal deficit target of 6.8% may come under pressure because of upward revisions in some expenditure items such as food and fertilizer subsidies, MGNREGA and extension of the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana along with some shortfall in non-tax and non-debt capital receipts. In spite of these pressures, it would be advisable for the Centre to continue infrastructure spending. The Centre’s incentivisation of state capital expenditure through additional borrowing limits would also help in this regard. According to available information, 11 States in the first quarter and seven States in the second quarter qualified for the release of the additional tranche under this window. Even as Central and State capital expenditures gather momentum, high frequency indicators reflect an ongoing pick-up in private sector economic activities.
High frequency indicators
PMI manufacturing increased to a 10-month high of 57.6 in November 2021, increasing from 55.9 in October 2021. PMI services remained high at 58.1 in November 2021, its second-highest level since July 2011. Gross GST collections at Rs. 1.31 lakh crore remained above the benchmark of Rs. 1 lakh crore for the fifth consecutive month in November 2021. Core IIP growth increased to 7.5% in October 2021 from 4.4% in September 2021. Compared to its October 2019 value, core IIP showed a growth of 7.0% in October 2021. Merchandise exports growth was at 26.5% in November 2021 and 43.0% in October 2021 as compared to the corresponding month of the previous year. When compared to 2019 levels, exports grew by 35.9% in October and 15.9% in November 2021, reflecting robust external demand.
An important difference between 2019-20 and 2021-22 arises from the performance of the Centre’s gross tax revenues (GTR). The growth in the Centre’s GTR in the first half of 2019-20 was at 1.5% and there was a contraction of (-)3.4% for the year as a whole. In the face of such weak revenues, the Central government could not mount a meaningful fiscal stimulus in 2019-20 even as real GDP growth fell to 4.0%. In contrast, the government is in a significantly stronger position in 2021-22 since the growth in GTR in the first half is 64.2% and the full year growth is expected to be quite robust. Thus, the key to attaining a 9.5% real GDP annual growth in 2021-22 lies in the government’s ongoing emphasis on infrastructure spending as reflected in government’s capital expenditure. This is also seen in the high real growth in public administration, defence and other services of 17.4% in the second quarter of 2021-22. It is imperative that this momentum is sustained in the remaining part of the fiscal year.
C. Rangarajan is former Chairman, Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council and Former Governor, Reserve Bank of India. D.K. Srivastava is Chief Policy Advisor, EY India and former Director, Madras School of Economics. Views are personal
While effective and meaningful access to the police is important for all Indian citizens, it is doubly so for persons with disabilities. Their disability exposes them to heightened risk of violence. As the Supreme Court noted in a case concerning the rape of a blind Scheduled Caste woman earlier this year (Patan Jamal Vali v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh), “as the facts of this case make painfully clear, women with disabilities, who inhabit a world designed for the able-bodied, are often perceived as ‘soft targets’ and ‘easy victims’ for the commission of sexual violence.”
Against this backdrop, the Draft Accessibility Standards/Guidelines recently released by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for built infrastructure under its purview (police stations, prisons and disaster mitigation centres) and services associated with them assume significance. The Standards recognise that these spaces and services must be barrier-free by design, for persons with disabilities to fully and effectively enjoy their rights equally with others. Unfortunately, however, the Standards are not in conformity with a rights-based understanding of disability when they state that accessibility is society’s “social responsibility” towards the “differently abled”. This understanding is flawed as accessibility is in fact a legal entitlement that inheres in the disabled as rights-bearing citizens.
Steps in the right direction
The Standards set out models for building new police stations as well as improving upon existing police stations and prisons that are modern, gender sensitive and accessible. On the positive side, the Standards speak to the need to make the websites and institutional social networks of police stations accessible, ensuring that persons with disabilities accused of committing any crimes are treated appropriately, having disabled-friendly entrances to police stations and disabled-friendly toilets.
Interestingly, the Standards state that the police staff on civil duty could be persons with disabilities. This is inconsistent with the Office Memorandum issued by the Department of Empowerment for Persons with Disabilities on August 18, 2021, according to which the Centre has exempted posts in the Indian Police Service; the Delhi, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Lakshdweep, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli Police Service; as well as the Indian Railway Protection Force Service from the mandated 4% reservation for persons with disabilities in government jobs. Even as the Central Government is committed to creating a more disabled-friendly police service through the issuance of these standards, it has foreclosed the possibility of the disabled being part of the police force. A police force that does not have adequate representation of people with disabilities can scarcely be inclusive towards them.
The Standards further highlight the distinctly disadvantageous position of persons with disabilities, especially women, children and persons with psycho-social disabilities, during natural disasters. Acknowledging that persons with disabilities must receive equal protection as others in such situations, the Standards provide direction on disability inclusion in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery efforts. They also stress on disability inclusive training for persons involved in disaster relief activities, data aggregation, use of information and communication technology (ICT) and enforcing accessible infrastructure models for schools, hospitals and shelters following the principle of universal design.
Moreover, the Standards introduce accessibility norms for services associated with police stations and prisons. These norms promote the use of ICTs to facilitate communication, development of police websites, app-based services for filing complaints, making enquiries, etc., as well as encouraging the use of sign language, communication systems such as Braille, images for persons with psycho-social disabilities, and other augmentative and alternative modes of communication.
Inadequate in certain aspects
Equally, however, the Standards are also inadequate in some key ways. First, the cover letter to the Standards, containing such crucial details as the coordinates of the competent official to whom public comments are to be sent and the last date of submission, is embedded in an image. Consequently, a screen reader (the software used by the blind to access the computer) cannot make out the text.
Second, the Standards call for the deployment of directional signage regarding accessibility features in the MHA’s physical infrastructure as well as to indicate the location of accessible toilets. However, they do not require that such signage itself be accessible to the visually challenged, such as through auditory means.
Third, the Standards characterise several reasonable accommodations that are necessary for the disabled as being merely recommendatory. These include having trained police personnel in every police station to assist persons with disabilities and placing beepers at all entrances to enable the visually challenged/blind to locate themselves. Just as posting signs for the benefit of the able-bodied is not optional, it is difficult to understand why placing beepers for the benefit of the visually challenged should be.
Finally, in the case ofPatan Jamal Vali, the Court suggested connecting special educators and interpreters with police stations to operationalise the reasonable accommodations embodied in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013. It further recommended setting up a database in every police station of such educators, interpreters and legal aid providers to facilitate easy access and coordination. While the standards do require developing a mechanism to provide human assistance to the disabled such as sign language interpreters, they are short on specifics on this count.
In sum, the Standards, when enacted into law, will mark a huge step forward in making our law enforcement apparatus more disabled-friendly. Bolstering the Standards further, by incorporating the suggestions flowing from well- thought-out public comments, will take us closer to the aim of ensuring that India’s disabled citizens truly have the police they deserve.
Rahul Bajaj and Damini Ghosh are Senior Resident Fellows at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy
Days after meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Delhi, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a summit via video conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While the two meetings may have focused on bilateral issues, the conversations appear to have overlapped in unusual ways. According to a senior Kremlin official, after discussing with Mr. Modi India’s problems with Chinese aggression, which were raised publicly during the visit by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Mr. Putin “briefed” Mr. Xi on his talks in Delhi. The official then indicated that a trilateral summit of the leaders of Russia, India and China (RIC) could be held in the near future, which would pick up on the Modi-Putin-Xi conversation during an RIC summit on the sidelines of the Osaka G-20 summit in 2019. However, much has occurred between that summit and today. China’s aggression at the Line of Actual Control has dented hopes of peaceful coexistence and growth between the neighbours that had been outlined during the RIC as well as the Modi-Xi Mamallapuram summit, when the leaders last met face to face. Since April 2020, the two leaders have not spoken directly even once, and while they have attended the same multilateral summits (BRICS, SCO, G-20, etc.), it would be hard to see them engaging in a face-to-face format unless the situation at the LAC considerably eases. In addition, the RIC summit should not be held before promises made by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in meetings with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar are fulfilled.
While India-Russia defence and bilateral ties have considerably strengthened, especially after the Modi government’s decision to go ahead with its purchase of the S-400 missile defence systems despite the U.S. threat of sanctions, New Delhi must tread cautiously in its trilateral and multilateral cooperation with Moscow and any hint that Russia could play a facilitator of talks with China must be scrutinised closely. Russia and China have consolidated their support for each other in the face of U.S. concerns over Russian action against Ukraine and Chinese action on Taiwan. Russia is also deeply dependent on Chinese investment, particularly in the 30-year $400 billion gas pipeline. On Afghanistan, Russia has shown that it was prepared to cut India out of negotiations held by the Troika plus group with the U.S., China and Pakistan. Any expectation that Mr. Putin could play “honest broker” between Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi must take these factors into account. While India must continue to walk the tightrope between Moscow and Washington, and its partners in Eurasia versus those in the Indo-Pacific, it needs to disentangle these threads from the very potent threat it faces directly and bilaterally from its northern neighbour, where it has little choice but to follow an independent path.
The Union Cabinet’s decision this week to set aside Rs. 76,000 crore for supporting the development of a ‘semiconductors and display manufacturing ecosystem’ is a belated but welcome acknowledgment of the strategic significance of integrated circuits, or chips, to a modern economy. The basic building blocks that serve as the heart and brain of all modern electronics and information and communications technology products, the ubiquitous chips are now an integral part of contemporary automobiles, household gadgets such as refrigerators, and essential medical devices such as ECG machines. The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically thrown into sharp relief the vulnerability that a range of manufacturing industries and, by extension, national economies are exposed to in the face of disruptions in the supply of these vital semiconductors. The pandemic-driven push to take sizeable parts of daily economic and essential activity online, or at least digitally enable them, has also highlighted the centrality of the chip-powered computers and smartphones in people’s lives. With the bulk of semiconductor manufacturing and supply capability concentrated in a handful of countries including Taiwan, South Korea, U.S., Japan and, more recently, China, governments worldwide have realised that it is in the national interest to treat chip manufacturing as a strategic imperative. The Cabinet decision to simultaneously establish an India Semiconductor Mission helmed by ‘global industry experts’ to drive long-term strategies for the sustainable development of the chip and display industry is therefore a step in the right direction.
The challenge ahead, however, is fairly daunting. For one, the level of fiscal support currently envisioned is minuscule when one considers the scale of investments typically required to set up manufacturing capacities in the various sub sectors of the semiconductor industry. A semiconductor fabrication facility, or fab, can cost multiples of a billion dollars to set up even on a relatively small scale and lagging by a generation or two behind the latest in technology. Even granting that India’s Production Linked Incentive scheme intends to give only 50% of the cost of setting up at least two greenfield semiconductor fabs by way of fiscal support, not much of the current scheme outlay of approximately $10 billion is likely to be left to support other elements including display fabs, packaging and testing facilities, and chip design centres. Chip fabs are also very thirsty units requiring millions of litres of clean water and extremely stable power supply. It may be best if the new mission focuses fiscal support, for now, on other parts of the chip-making chain including design, where surely India already has considerable talent and experience.
External Affairs Minister P V Narasimha Rao informed Parliament that “although fairly wide differences” persisted between India and China on the border question, there was hope of a better understanding on each other’s positions. Making a statement on the official-level talks between the two countries last week, Rao said it was a positive step. Rao reiterated that it was the desire of the government to normalise relations fully with China. “This is only possible when we bring about a complete resolution of our problems as well as a stable relationship in all fields.” Rao also explained India’s position on the Polish crisis and the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel. The Polish government-Solidarity confrontation leading to the clamping of martial law in that country was described as “primarily the concern of its government and people”.
Communists meet
The communist leaders of eastern Europe will reportedly gather in the Soviet capital this week for an informal summit conference that will include talks on Poland. The Polish leader, Gener Wojciech Jaruzelski was considered a likely absentee, but all other communist chiefs were expected. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev’s 75th birthday on Saturday, already being celebrated as a major event with flowery tributes filling the pages of the Soviet press, is the main reason for the other party leaders’ visits. But with the world’s attention focussed on Poland, analysts said it was impossible that the communist elite could pass up a chance to discuss their options in that nation.
Bihar strike
While the Bihar government is talking in terms of disciplinary action against the six lakh striking non-gazetted employees and teachers, the associations declared they would not be “cowed down by the provocative steps”.
There is no immediate threat to India from a World Trade Organisation (WTO) panel’s report recommending withdrawal of its subsidies on exports. The reason is that these subsidies — amounting to Rs 10,448 per tonne in the 2019-20 sugar years (October-September) and Rs 6,000 per tonne for 2020-21 (slashed to Rs 4,000/tonne in May) — are no longer in place. While they enabled exports of 5.96 million tonnes (mt) and 7.07 mt in these two years, high global prices have ensured continued shipments even without subsidy. Indian mills have already contracted some 3.5 mt of exports and may well do 6 mt-plus in 2020-21. To that extent, the WTO panel’s finding, that India’s so-called lump-sum assistance for exports constitutes “prohibited subsidies”, is like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.
Thanks to the record exports of the last two years, Indian mills have started the new sugar year with stocks of 8.3 mt, against 14.5 mt in October 2019. With an estimated production of 30.5 mt, domestic consumption of 26.5 mt and exports of 6 mt, they should close with stocks of 6.3 mt. That level, equivalent to less than three months’ consumption, would be comfortable from the standpoint of the industry. It would be so for consumers, too, given that factories usually commence crushing operations from early November. The credit for the whittling down of stocks goes to exports and also the Centre’s biofuels programme. The target of 10 per cent average ethanol blending in petrol is set to be achieved, with 3.4 mt of sugar equivalent getting diverted to ethanol in 2021-22, compared to 2.1 mt and 0.8 mt in the preceding two years.
More than the pronouncement on export subsidies, it is the WTO panel’s findings about India’s domestic support to sugarcane growers — its allegedly exceeding the permitted 10 per cent level of total crop value — that has profound implications. The panel’s estimates of the country’s aggregate measure of support to cane farmers, at Rs 1,11,106.583 crore in 2018-19, being way above the permitted Rs 12,304.90 crore, need to be challenged. When cane is being bought at minimum support price (MSP) by mills, not government, how can such payments constitute “market price support”? MSP is, in any case, a matter of domestic policy. To give it or not to, is for India to decide.
This editorial first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘Not so sweet’.
It has neither the elegance of a Negroni, nor the brightness of a Mojito, but there’s something about the Bloody Mary. There’s no other way to explain the perennial popularity of this cocktail that once went by the decidedly grimmer name of Bucket of Blood (or so goes one story). This combination of vodka and tomato juice turned 100 this year, according to Harry’s New York Bar in Paris, which claims to be Bloody Mary’s birthplace. But, like the variations on this drink — with or without tabasco, bits of bacon and shrimp, celery salt, olive juice — stories about its origins are numerous.
Indeed, the lore that surrounds the Bloody Mary would seem quite out of proportion with the modesty of its ingredients and its appearance which, even when jazzed up with a salted rim or a celery stick, is not greatly appetising. Also consider the fact that, save for vodka, all the ingredients that go into its making are also used to make soup or sauce, and the Bloody Mary’s legions of fans make even less sense.
But, have a sip. First, the combination of vodka with tomato juice packs a punch, especially with the added heat of tabasco and black pepper. This has made the drink a popular “hair-of-the-dog” remedy. Combined with its heartiness, this makes the Bloody Mary a great option for a guilt-free brunch or lunch drink. Best of all, the Bloody Mary is an incredibly forgiving, fuss-free drink. Have it at a swanky bar, made with the best quality vodka, or rustle it up at home with one that tastes and smells like paint thinner — Bloody Mary will be there with you, through it all.
This editorial first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘Something about Mary’.
A constitutional democracy is held up as much by its individual and separate institutions as by the terms of their relationship with each other. The respect and dignity they give to, and demand from one another, may sometimes be intangible, but is nevertheless crucial. In India, the Election Commission discharges its constitutional mandate of conducting free and fair elections but it does more than just that. It also forms the core of a sprawling electoral system in which, except the odd aberration, even those who lose an election by a hair’s breadth seldom question the results, or the credibility of the poll monitor. The EC’s reputation for independence and fairness is not just its individual attribute, but also forms an inalienable part of the system’s legitimacy, the people’s trust in supervisory institutions, as winners and losers come and go. The EC, therefore, must especially be accorded its due dignity and respect — much depends on it. That is why there is reason to pause on the wording of a letter from an official of the law ministry to the poll panel last month. As this newspaper has revealed, it effectively summoned the CEC to a meeting chaired by an official in the PMO. There is reason, also, to ask why, after the CEC had made known his “displeasure” at the tone of the letter, and stayed away from the meeting, all three election commissioners bent immediately thereafter, joining an “informal interaction” with the PMO official. Questions must be asked — of the PMO, law ministry and the EC — not because any meeting between them is controversial, but because the lack of form and propriety in the entire exchange matters. It speaks of larger and disquieting things.
The strength of institutions, or the balance between them, is a changeable thing, varying and wavering over time. The EC was not always the formidable body that it is today. Much of the ground for its current standing was laid by the leadership of TN Seshan, whose tenure in the 1990s was widely seen to rouse a sleepy institution. CEC Seshan gave new force to the EC’s role of upholding the rules of the game, including the Model Code of Conduct. Similarly, the equilibrium between institutions has not remained the same. In fact, ever since a single party won a majority at the Centre after over two decades in 2014, there has been mounting pressure on unelected institutions to bend and bow to the elected and their “mandate”. The EC has not always stepped up to the watchdog’s rising challenge. Several decisions, from the delay in announcing the election schedule in Gujarat, 2017, to the prevarication in banning campaign activity amid the second Covid surge in West Bengal this year, were seen to favour the Centre’s ruling establishment.
The EC must urgently dispel the impression of not being able to keep an aggressive Executive at arm’s length, of any weakness in the knees. At the very least, the CEC should ask the Law Ministry to regret on record and withdraw the note in question. The government must also recognise that undermining the EC ends up weakening the very system it draws its strength from. In the run-up to the coming round of assembly polls, the red lines will need to be redrawn, with a renewed firmness. The EC will be closely watched.
This editorial first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘Buckling’.
The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 is striking for its imagination of what India’s data regulation architecture should look like. It reaffirms the core components (some of them problematic) of the Bill and fine-tunes many aspects. But it has also used the Bill to paint a broader canvas of data regulation for India. Some of these proposals will require greater deliberation in and outside Parliament.
First, the JPC has provided a rationale for regulation more firmly grounded in sovereign interests than has been articulated yet. With respect to the issue of data localisation, for example, the JPC has argued for further procedural constraints on the free flow of data on the basis of security interests. The text proposed by the JPC states that all contracts enabling businesses to take sensitive personal data out of India’s borders will now need the approval of the central government in addition to the data protection regulator (DPA). The original draft only required the DPA’s approval. The report also proposes requirements that limit the sharing of data processed outside with a third country without prior government approval.
The JPC has doubled down on the rationale of data localisation as an instrument for developing local innovation, AI eco-systems, and for ensuring proper taxation of digital companies. In addition, it has used the discussion on security considerations advanced for localisation to argue for the need to develop local financial systems that reduce dependency on existing mechanisms like SWIFT. While the proposed changes to the Bill do not reflect this concern, it is significant that the discussions of the JPC paint a broader canvas of self-reliance than just localisation. Indigenisation may be a more appropriate term to describe the broader thrust of the report’s discussions on these issues.
Second, the report increases the scope of regulation of the Bill. It proposes in clear terms, the need to end the exemptions that social media platforms enjoy from liability based on their status as “intermediaries” under existing law. Its proposal to regulate social media platforms as significant data fiduciaries under the Bill will not make such companies liable for content by itself. The relevant clause requires only mandatory registration in India. However, the related discussion argues that these businesses can no longer be treated as “intermediaries”, but as platforms instead. The shift in semantics strikes a nail in the coffin of the normative concept of giving wide leeway to social media platforms.
Whether these businesses deserve to be treated as intermediaries or platforms would become an empirical question under the JPC’s proposal, not a normative one. Some would argue, as the report does, that the market realities have changed and platforms no longer function the way “intermediaries” are supposed to. Regardless of where one falls on this debate, this proposal would herald a significant exercise of sovereign regulatory power over businesses that some argue are the last bastions of free speech.
On many other aspects of the Bill, the JPC has adopted a workman-like approach. Clauses that proposed to exempt small businesses from certain parts of the Bill have been modified. While the earlier provision sought to exempt “manual processing”, the report proposes a more sensible idea of exempting non-automated processing. Simple lists of names stored on text documents for convenience would now thankfully go out of the ambit of this law, providing necessary leeway to small businesses. This narrows down the focus of the Bill to data-processing activities that originally motivated the need for data protection — the use of big data, automated decision-making, and hard to understand algorithms.
Similarly, the Bill narrows down the scope for employers accessing employee personal data, proposes a simpler mechanism to safeguard children’s data, and provides a timeline of implementation for different parts of the Bill. The most significant aspect of this implementation exercise will, of course, be the creation of the Data Protection Authority — the over-arching regulator proposed to oversee data protection.
On some very contentious aspects of the Bill, however, the report is unfortunately modest. The Bill presented in Parliament gives the central government the power to exempt its agencies from the ambit of the data protection regulation. The text of the modifications proposed in the report do modify this proposal, but in a way that may not amount to much. The report proposes that any procedure followed by such agencies will have to be a “just, fair, reasonable and proportionate procedure”. While this encapsulates the checks laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgment on the right to privacy, it leaves it to the executive to figure out what just, fair, reasonable and proportionate ought to mean. A hard-headed executive may well argue that its existing procedures meet all these tests.
The report takes a similar approach to the provision that enables the central government to require businesses to hand over non-personal data to it. The original provision provided wide leeway to the government regarding the circumstances in which it could exercise this power, and provided no framework for compensating businesses who would have to hand over such data. This discretionary largesse persists in the JPC’s report as well.
Many years of privacy activism rooted in scepticism of state power have ironically led us to this expansion of state power in the domain of privacy. In the final analysis, state power has increased. While some of this is necessary and appropriate, state accountability in matters of privacy continues to elude us. The JPC’s report only reaffirms this fact.
This column first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘Shielding the state’. The writer is fellow and associate research director in Carnegie India. Views are personal
Kabir’s ghost is still alive in the lanes of Kashi, where pilgrims from all over swirl in, searching for moksha, freedom from all earthly ties. Swallowed up again and again by totalitarian regimes, Kashi still knows how to reflect upon the deeper ironies of the human situation.
The humble weaver Kabir’s cryptic, profound, but irreverent verses mirror Kashi’s soul as no historian can. With utter love and irreverence known only to those who fear none, Kabir sings of human love and the utter degradation of the system humans surround themselves with. No one knows who Kabir’s parents were. His freedom from the past and any known caste or religion make him a perfect fit for Kashi. “Jo Kabira Kashi marey, Ramhin kaun nihora?” (If Kabir will seek to die in Kashi, who’ll look after the true Lord?) he asks, tongue in cheek, of the rich and famous. His reasoning is strictly defined by the authoritarian and tyrannical situation a low-caste man like him finds himself in.
Kabir’s Kashi was anything but provincial. It had been the prosperous capital of Kosala, was still a rich international hub of trade linking the lands across the Khyber Pass to the rich eastern provinces of India and known for its fine silks and spun cotton. Kashi was also a cultured seat of learning and host to some of the best artists, artisans and musicians north of the Vindhyas. Even Kashi’s courtesans and thugs were considered some of the best in their respective professions.
On December 13, which was also the anniversary of an awful terrorist attack on independent India’s Parliament, a spectacular event was mounted in Kashi. Its main objective was to showcase the spruced-up version of the famous Kashi Vishwanath temple as a symbol of Hindus’ determination to crush memories of its repeated desecration by non-Hindu invaders. The televised speech by the prime minister reminded the audiences of the marauding armies of emperor Aurangzeb, his Hindu challenger Shivaji and its rebuilding, over a century later, by a Maratha queen. The speech seemed aimed almost at a reversal of time, harking back to the medieval ages.
Under the harsh, myriad-coloured light beams, chants and ringing of bells, Kashi seemed like some sort of a set for a Bollywood historical. It was hard to believe it was once a dramatic and vociferous seat of multiple languages, multiple faiths and great learning. Surrounded by men carrying outsize dumroos, loud slogans of “Har Har Mahadev” along with “Jai Shri Ram”, showering of petals and a great display of ritualistic worship, the old Kashi faded slowly. Kashi, the eternal host to higher learning and philosophical dissension, the seat of the Naga and Yaksha deities, coexisting peacefully with the Vedic and post-Vedic pantheon of gods, of great dissenters and heretics, Yogis, Nath, Siddha and Aghorpanthis, was being fitted, it appeared, into a new definition of politically honed, unsmiling and aggressive Hindutva.
Some four centuries after Kabir, Bhartendu Harishchandra, another poet from a rich family of silk traders of Kashi, continued to carry on the typical tradition of Kashi: A firm rejection of convention and a constant search for true change. His verses from a little-known play of his, Prem Jogini, swam into my mind while watching the grand spectacle at the Kashi Vishwanath Dham unfold on my TV screen: Dekhi tumhri Kashi logo, dekhi tumhri Kashi/ Jahan virajein Vishwanath Vishweshwar Avinashi/ Adhi Kashi randi, mundi, bhanderiya, bahman aur sanyasi… (Folks, I’ve seen your Kashi, where the Lord of the Universe resides/ However half your city is full of courtesans, tonsured holy men, clowns, and sanyasins).
Even as the British empire flourished all around, Kashi had kept celebrating its culture by injecting a notion of comedy to burst the ballooning egos of upper-caste, upper-class society, undermining the grand seriousness in which they wrapped themselves. “Kahin bainganwali miley toh bula dena…”, Bhartendu of Kashi sang famously, standing on a city bridge with a priceless heirloom pearl dangling from one ear and a long aubergine from the other. It was said that on the day of the poet’s last journey, courtesans in the city, who sang what he wrote, downed their shutters.
But it was also Bhartendu, who efficiently spruced up the version of official Hindi available in the Nagari script. He coined the term Nayi Hindi, and rooted for a multi-textured Hindi free of the Sanskritised Hindi of Varanasi Pandits and also the Khadi Boli into which four native colonial Bhakha Munshis (language clerics) had tied it up. It was he who allowed the common man’s Hindi to mingle, develop and run with Urdu and dialects like Braj Awadhi and Purabiya. From the speeches coming out of Kashi temple, it looked as though a century and a half later, political expediency and the advent of digital mass media is fast undoing the inclusive linguistic space Bhartendu had won for peoples’ Hindi. It figures. Language battles are now being fought not for literary reasons but to forge and feed a vast propaganda machine. This Hindi no longer needs actual lived human experience, but smart phrases like the ones Bollywood superheroes mouth and send the common folks into hysterical fits of clapping and yelling.
For one who really wishes to understand Kashi, writers and artists of Kashi still are the best bet. The kind of eccentric writers and artists who hung around the lanes and bylanes of Kashi since the last century: The bhang-loving writer of mystery novels, Devaki Nandan Khatri; the poet scion of a snuff trader’s family, Jaishankar Prasad; the sedate Urdu-Hindi writer Premchand, Pandit Lalmani Misra, Bismillah Khan, the tabla maestro Kishan Maharaj, the list is endless. This is a city that not only holds heated freewheeling discussions on subjects ranging from literature to food to types of intoxicants at local tea shops, but where, during the famous Budhwa Mangal, fair well-known courtesans once sang specially composed musical bandishes for their patrons in the police (like one Meer Rustam Ali or a bouncer named Data Ram Nagar). Frequent visitors like the aesthete Babu Bachchu Singh, by way of thanksgiving, created a whole garland of verses (Ashtottari Mala) naming all the major courtesans and female singers of Kashi. At heart, Kashi is an alchemical blending of dream and reality. An autonomous, often intoxicated, imagination creating a fakkad (free and autonomous) universe in which the real seems fantastic and the fantastic suddenly unmasks the real.
The age-old experience of Kashi, the scene of so many massacres, sectarian riots and colonial loot, has taught it not to worship at the temple of history or eulogise political leaders for long. It has a more clear-sighted picture of the future than the power seats in Delhi or Mumbai or Pune or Ahmedabad, intoxicated as they are with their own notions of India’s Hindu destiny. So far, Kashi’s cultural vitality has held out against all the marauding hordes of Delhi, bringing with them a loud cacophony of sounds and chants and sloganeering in the name of new gods. Let the hemp- and music-loving, free-roving ascetic Shiva help it survive the latest challenges to its soul.
This column first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘Dekhi tumhri Kashi logo, Dekhi tumhri Kashi’. The writer is former chairperson, Prasar Bharati
If all the world’s a stage on which Covid-19 has been the longest-running act in a hundred years, then the theatrical axiom about the unsustainability of two prima donnas in the same scene was bound to take effect. On December 12, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson bowed before Omicron and declared an “Omicron Emergency”, predicting a “tidal wave” of Omicron cases.
Johnson’s announcement was preceded by the publication of a not yet peer-reviewed modelling study by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). The model suggests that if additional control measures are not put in place in the UK, the Omicron variant may result in higher levels of cases and hospitalisations in the country than those seen during January 2021. In the most optimistic scenario, between December and April, there will be close to 25,000 deaths. If no measures are put in place, this number rises to 75,000. With immediate effect, the UK introduced booster doses for all eligible persons.
In the same announcement, Johnson also stated: “Some medical appointments are to be postponed to focus on boosters”. This could be the unfortunate scenario around the world. Due to a diversion of attention and resources towards Covid, a large number of people are deprived of treatment for existing medical illnesses. In the time since the detection of Omicron in Botswana, while there has been one known death due to Omicron, there have been three million deaths due to other preventable or treatable causes. These include cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhoea, AIDS and suicide. In the months to come, the indirect cost of Omicron may be higher than that of the variant itself.
According to the WHO, we are facing a large undercount of overall deaths directly and indirectly linked to Covid-19 with the latest Covid deaths reported to the global health agency already reaching 3.3 million, based on the excess mortality projections calculated for 2020. According to the WHO’s most recent malaria report, an estimated 241 million malaria infections and 6,27,000 malaria deaths occurred globally in 2020 — around 14 million more cases than in 2019, with 69,000 more fatalities. During the pandemic, almost two-thirds of excess fatalities were attributable to interruptions in malaria prevention, diagnosis and treatment.
Epidemiologists consulted by The Economist have developed a machine-learning algorithm that calculates the number of excess deaths in each nation on each day since the pandemic began. It is based on over 100 statistical variables as well as estimates of deaths in excess of official figures. Although the official mortality toll from Covid-19 is currently 5.3 million, the best estimate is that the true toll is 17.6 million. Based on the model, there is a 95 per cent possibility that the actual number of fatalities is between 11million and 20.5 million more than the official number. In India, the model indicates that 2.3 million people had died from Covid-19 by May 2021, compared with about 2,00,000 official deaths. These figures include unaccounted death due to Covid and mortality due to other causes.
Omicron is spreading relentlessly and is currently on every continent and in over 80 countries. It exacts a different toll across nations. For instance, for reasons that are unclear, patients in South Africa are recovering faster with milder illnesses than those in the UK. The WHO Director-General has warned that health authorities should no longer assume that Omicron is a mild variant.
To minimise the effects of Omicron we need to look not only at the low lethality of the variant, but at its larger impact on global health. Only by minimising hospitalisations due to Omicron can we focus on other illnesses. An increase in testing to identify and isolate individuals with Omicron for prompt treatment, increasing the capacity for genome sequencing within the nation and rapidly deploying booster vaccinations along with reiterating Covid appropriate behaviours are measures that will minimise the collateral damage caused by Omicron.
Genome surveillance tracks changes in the virus’s genetic make-up to examine how variations in the order of the nucleotides influence viral actions. We need to better understand Omicron’s transmissibility, severity, evasion of antibodies acquired from past infections or immunisation and the likely evasion of detection.
Vaccination continues to be the best global defence against SARS-CoV-2. To contain Omicron and its collateral damage, it is time to overhaul our vaccination policy, particularly with regard to booster doses in vulnerable populations such as immunocompromised patients and healthcare workers. Alternatively, we can consign our rapidly expiring stocks to the dustbin. This need not be a Shakespearean dramatic dilemma.
This column first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘On Omicron alert’. The writer is Director, Medical Research and Honorary Neuropsychiatrist at the Jaslok Hospital and Research Centre, Mumbai
In the run-up to the repeal of the three farm laws, the potential cost of MSP to the taxpayers became a matter of debate. Experts and agricultural economists quoted numbers that ranged from “trillions of rupees” in the coming decade, to “Rs 17 lakh crore” and “Rs 3.8 lakh crore”, to “Rs 36 thousand crore”. The enormity of the variance in estimates is astounding. There is also a dissonance between the NSSO data and the administrative data on the number of farmers who enjoy MSP. Further, there is no consensus on the formulae for the calculation of MSP. As a tax-paying citizen, it is troubling that the farm laws were passed without a consensus on these numbers. This only fortifies that the laws ought to have been sent to a select committee and debated in the House. That there is now a debate is a good sign.
In the writing on farm laws, there is consensus at least, on certain aspects. That agricultural reform is needed is beyond debate. That MSP has formed the mainstay of every committee and commission on agriculture reform, including the Swaminathan Commission. That India is an agri-surplus country. That domestic prices of agri-commodities are often higher than in the international market and therefore, there is a need to bring them down.
Cost reduction can happen either by creating efficiencies by plugging leakages or, by cost-cutting — including reducing farmers’ margins. The former is a long-term measure, and the latter, a short-term, drastic one. While I may be speculating, it is perhaps possible that the refusal to grant a legislative guarantee for MSP under the now-repealed farm laws may have been an indication of the latter. In the recently-reached understanding with the farmers, the government has agreed to constitute a committee on MSP. Hopefully, a formula can be arrived at by which costs of domestic agricultural produce can be reduced while ensuring a “remunerative price” for the farmers.
There is also a need to protect landholdings. Farmers’ fears in this regard are not exaggerated. Under the erstwhile laws, orders of payment made by an SDM/Collector could be recovered as “arrears of land revenue”. While agricultural lands were protected from such recovery, non-agricultural (immovable and movable) assets appeared to be fair game. Further, circumstances such as sustenance and payment of debts could force a farmer to sell their agricultural landholdings.
The government should also reconsider the dispute resolution mechanism provided in the erstwhile laws. In an MSP driven regime, the government is likely to be a party in any potential dispute. There will be a direct conflict of interest since the SDM/Collector is an arm of the government. Land records are within the jurisdiction of the patwari and tehsildar, who report to the SDM/Collector.
It would be advisable to think in terms of fast-track courts, and remove the provision of recovery through arrears of land revenue. It would also be advisable to have only one dispute resolution mechanism for all farm laws. In the event of a dispute covering more than one legislation, the issue of jurisdiction may first require resolution. There is also a need to think about making jurisdictions farmer-friendly, particularly in cases involving inter-state trade.
Given that the non-agricultural sector is hurting, there is an impulse to hasten reform in the name of “free markets”. While there is a Private Member’s Bill for the removal of “Socialist” from our Preamble, we still have a fair distance to traverse before we shed our welfare schemes. Before we ask our farmers to brave corporatisation without levelling the playing field, and callously requiring them to change their line of work if they don’t measure up, it might be worthwhile to consider: Are there enough jobs in the non-agricultural sector?
Perfunctory reforms and those that don’t work for all constituents — corporates as well as farmers — could have long-term deleterious effects for not only the agricultural sector, but the economy as a whole. Large-scale loss of landholdings could lead to their consolidation in the hands of a few. This could have the impact of turning the clock back, reminiscent of the Zamindari system. Worse, over-corporatisation without the creation of the requisite efficiencies could lead us to become heavily import-dependent, killing the benefits of the Green Revolution.
This column first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘Repeal and reform’. The writer is a practising advocate and the founder of JUSCONTRACTUS. She recognises the assistance of Raghav, a law student at the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi
On Friday morning, I woke up to a shocking headline in The Indian Express that the Chief Election Commissioner and two Election Commissioners were summoned by the PMO to attend a meeting with the Principal Secretary to the PM.
My memory went back to June 27, 2006, when I received a call from Pulok Chatterji, the Principal Secretary to the then PM, Manmohan Singh, informing me that I was being considered for appointment as EC and asking if I would accept it. Postings in the government are not optional; you are just appointed. Why this question, then? The reason was made clear by Chatterji. I will have to resign from the IAS.
Why was the appointment as EC conditional on my resignation from the IAS? Therein lies the important constitutional principle of distancing from the executive/government. Importantly, a wall was built between me and the PM who had appointed me.
As secretary to the Government of India, I was at the mercy of the PM, but as the EC, I was independent, neutral and distant from him. There was no question of his calling/summoning me to see him or with any request, let alone any direction or instruction. He could appoint me but could not order me, or remove me because of the constitutional scheme of things. An independent ECI is a gift of the Constitution to the nation. Free and fair and credible elections are sine qua non of the EC. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed this point, calling it part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
The PMO summoning or “inviting” not just the CEC but the full bench is in violation of the Constitution, irrespective of how important or urgent the issue. Let alone the PS to the PM, even the mighty PM himself cannot indulge in this unacceptable act. Can you imagine the PS to the PM issuing such summons to the CJI, to come with the full bench and attend a meeting with him on judicial reforms? He will be running for cover with a contempt of court case.
In my opinion, there is no difference between the neutrality and independence of the Supreme Court and ECI in this context. Both are independent constitutional authorities deliberately separated from the executive. Not to speak of summoning CEC and ECs, the PS to the PM cannot even call on the ECI without public knowledge of the meeting and what transpired in it. Politicians of all hues visit the ECI regularly with their petitions or complaints or suggestions, but with full transparency. I never met any of them alone, insisting on the presence of my two colleagues. Transparency is the key word here and perception of transparency is equally important.
Now, let us talk about the protocol, though that is secondary. The CEC is very high in the warrant of precedence — ninth, while the PS to PM is 23rd. How can such a high constitutional functionary be summoned to attend a meeting with an officer, howsoever high and mighty? The law ministry, which advises the government on all legal and constitutional matters, should have known better than convey that the PMO “expects” the CEC/ECs to attend.
I will recall another event. One day, I got a call from Veerappa Moily, the then law minister. “Mr Quraishi, you have been raising the issue of electoral reforms. Why don’t you come for a cup of tea in my office so that we discuss them?” I was in a fix, but only for six seconds. My going there would have been in violation of the spirit of the Constitution. I declined the invite. Instead, I requested the honourable minister: “Sir, thank you for your kind offer but why don’t you come over instead? I will introduce you to my brother commissioners and senior officers.” Gracious as he was, Moily came over the next day with four of his top officers. What was expected to be a short semi-courtesy meeting went on for over three hours. He asked whether we would like to join the ministry in hosting seven regional conferences to build a national consensus on electoral reforms. We readily agreed. When all regional meetings were over, the law minister came over to the Election Commission a second time to discuss the arrangements for the final national meeting.
Just as the reforms were getting materialised, Moily was shifted to another ministry and replaced by Salman Khurshid. I called up the PM to protest that just when Moily had built up a national consensus, you have transferred him, undoing all his and our work of six months. He said, “Don’t worry. Salman will carry forward this work. I will send him to you”. Note that the PM did not say, “go and meet him”.
Sure enough, Khurshid came to the Commission within a week and reassured us about taking the reforms forward. It’s a different matter that the proposal fizzled out. The important thing is that the Union law minister, who heads the ECI‘s administrative ministry and sanctions our budget, visited the ECI thrice in four months, in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution.
The initial reaction of horror and disgust of the CEC and ECs was most heartening and I salute them. But why they got persuaded to attend the “informal interaction” subsequently puzzles me. A meeting of the PS to the PM, formal or informal, online or in the PMO or ECI, just before elections raises unnecessary suspicions. Who knows what was discussed. The election dates? Or, something else?
This incident is a transgression that should not happen again. The distance of an arm’s length in interactions between institutions envisaged in the Constitution is sacrosanct. It should not only be maintained but also “seen” to be maintained.
This column first appeared in the print edition on December 18, 2021 under the title ‘The arm’s length test’. The writer is former Chief Election Commissioner of India and the author of An Undocumented Wonder — The Making of the Great Indian Election
Beginning 2022, the Delhi government will de-register diesel vehicles that have completed 10 years. The announcement is to give effect to an old order of the National Green Tribunal that was reiterated over three years ago by the Supreme Court. However, all is not lost for many vehicle owners who will be affected. If the vehicle is not over 15 years old, they can get a no-objection certificate from Delhi and have it registered in a neighbouring state. That may not help improve Delhi’s air quality but it serves to highlight the inconsistencies in the system to prevent air pollution.
An effective regulatory framework is sharply focussed on the overarching goal and the target that realises it. In the case of vehicular pollution, the only thing that matters is tailpipe emission, not the age of a vehicle. This should be the focus of the exercise to improve air quality in India. This step needs to be complemented by a national approach as state boundaries are irrelevant to the problem. A policy to tackle air quality that targets anything other than tailpipe emission will lead to distortions in the market for used vehicles without realising the overarching goal.
India notified a national vehicle scrapping policy in September. It relies on incentives to phase out old vehicles. GoI in Parliament has said that the policy’s aims include taking “unfit polluting vehicles” off the road. Mission creep of policy goals dilutes their efficacy. India does need to get unfit and polluting vehicles off its road. The best way to do it is to focus on tailpipe emissions and make it mandatory for older vehicles to undergo periodic fitness checks. None of these measures will work unless enforcement is strict. The approach, therefore, should be to tightly align a policy goal and the attendant measure.
Who vaccinated you? Who provides the bulk of the care if you are hospitalised? Nurses are the lynchpin of our healthcare system but they just don’t get their due. To illustrate, the Lok Sabha this year saw 31 questions about doctors, including about violence against them, their mental wellbeing, shortages and deaths. Nurses suffer similar issues but they merited a grand total of one question. We learn from the answer that India has 1.79 nurses per 1,000 population, 46% less than the WHO norm. Topped with 21 months of non-stop pandemic work, this is a recipe for exhaustion.
Burnout has caused serious nurse shortages in many parts of the world. In the US Kentucky’s governor has actually declared a nurse staffing emergency, with an action plan to increase the state’s nursing students rapidly. Rich countries also have the option of importing nurses, with India being a top global exporter. Unattractive working conditions at home mean our nurses migrate eagerly. That most of them are women is not incidental to why they are underpaid and undervalued.
Beds and doctors cannot treat patients by themselves. It follows that India must reform outdated systems of professional governance as also the Indian Nursing Council Act of 1947 and increase investments in nursing education. But young people will be incentivised to train for the profession only if they see it being treated respectfully and remunerated fairly.
The National Family Health Survey (NFHS)-5 data reveal positive trends in women’s educational attainments, reproductive health, sex ratio, financial inclusion, and access to mobile connectivity. But have these gains led to fundamental changes in women’s lives, social relationships, or choices?
For the first time, India’s overall sex ratio — women per 1,000 men — is now at a level seen in developed countries. For every 1,000 men, India has 1,020 women. But there is a cause for concern, too, since the sex ratio at birth (SRB) continues to be lower than what is naturally expected (952 girls per 1,000 men). This implies a continuing preference for a male child. SRB has only marginally improved from 919 in 2015-16 to 929 in 2019-21, while, in some states such as Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Odisha, there is a declining trend.
In terms of immovable property ownership, a touchstone of women’s economic empowerment, only 38% urban and 45.7% rural women own a house or land, alone or jointly, which was 38.4% in NFHS-4. However, by law, women and men, both, have an equal coparcenary right of inheritance. NFHS-5 indicates a nominal rise in married women’s decision-making power in household matters from 84% in NFHS-4 to 88.7%. However, a field study in 2017 in the rural and urban areas of West Bengal among married women (18–26 years) to assess their participation in household decisions noted that “although the NFHS-4 reported the decision-making power of women of about 84%, but, on ground, they don’t enjoy freedom up to that extent, as patriarchal norms over decision-making still continues, and hierarchies based on gender and generation play a dominant role”.
In a world where the internet wields enormous power, India has the widest gender gap in internet usage of 40.4% within the Asia-Pacific region. In urban India, 59% of women, while 64% of rural women cannot get online. Indian women endure triple handicaps: A rural-urban divide, income-based divide, and intra-household discrimination, which cut them from accessing online facilities of health care, education, job-seeking resources, banking, and other enabling platforms. In the rural hinterland, women’s mobile use is also considered “as a risk to her reputation and an interruption in her care giving responsibilities”. Nevertheless, NFHS-5 data revealed that 69.4% urban women now own a mobile phone for their use, compared to 46.6% for rural women, a rise from an average of 45.9% in 2015-16.
But, what rings an alarm bell is the revelation that a large percentage of women and men supported a husband’s right to physically assault his wife for reasons such as “disrespect to in-laws, neglecting the house or children, etc”, which reaffirm the prevalence of deep-rooted gender beliefs. Of the women surveyed, Telangana led with 83.8%, and among men, Karnataka surges ahead with 81.9% of the respondents saying that such behaviour is reasonable. The NFHS-5 data confirmed that about 29.3% ever-married women (18-49 years) experienced spousal violence, as against 31.2% in the previous report.
Recent studies in rural areas of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Odisha, and Uttarakhand, reveals women’s extreme social isolation, said that “such seclusion severely limit their access to crucial information about informal credit, insurance, jobs”. A World Bank research in 2020, among more than 600 married women in Jaunpur (UP), revealed that the “absence of social relationships, forces women to bank upon immediate family members, more so, in case of private and stigmatised topics like family planning, and mother-in-law’s influence carries an outsized weight”. Nonetheless, a survey among urban women (20-35 years), by a women’s social networking platform with about two million members, found that the majority “craved for selfhood, freedom of living life on their own terms, meaningful work, supportive relationship, travel and beyond, and considered marriage, motherhood as conventional expectations”.
Sadly, empowerment, a facilitating process for a woman to take charge of her life, and fulfill her desires and rights, is yet to take firm root in India. Inclusive policies or legal reforms alone will not change the status quo. A metamorphic change in attitude and mindset, which are deeply embedded in patriarchal traditions, both in women and men, can bring about fundamental transformation.
Archana Datta is former director-general, Doordarshan, and All India Radio; and former press secretary, President of India
The views expressed are personal
Earlier this month, the American President, Joe Biden, invited 110 world leaders to participate in a virtual summit to discuss democracy. The meeting was part of his attempt to stem the rise of authoritarianism and demonstrate that democracy does deliver. In his speech, Biden warned about the impact on democracy of “autocrats [who] justify their repressive policies as a more effective way to address today’s challenges.” Those autocrats draw much of their support from their countries’ inequality. The poor resent the gap between them and the prosperous.
In his speech, Prime Minister Narendra Modi described Indian democracy as “a story of unprecedented socio-economic inclusiveness in all spheres.” However, The World Inequality Report, published by The World Inequality Lab at the same time as the summit, described India as “a poor and very unequal country with an affluent elite.” According to the report, India is one of the most unequal countries in the world in economic terms. But two of its fellow BRICS countries — Brazil and South Africa — are found to be even more unequal.
Inequality is not just a problem for developing countries. The world’s two largest economies, the United States and China, suffer from it in roughly equal measure. America’s inequality is more significant than any of the other G7 rich nations, the world’s wealthiest nations, and the level of inequality is still rising. It is a significant cause for the rise of Trumpism. The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has warned that his country’s wealth gap is not only an economic but also a political issue, and could threaten the Communist Party’s legitimacy. In Britain, resentment at inequality fuelled Brexit, the campaign to leave Europe. Joblessness in the deprived areas of the north of England, traditionally almost a no-go area for Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party, won the last election for him.
For all the evidence that inequality is a threat to democracy, some economists argue it is not a priority. They say concern about inequality diverts attention from the prime task of ensuring that everyone is provided with the necessities for living a full life. There is a saying: “A rising tide lifts all boats.” But then why do some boats lift more slowly than others? The tide argument is that achieving Gross Domestic Product growth is the overriding necessity for economic development and that considerations like growth for whom and growth at what cost, for instance, environmental cost, are very much secondary issues.
What can be done about inequality? That seems to be a riddle no one has yet solved. America has tried the market and private ownership route. Although China has had decades of pro-market reforms, the State remains heavily involved in the economy. In both countries, severe inequality persists. Income redistribution through high taxes has been tried, but has been found to drive away investment, stifle growth, and encourage corruption. Welfare certainly helps those who receive it, but it does not make them more equal.
India would be a more equitable country if the barriers to social mobility erected by caste, religion, social status, ethnicity, and sex were lowered. Governments should realise their limitations in achieving this and seek advice and help from civil society. But recently India’s national security adviser said: “The new frontiers of war — what we call the fourth-generation warfare — is the civil society”. A leading member of civil society described this statement to me as “declaring war on your own people”. To protect democracy, the war should be against inequality. Biden’s summit has made it clear that democracy must be seen to deliver greater equality if it is to win the battle against authoritarianism.
The views expressed are personal
Should the Army apologise for killing 13 innocent fellow citizens in Nagaland? It’s a simple and blunt question, but it’s also a pertinent one. No matter what the background or the extenuating circumstances, this was a terrible mistake. That’s undeniable. Doesn’t that alone call for an apology?
The Army and the government have expressed regret, but is that sufficient? According to the dictionaries I’ve consulted, regret indicates sorrow that something has happened whilst an apology is an acceptance of a mistake. Colloquially there are many things one regrets but does not apologise for. For instance, you could regret not accepting an invitation, but you’re not apologising on that count. So when the people of Nagaland call for an apology they want more than an expression of sorrow. They want an acknowledgement of error, which is inherent when you say “I’m sorry”.
I’ve discussed this issue widely with several retired generals. They’re divided and, at times, pretty sharply. Let me see if I can explain their respective positions.
The view there’s no need for the Army to apologise is grounded in the belief the Army did not commit an offence. No doubt it was a mistake but committed in good faith and, probably, on the basis of faulty intelligence. In a disturbed area like Nagaland, with an ever-present threat of insurgency, such errors can happen. The important point is it wasn’t done deliberately. The Army did not knowingly kill innocent people.
To this argument is added the claim that an apology would be perceived as a sign of weakness that could embolden insurgents. It could affect the Army’s morale.
The opposite view that an apology is called for also, ironically, starts by distinguishing between a mistake and an offence. Where it differs is that it believes a mistake must be apologised for, particularly when innocent fellow citizens have been killed.
One of the generals I spoke to went a critical step further. The killing of seven civilians by soldiers who were trying to disperse the crowd was clearly excessive use of force. The soldiers should have fired to disable, not shoot to kill. This argument seems to convert a mistake into an offence and, therefore, provides clinching grounds for an apology.
The need to apologise is also corroborated by the belief that it will placate emotions in Nagaland. In other words, an apology is required both because it’s a moral imperative but also because it’s practically helpful.
Of course, the generals I spoke to viewed this matter from the perspective of the Army. I’m an Army son myself but I believe in a democracy there’s a more powerful reason why you must apologise when innocent citizens are killed.
You owe it to them. An apology cannot restore them to life, but it’s the least that’s expected. No institution is too powerful, too important, and too critical to be exempted. If anything, the opposite is true. The more important an organisation, the more necessary the apology.
For a moment, consider the opposite. It’s arrogance for the Army to believe it does not need to apologise. The people it killed were not criminals, insurgents or illegal migrants. They were fellow citizens.
Let me put it differently. A people’s Army — and that’s what ours is and wants to be recognised as — cannot kill its own people and get away with a mere expression of regret. That’s even more true of the government under whose command it operates. In a democracy, the people are the masters. They cannot be treated in a cavalier and casual way.
Finally, I don’t believe an apology should be viewed as weakness. It’s never easy to say sorry, even when necessary. An apology would enhance the Army’s stature. More importantly, it would restore the Army’s image in the eyes of the Nagas, where it has undoubtedly suffered. I know two weeks have passed and many want to forget this dreadful episode, but it’s never too late to say sorry. It’s also the best way of attempting closure.
Karan Thapar is the author of Devil’s Advocate: The Untold Story
The views expressed are personal
In June 2020, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi pointed out to his party workers that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was represented by 113 Other Backward Class (OBC), 43 Scheduled Tribe (ST) and 53 Scheduled Caste (SC) Members of Parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha (LS). In other words, 37.2% of the BJP’s Lok Sabha MPs were OBC, 14.1% ST and 17.4% SC. This meant that 68.9% (209) of its 303 Lok Sabha MPs elected in 2019 were non-upper-caste, and from castes that were traditionally considered lower down in the caste hierarchy. This is strikingly on par with the widely accepted national share of the population of these castes: 69.2%. If you leave seats reserved by law for SCs and STs alone, non-upper castes still accounted for almost 60% of BJP MPs from general constituencies. Within this, as many as 50% (113) were OBC.
The BJP has long been considered an upper-caste-dominated party by those who study it. However, new caste data that I have put together shows that research and scholarship on the party have lagged behind the party’s reality and the charge of upper-caste domination is difficult to sustain.
Modi’s 2020 statement flew in the face of assertions in recent political science research on India that claimed a significant resurgence of upper-caste dominance between 2009 and 2019 within the BJP. Most recently, the Paris-based Sciences Po’s Christophe Jaffrelot declared that the 2019 poll marked “the revenge of the upper-caste elite” aligned with the “BJP against the Dalits’ and OBCs’ assertiveness”. Jaffrelot and Gilles Vernier argued that ‘‘the last decade has seen the return of the savarn (upper caste) … and the erosion of OBC representation … along with the rise of the BJP.” In a recent caste profile of the 2019 LS, they claimed that the BJP’s dominance in Parliament was driven by 36.3 % upper-caste MPs and only 18.8 % OBCs (the lowest OBC representation in a major party, compared to the Congress and the regional parties).
It is impossible to square these two claims. To critically reassess the emerging picture, the Mehta-Singh Social Index, which I came up with along with Sanjeev Singh, set out to study the caste backgrounds of thousands of Uttar Pradesh (UP) politicians across five domains between 1991 and 2019. This was important because caste in UP is notoriously difficult to pinpoint by only looking at names on a list. Vermas from Noida are Gujjars (OBC), Vermas from eastern UP are SCs, Vermas from near Bulandshahar are Sunars (OBC), Vermas from the Awadh region are Kurmis (OBC), and those from eastern UP are Kayasths. Similarly, Chaudharys from Ballia are Yadavs, those from western UP are Jats, while those from four UP districts are Kurmis. Kushwahas can be both upper-caste Rajput or OBC. Rawats from Uttarakhand are Rajputs/Thakurs while Rawats from UP are Pasi Dalits (SCs). Likewise, Chandras can be SC or Thakur/Rajput. Tyagis in western UP are Brahmins, but some Tyagis in eastern UP are SC and some Tyagis from Meerut are Bhumihars. This is why a revisionist look at caste names was essential.
A closer examination of these caste names allied with the findings of the Mehta-Singh Index shed new light on the BJP’s social engineering experiments in UP between 2009 and 2019. There are five salient points.
One, the party systematically increased OBC representation in significant numbers at every level of political organisation: From district-level presidents to state unit leaders to the council of ministers to assembly and LS candidates. Two, OBCs became by far the single-most represented caste category in the BJP at every organisational level. Three, not only did the BJP systematically increase OBC representation, this expansion was primarily based on non-Yadav OBCs (over 20 sub-categories such as Kurmis, Jats, Sainis, Mauryas, etc). These castes did not have a similar representation in the previous OBC-dominated Akhilesh Yadav-led administration of the Samajwadi Party (SP), which was dominated by Yadavs.
Four, the BJP systematically increased SC representation, though to a lesser extent than OBCs. Again, it did so by focusing on non-Jatav SC sub-castes (over 17 sub-categories such as Pasis, Dhobis, Valmikis) that did not have such representation in the previous SC-led administration under Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)’s Mayawati where Jatavs were dominant. Five, this social engineering was done without losing the support of the upper castes.
Essentially, the BJP became far more representative of all castes in UP (barring Muslims) compared to its rivals. In the process, upper-caste dominance in the party was significantly reduced.
To give a bird’s eye view of the numbers, OBCs and SCs accounted for as many as 57.5% of the BJP’s UP LS candidates in the 2019 general election, 52.8% of its candidates in the 2017 assembly poll that it swept, 50% of its office-bearers in the state in 2020, 48.1% of UP chief minister Yogi Adityanath’s council of ministers and 35.6% of the BJP’s district-level presidents.
These numbers revealed by the Mehta-Singh Index show why it is misleading to characterise the new BJP under Modi and Amit Shah as a party dominated by upper-castes. It is quite the reverse. The BJP, between 2013 and 2019, saw a remaking of not only its social support base, but also of its internal organisational systems, with OBCs being given centre stage. In UP, a state where OBCs are 54.5% and SCs 20.7% of the population, the BJP was ahead of all other major political parties in providing proportional representation to candidates from these castes in the LS and Vidhan Sabha polls and inching closer towards this in other political structures. The BJP in UP, after 2013, put up significantly more OBCs as candidates than its political rivals: SP, BSP, and the Congress. It also gave them more space in its internal power structures in the state, radically redoing its organisational DNA.
To be sure, upper-castes, who account for about 24.2% of the population in UP, are still over-represented and remain integral to the party, but the proportion is much less than before. This caste mobilisation — without caste wars or confrontations — has brought the party’s composition closer to that of the overall population’s in UP than any of its rivals had managed. And its success may well rest on that.
Nalin Mehta is the author of the forthcoming book, The New BJP: Modi and the Making of the World’s Largest Political Party
The views expressed are personal